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Peters v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.
377 N.W.2d 774
Mich.
1985
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*1 594 423 v BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY PETERS MICHIGAN MOTORSCORPORATION MORRISH v GENERAL (Cаlendar 13, 4, 71928, Argued Nos. 71931. June Docket Nos. 14). 22, November 1985. Decided compensation psychi- for a Peters awarded workers’ Patricia was disability of as a the course her atric telephone suffered Telephone Company. operator Michigan for the Bell Compensation Appeal Court Board affirmed. The The Workers’ Maher, P.J., Appeals, Hood, and V. J. Brennan R. M. of JJ., 68071). (Docket appeal to No. denied the defendant leave appeals. defendant The compensation Margaret a E. was workers’ for Morrish denied job related to her which she' claimed was hearing Corporation. A Motors referee found with the General caused, aggravated, plaintiff’s disability not Compensation employment. to The contributed her Workers’ C.J., Appeals, Appeal Danhof, of Board reversed. The Court (Cynar, J., dissenting), the defendant denied Bronson, 68564). (Docket appeals. appeal No. The defendant leave to opinion joined by Chief Justice Williams, Justices In an Supreme Levin, Cavanagh, Boyle, Court held: Legislature issue in these cases amended the statute at 1, January 1982. has construed the Because Court effective occurring being applicable personal injuries after as to statute 1, (ante, 531), Supreme p January Court declines predecessor interpretation be- of stаtute’s reexamine its poten- persuaded it is that it would be unwise create cause liability alleged tially for for third determination of standard disability. to the mental The cases are remanded work-related granted. Appeals of for consideration as leave Court dissenting, stated that in order recover Justice [1, [2] Mental disorders Admissibility 2] Am Jur acts. pensation cases. ALR3d Am Jur Workmen’s 97 ALR3d 161. 2d, 2d, and health and accident Workmen’s References opinion compensable under Compensation 528. evidence as for Compensation Points insurance and workers’ com- § Headnotes employability §§ workmen’s 302. on issue Peters alleged disability, benefits workers’ preponder- by expert testimony by a claimant should establish: disability; by a mental the evidence the existence of ance of that, objective preponderance the evidence as a matter *2 precipitated trauma, physical reality, or events which the event they actually disability and that were occurred the mental work-related; preponderance by expert testimony by of a and precipitating physical work-related the evidence that the events, degree, aggravated, trauma, to a substantial event or accelerated, internal weakness or dis- or combined with some produce disability. the mental of the claimant to еase compen- permitted honest-perception standard which 1. The factually disability estab- where a claimant sation for mental mistaken, perceived although honestly subjective, a lished employment, disability a mental and causal nexus between proved upon practi- although apparently inception, viable at its application intent of the in accordance with the cal not to be result, change compensation a in that area act. As a workers’ necessary. can arise from a Mental disabilities of the law is stimulus, trauma, specific physical from a mental or from requiring expert period By a of time. mental stimuli over preponderance testimony by a a to establish evidence proven employment and a causal nexus between substantial disability, spirit philosophy of the act will be mental the and Moreover, uphold continue to out. this standard will carried Michigan’s compensation long-standing principle workers’ employees they employers them. must take as find law that alleged disability to recover benefits for an mental 2. In order act, compensation a claimant should be under the workers’ disability by expert testimony should establish the disabled and addition, preponderance the claimant a of the evidence. evidence, prepоnderance of the as a establish a should precipitating physical objective reality, that a matter of trauma, actually Precipitating physi- occurred. event or events trauma, "personal injury” as set event or events are cal injury” act. "Personal in the workers’ forth trauma, event, i.e., stimulus, physical a mental or includes events, i.e., period of time. Where a mental stimuli over a continuing alleged stress of as a result mental time, period general occurring conclu- over a satisfactory. anxiety There and would not be sions of stress incidents, enough specific for the shown in detail be should actually specific events oc- determine that factfinder to Further, they it should be were work-related. curred and events, trauma, physical or event that the work-related shown 423 Mich aggravated degree, or or combined accelerated to a substantial the claimant or disease of with some internal weakness Expert testimony disability. produce should estab- the mental trauma, physical precipitating event that the work-related lish claimant and that there is a events stressful were nexus, psychodynamics of which can be causal substantial by expert testimony and reasonable identified elucidated psychiatric certainty, precipitating degree of between the work- trauma, physical events the mental dis- event or and related involving apply ability. This would all cases standard personal injury oc- where the date of mental 1, filed, yet prior January to be which have curred referee, hearing yet by a are been filed but not heard have appeal. preserved currently pending issue concurring part joined Ryan, Brickley, Justice Justice part dissenting Riley, with Justice stated while compensable expert testimony may necessary to establish a be disability, adopted which a rule should not would per provision automatically require testimony such se. No act, including provision the workers’ procedure hearing regulates process referee or the before Board, interpreted Compensation Appeal can be Workers’ *3 testimony prove requiring expert psychiat- a introduction to addition, permit- disability lay testimony has been ric claim. professional malpractice the lack of in medical cases where ted that it within the common knowl- care is so manifest would be layman edge experience and of a conduct careless professional practice and care and not within the standards of Likewise, community. possibility employed there is a disability clearly may it a be so manifest that that mental lay testimony. by could be established by J. — Compensation Injuries — 1. Work-Related Mental Workers’ Disability. alleged for to workers’ In order recover beneSts expert disability, a claimant must establish: testi- mental mony by preponderance of the evidence the existence of a that, by preponderance disability; of the evidence as a mental trauma, objective reality, physical event events matter precipitated disability actually the mental occurred and which work-related; they by expert testimony by a were precipitating preponderance of the evidence that work-re- trauma, events, degree, physical event or substantial lated accelerated, aggravated, internal combined some weak- Michigan Bell Peters v Opinion of the Court produce disability mental or disease the claimant ness (MCL 418.301[1]; 17.237[301][1]). MSA Ryan, Opinion Compensation Injuries — — Mental Workers’ Work-Related Disability Expert Testimony. — required automatically Expert testimony to estab- should not be compensable the workers’ com- lish a mental under act; provision interpreted pensation act no can be requiring testimony such to establish a claim, disability may possibility there is that a lay clearly it could so manifest be established testimony. Nunn, Kadushin, Sachs, Kates, O’Hare, Helves- Ries), Waldman, ton & P.C. Granner S. for (by plaintiff Peters. M. Crites for

Robert plaintiff Morrish. Stephen Lacey Jay Schwartz) & Jones for (by Michigan Telephone Company. defendant Ottaway, Ducey Conklin, McLeod, Benham, & Critchell), Rahie, Martin L. John P.C. G. Office (by Nobach, Munroe P.C. & Counsel, General McComb), C. Cameron for General defendant (by Corporation. Motors Curiae:

Amicus Ducey Ottaway, McLeod, Conklin, Benham, & Martin L. Critchell), P.C. Self- (by Insurers’ Association.

Williams, granted C.J. leave in these The Court legal in order consider the standard two cases *4 involv- compensation in workers’ cases applied employment. related to disabilities ing psychiatric the relevant statute Legislature has amended The 1, today 1982. Because this Court January effective 423 Opinion the Court Co, 531; Ford Motor 423 Mich in Hurd v (1985), this statute has construed NW2d 300 occurring on "personal injuries applicable 1, 1982,” to reexamine we decline January after in Deziel v the earlier statute interpretation our (After Remand), Laboratories, 403 Mich Difco Inc (1978). 1; 268 NW2d

Facts Telephone Co A. Peters v for operator a telephone worked as plaintiff November, 1967, Septem- until from defendant 1978, ber, filed a September plaintiff 1977. benefits, alleging claim for workers’ disorder, aggravation a nervous emotional of an aggravation and an hypertension, heart, nervous system, and central circulatory system. hearing benefits

Plaintiff was awarded 29, 1980, and, 1982, October referee Deziel, citing affirmed the award with wcab, Appeals The Court of denied minor modification. to appeal leave application defendant’s In an order dated from the decision of board. 19, 1984, Court September granted leave appeal. Corp

B. Morrish v General Motors Morrish for General Motors Plaintiff worked until Subse- February, January, from Morrish filed a workers’ quently, claim, alleging caused referee, hearing on Febru- incidents at work. The 4, 1980, no determined that there was causal ary and her em- plaintiff’s disability nexus between 19, 1982, the Workers’ On November ployment. the decision Compensation Appeal Board reversed *5 Peters Opinion op the Court referee and awarded benefits. hearing of the The. Appeals application denied defendant’s Court 25, 1983. In an order appeal May for leave to 1984, 19, granted this Court de- September dated appeal. for application leave fendant’s

Discussion Deziel, compensabil- In considered the this Court statute, existing under of mental disorders ity 17.237(301X1). 418.301(1); interpret- In MCL MSA compensable requirement ing statutory of’ arise "out of and in the course injuries must three-step analysis. developed we employment, required findings This analysis 1) disabled; the claimant was 2) precipitating of a work- the form occurred; related event had 3) standard, causal nexus using subjective internal had combined with some produce disability. or disease to weakness Deziel, p changed subsequently

The relevant statute was 357, 418.301(2); 1980 PA MCL Legislature, 17.237(301X2), 1982.1 January MSA effective

Conclusion action, we decline light legislative of the as we are interpretation our Deziel reexamine poten- it would be unwise to create persuaded of the a third standard for the determination tially alleged for work-re- complex question liability including aging process, "Mental disabilities and conditions conditions, shall be not limited to heart and cardiovascular but aggravated compensable employment compensable unfounded to or or accelerated if contributed significant manner. Mental disabilities shall in a when employment, arising not out of actual events of perceptions thereof.” Mich Opinion Dissenting cases are remanded These disability. lated mental granted leave as on Appeals to the Court of with this not inconsistent proceedings further opinion. JJ., concurred Cavanagh, Boyle,

Levin, Williams, C.J. *6 were con- (dissenting). These two cases Riley, J. appro- decide the to enable this Court solidated compen- in workers’ legal apply standard to priate disabil- involving claims of sation cases of and in the course of’ one’s arising ities "out colleagues have not done. my This employment. Rather, has stated that because majority the relevant statute ef- Legislature has amended 1, 1982, need not reexamine January they fective of the eаrlier statute interpretation this Court’s (After Remand), Laboratories, Inc Deziel v Difco (1978). 1; 403 Mich 268 NW2d disregards the fact completely This rationale Remand) (After Deziel the rules set forth disability mental cases with a applied will be to all 1, 1982. prior date "personal injury” January (providing include cases to be filed yet This would provision the notice and claim set compliance with 317, 418.381[1]; MSA forth at 1969 PA MCL heard 17.237[381][1]), yet by cases filed but to be also, referee, and, those cases now hearing preserved ap- the issue was pending wherein opinion, in its has peal. majority, cursory The amendment should why no reasons articulated by of cases unaffected preclude consideration and most Additionally, importantly, legislation. Remand) (After Deziel majority adhering to set forth previously standards ignores Peters v Dissenting Opinion regarding interpretation application Court disability compensation workers’ statutes. respectfully separately Thus, I dissent and write interpret Disability in an effort to the Workers’ Compensation Act in a manner consistent with the legislation. intent of the Products, 1, 9; In Selk v Detroit Plastic 419 Mich 345 NW2d 184 (1984), that, regard statutory interpretation this Court stated application, "give plain meaning we must effect to the of the language recently used.” This rule was reaffirmed in the consolidated Copper Division, cases of Franks v White Pine Chambers v General Corр, Corp, 636, Motors 650; v General Motors Gomez (1985), 375 NW2d 715 applying step wherein this Court stated: "Our first language for, statute must be an [a] examination of the if it clear, interpretation unnecessary, only applied.” is and it need statutory language applicable to the workers’ issues raised in these cases is set forth at 1969 PA MCL 418.301(1); 17.237(301)(1), states, alia, MSA which inter that for a “personal injury” compensable to be it must arise "out of and in the employment. course of’ the claimant’s Within the context of the cases, language issues raised in these I believe this requires application interpretation. and not interpretation (Añer statutory language Present in Deziel Remand) allows a claimant to recover for a mental presenting any objective without establishing evidence causal nexus between the disability. and the mental *7 Accordingly, may a claimant recover benefits for a mental may not in employ- fact arise "out of in and of course his ment.” majority The cautions that it would be unwise to reconsider this interpretation determining lest we create a "third” in standard compensability alleged disability. However, of an work-related mental I believe the issue is not whether this Court should or should not standard, but, rather, (Añer create a "third” whether the Deziel

Remand) holding legislative is in accordance with the directive that a "personal injury” employ- must аrise "out of in and the course of’ compensable. ment to be Therefore, honest-perception inasmuch as I believe that the test set (Añer Remand) legislative forth in Deziel does not effectuate the 317, 418.301(1); 17.237(301X1), intent of 1969 PA MCL MSA I believe primary importance that it is of that we disavow that standard. The that, possibility states, majority may as the create a "third” reject standard is not a valid reason to reconsideration of Deziel (Añer Remand). honest-perception The weaknesses of the test can be implications possible assessed. The of a "third” standard cannot. 423

I

Facts Co Telephone A. Peters v 1941, working for began plaintiff, The born operator Novem- telephone the defendant as a 1967, operator ber, telephone and as a continued her Plaintiff years employment. the entire ten of 2, September for defendant on last worked 1977, of dizzi- job complaining she left her when of impaired Following respite vision. ness and months, to return plaintiff attempted three some 1977, 3, but termi- on December defendant to work at time for excessive nated her employment due, pressure high to her blood part, absences condition. a workers’ com- plaintiff subsequently filed 1978, alleging petition September

pensation in the of a nervous- a work-related form disorder, aggravation of hypertension, emotional the heart aggravation of an nervous circulatory systems. central hearing, testi- plaintiff At an administrative that she regarding aspects job various her fied testi- to her Plaintiff alleged disability. contributed telephone she was fied about numerous calls many to handle and indicated that required were abusive. ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍She also testified phone these calls regarding supervisors very rigid her were attendance, tardiness, trips and the frequency necessary it stated that was the restroom. Plaintiff often than her to leave work station more for her of medical treatment she her co-workers because undergoing She testified that hypertension. permission go to the necessary request it was were these kept and that records restroom visits. *8 Peters v Dissenting Opinion by Riley,

Testimony was also heard from three medical Dr. experts, Bruce L. (plaintiff’s Danto psychia- (defendant’s trist), Dr. Gordon R. Forrer psychia- trist), (defendant’s and Dr. S. L. Schuchter inter- nist). At the conclusion proofs, hearing the award, referee entered an open finding that plaintiff had suffered a compensable injury de- scribed as a severe "moderately reaction anxiety caused work stress.” The Workers’ Compensa- tion Appeal Board affirmed open award of benefits granted referee, hearing with the sole modification that interest on compen- accrued paid sation be at percent rate of twelve per year, rather than the five-percent rate ordered by hearing referee. Defendant’s subsequent appli- cation for appeal leave to Appeals the Court of was denied. Defendant thereafter filed an applica- appeal tion for leave to with this Court which was granted 19, September 1984.

B. Morrish Corp v General Motors plaintiff, 1949, began born working the defendant February For the first years line, few she worked a teletype on the motor 1976, sorting pistons. she fell down a stairway at work and was incapacitated for a few months alleged with an back injury. Following her return work without restrictions in October of performed she various jobs. work,

Shortly returning after plaintiff given a in the job department. sanitation Appar- in this ently, particular job, plaintiff initially problems had with the foreman. In response alleged foreman, threats and harassment by the plaintiff depressed became and angry, drank considerably, shooting considered herself or alleged the foreman because of the threats *9 423 Mich by last with General harassments. Her of work day 16,1978. Motors January was for plaintiff petition The filed subsequently alleging benefits workers’ referee, hearing fol- disability. The determined that lowing expert testimony, lay or mental was plaintiffs the nervousness aggravated by, not caused contributed by, there was no causal her her employment. nexus between her illness and on plaintiffs testimony The concluded that referee this issue not credible. was 1982, 19, the

In an entered November order the Compensation Appeal Board reversed Workers’ and ordered hearing decision of the referee at of interest on accrued payment of percent per The Court year. the rate of twelve application Appeals denied defendant’s 25, In May on an order dated appeal leave 1984, defen- granted this Court September appeal. for leave to application dant’s II

Discussion one of the most controversial Historically, to face this Court the area complex issues appropri- disability compensation workers’ involving in cases claims apply standard to ate of and in the course arising out mental disabilities2 opinion general disability” in this in a is used The term "mental sense: upon "Again, this to caution reader it is incumbent us categorize opinion every attempt and discuss this Court cannot neurotic, psychoneurotic, psychotic, depressive; or conceivable kind functional Court while the Court does not personality overlay, hysterical symptom, This disorder. 'mental,’ general by using attempts term to be all-inclusive However, phenomena. рsychotic focusing psychoneurotic or phenomena.” intend to exclude other associative Peters Dissenting Opinion Riley, J. In past, employment. Court has consis tently held that where mental disability results from a work-related physical trauma the disability is compensable. This principle acknowledged the case of Harris v Castile as 1923 in early Co, (1923). Mining 709; 222 Mich 193 NW 855 plaintiff in that inguinal case suffered an hernia working while in the mine. defendant’s iron As a result personal of this injury plaintiff subse quently developed a mental disorder in the form of affirming benefits, neurasthenia.4 award of this Court stated that "neurasthenia caused attributable to the is a personal accident *10 Id., under the 712. act.” Co, in Redfern v Sparks-Withington

Later 353 286; (1958), Mich again 91 NW2d 516 this Court question faced with the whether a (After Laboratories, Remand), 1, 23, 8; Deziel v Difco Inc 403 Mich n (1978). 268 NW2d 1 3 physical disability, Where trauma results in a mental it uni is formly Larson, compensable. See, generally, held a that such condition is IB Law, 42.22, Compensation p Workmen’s For § 7-597. case law (ED point, McLellan, NY, Supp see Travelers Ins Co v 302 F 351 1969), Comm, 190; (1960), Murray v Industrial Ariz 87 349 P2d 627 Bd, Compensation Appeals Rptr Zurich Ins Co v Workmen’s 109 Cal 211; (1973), Comm, 512 P2d Co 843 Ford Motor v Industrial 357 Ill 401; (1934), Mfg Comm, 192 NE 345 Allis Co v Chalmers Industrial 57 257; (1974), Comm, Spetyla Ill 2d 312 280 v NE2d Industrial 50 Ill 2d 1; (1974), Co, Spring 319 NE2d 40 Hartman v Cold Granite 243 Minn 264; (Í954), Eclipse 67 NW2d 656 Moccia v Pioneer Div Bendix Aviation, Super 470; (1959), Co, Ayub Toy 57 129 NJ 155 A2d Ideal v (1975), 1051; Shaffrey, 50 AD2d 377 NYS2d 730 Griffiths v 283 AD 839; (1954), Trgo Corp, 129 NYS2d 74 v Harris Structural Steel 13 856; (1961), Comm, AD2d 214 791 NYS2d State of Ohio v Industrial 114; (1960), Publishing 83 Ohio L Abs 165 NE2d 211 Farran v Curtis Co, 553; (1923), 276 Pa 120 A 544 and Traders & General Ins Co v (Tex 1937). Slusser, App, 110 598 Civ SW2d 4Neurasthenia is term oncе "[a] attached a condition that was marked chronic fatigue, pressure scalp, neck, pain sensations of on the tension in the along spine, inability experience an to concentrate. Clinical deep anxiety has shown that these are of a manifestations seated Brussel, original.) (Emphasis Layman’s Dictionary reaction.” Psychiatry (New Noble, Inc, 1967), p York: Barnes and 423 594 arising physical out of a work-related subject to trauma was the workers’ plaintiff, punch press opera- Redfern, a act. In tor, personal injury suffered a when fifteen- weight press pound punch off a and struck the plaintiff fell plaintiff between the shoulder blades. developed allegedly pre-

later cipitated by a mental physical trauma. This Court held: State, In this is well rule established dating authority line of from 1922 where body occupationally-incurred and/or produces system nervous a neurosis shock resulting death, compensable. it disability or Co, Darling v Len H 217 Mich 485 NW Klein [187 Detroit, (1922)]; City v 279 Mich 86 Cazan (1937)]; Chicago Pneu- NW 561 Laichalk [271 Co, (1944)]; matic Tool 308 Mich NW2d [13 Co, Casting Mich 609 Hayes v Detroit Steel [44 (1950)]. [Id., NW2d 190 299.] recog- addition, this Court in Redfern also disabling can be mental conditions nized part by preex- brought on at least claimant’s Accordingly, isting mental deficiencies. Court undisputed principle reasserted employers must law that workers’ they employees them their indi- find take physical deficienсies: and mental vidual *11 decided, however, pre a This Court has recovery of work existing disease does not bar subsequent occupational compensation when men’s injury point the aggravates the condition to disability. Sheppard v disability precipitates or 577;[5] Bank, Michigan 348 Mich National [83 5 Sheppard in v principle this Court was well articulated This Bank, supra, Michigan 584: National categories respects recovery placed in as 2 mankind is "Thus injuries: pre-existing or condition’ and a 'disease those with accidental Michigan Bell 607 Peters v (1957)]; Penegor, 348 Mich Coombe v NW2d (1957)].[Id., 635 NW2d [83 299.] Vibradamp in the of Johnson Finally, case (1968), rule 388; 162 NW2d 139 Corp, a disability resulting physical mental from in compensable trauma is embedded firmly became Johnson, compensation workers’ law. In plaintiff a hernia of his sustained course his employment. subsequently He was released work, return to but physician employer to his result, y6 to plaintiff refused reinstate him. As a developed regard a a functional overla previous back condition became unable Citing Redfern, return language work. from supra, again Court stated that a work-related or body shock to the nervous system resulting in a or death is com pensable under the act.7 Consequently, the func tional was held to overlay compensable dis ability.

In addition to the situation compensable where a mentаl disability results from a work-related phys- trauma, ical other workers’ catego- emotional, nervous, ries involving psychoneurotic handicapped. completely reject. those not so Nothing This classification we is better settled law than the act takes they gate. plant the workmen as some are arrive at the are Some weak and Some, advances, strong. age particularly pre- have existing 'disease or condition’ and some have not. No matter. All must They equally press work. the share the hazards of the their families want, stringencies all, they opinion, equally in our share protection accident, regardless prior act in event of of their 90-92, condition health. See 18 NACCA Law Journal and cases there cited.” lay terminology, overlay 'psychogenic "In a functional describes overlay.’ symptom 'emotionally existing It is an determined increment to an organic physically which has been of trau origin.’ Phrases, p matic 539.” Deziel 17A Overlay, See Words and Functional (After Remand), supra, n 9. Vibradamp Corp, supra, Johnson v *12 423 Mich 594 608 Opinion Dissenting Riley, J. mental) (i.e., psychotic been conditions have also

identified. specific a mental involves One such situation injury. physical Klein, In that results stimulus compensability recognized supra, the this Court single by specific physical injury mental a a caused accidentally plaintiff сase, the In that stimulus. dropped striking piece machinery, a fellow a plaintiff, employee he had fearful on the head. upset. co-worker, nervous and his became killed Eventually shock, delirious, into he went became subsequently awarded work- This Court and ers’ died. recog- plaintiff’s family,

compensation to the nizing mental stimulus which occurred plaintiff’s during in the his resulted death. assess, situation, difficult to most

Another mentally dis- becomes arises where abled as claimant stimuli that are the result of mental gradual This exem- in nature.8 and accumulative Corp, plified by 361 v Motors Carter General this Court was 106 NW2d wherein (1960), 577; 105 alleging a with a confronted claimant resulting gradual disability ployment. of em- stress from the plaintiff Carter, was unable to keep pace job up when he took one with the of his compensability of a as There exists a lack consensus disability resulting or mental stimuli from a mental stimulus mental occurring 42.23(a) Larson, 42.23, period supra, §§ over ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍a of time. See (b), jurisdictions Even where a mental cases therein. cited compensa regarded resulting stimulus is from mental stimuli, ble, distinguished between stimulus and some courts have brought imposing for mental disabilities a different standard rule, adopted general jurisdictions have the latter. As differentiation required men to establish that have the claimant greater allegedly involve causative of tal stimuli experiencеd everyday employment. and tension than that stress 42.23(b). Larson, point supra, Townsend For case law on this see § See v Maine (Me, 1979), Safety, Sloss v Public 404 A2d 1014 Bureau of (1978), Comm, Colony, 10; and Swiss Ariz 588 P2d 303 Industrial 46; Relations, Dep’t Industry, 2d 24 & Human Wis v Labor Inc (1976). NW2d 128 Peters assembly workplace. at a time to his Fearful of *13 off, laid being plaintiff began taking two as at time to semblies a his to increase his workplace However, efficiency. began plaintiff mixing up the assemblies was by berated his foreman. As dilemma, a consequence plaintiff of this devel oped a mental recognized This Court disability. that the mental did not result from a Redfern, supra, physical as in single trauma or a Klein, supra.9 Nevertheless, mental shock as this Court plaintiffs held "disabling psy chosis resulting from emotional pressures encoun tered him daily in his work compensable 10 Id., . . . 593. More recently, again Court addressed the question compensability of mental disabili- Laboratories, Inc, case of Deziel Difco ties in the v (1975). 394 466; 232 NW2d 146 Consolidated along with Deziel were v Bahu Chrysler Corp MacKenzie v General Corp. Motors cases, Deziel and Bahu involved

The first two situations where physical trauma resulted In each case disability. there had been accident, physical organic but was there no etiol- ogy explain the continuing pain. Both claimants believed their disabilities were caused phys- ical trauma suffered at In MacKen- workplace. zie, the claimant was in сharge of red-tagged defec- parts, tive but became nervous co-employees when parts would take the depart- defective from his ment and install them in cars on the assembly line. eventually MacKenzie became dis- mentally abled and believed "mental trauma” he had been at subjected to work was the causa- 9 Corp, supra, Carter General Motors compensation Recovery See Workmen’s for mental — any impact (1961). physical injury, absence of L R Iowa 423 Mich Riley, J. of the facts and A more detailed review agent.

tive of cases follows. history trilogy of this procedural Laboratories, Inc A. Deziel v Difco

1. Facts suit, began Deziel, 39 at the time of work- Mary tubes, handling mixtures ing in 1968 test for Difco 23, January 1969 a test On and various chemicals. broke, get filling causing glass to into tube she day and re- the next eye. her She was treated filled April 1969 test tube turned to work. On with iodine hit slipped from her hand and table, has splattering eyes. around her She iodine since. She made claim not returned to work compensation asserting she cannot work because headaches, eyes, pain anxiety, her in the back of *14 dizziness, tiredness, and nausea and occasional tightness in No for these physical cause chest. found. symptoms has been de- testimony the referee Deziel In her before being and nervousness nied treated fоr headaches prior working for Difco. Difco, However, prior her with was worked where she

Deziel lived and treated Ontario Brewer, deposed by Difco by Dr. who was testified that decision. Brewer after referee’s ailments for various includ- he had treated Deziel ing headaches, not anxiety, and tiredness but did eye prob- complained of recall whether she had Mich lems. 470-471.] [394 Compensation Hearing Referee and Workers’ Board Decisions

Appeal adopted the disease accepted referee and The Forrer, namely Dr. theory psychiatrist, of Difco’s always suffered from an obsessive- that Deziel has eye which attached to the compulsive character developed psychosis, into a called injury Peters 611 schizophrenic Coupled reaction. with that disease theory, the splashing referee found that the iodine "aggravated pre-existing latent mental disor- culminating occupational der” into a total disable- compensation. ment. He awarded Appeal opinion The Board a unanimous re- referee, holding versed the the that Deziel had not met proof burden show her ailments were work, excep- associated with her because tion eye of her ailments she had suffered the same symptoms since 1962. [394 471.] of Appeals Court denied to appeаl. leave Chrysler Corporation.

B. Bahu v

1. Facts Bahu, suit, 35 at time was hired Chrysler machine parts 1967. In 1968 stamping he at a worked lifting moving seven-pound day conveyor large from an overhead 19, September through 7, tubs. From October pains he was off work with back voluntarily paid workmen’s benefits. Bahu returned to work and complain continued to pain back, neck, in his and arms and inability to move one of his arms. He asked lighter 4, quit work January but was refused. He January 1969. From through part of of jobs, quit he worked at other but because back, pain in his and arm. neck hearing

At the before the referee on his claim compensation, psychiatrists for tiff’s two testified. Plain- psychiatrist, Dr. Dorsey, said that Bahu’s *15 pain physical by pre-existing personal- was caused plus ity precipitating factors events a stress- ful job Chrysler. situation at Forrer, Defendant’s psychiatrist, Dr. testified pain. that Bahu was in Forrer said that pain aggravated was not caused his work at Chrysler, but rather personality Bahu’s Mich Chrysler and he came to makeup fragile was when to his life’s troubles subconsciously he the event attached injury. In words of the work-related "a convenient work was of Dr. Forrer for trou- which he can attach causation hook on Mich of all kinds.” 472.] bles [394 Compensation Hearing and Workers’ Referee Appeal Decisions Board reasons, referee, stating found any The without injury, compensable personal Bahu received January from awarded and until further order. opinion to three was Appeal Board a four causally disability was that Bahu’s persuaded not related dissenting Chrysler. The for his work find- compensation, would have awarded members job relationship was requirement ing that provided the hook on job satisfied because hang his troubles. which Bahu could [394 472-473.] appeal. Appeals denied leave

The Court Corporation Motors v General C. MacKenzie

1. Facts suit, MacKenzie, began 65 at time of work- age of 15. In in 1924 at the ing General Motors age early at the of 56. he took an retirement he retirement prior his years For about five worked Fisher day in a General Motors on the shift job Body salvage department. His of, count, keep ship back to vendors red- track During his last two three parts. tagged defective he irritable years with General Motors became shift would the afternoon nervous because department and in- parts his defective from take *16 Peters Dissenting Opinion by Riley, J. assembly stall them on cars in the line. This him worry safety caused and about the newof cars required remaining him parts to recount the supervisors missing and account to his for the addition, parts. poor of work habits his co- harder, required worker MacKenzie to work which anxiety. added to his compensation. He made claim for At hearing referee, before the psyсhiatrist, MacKenzie’s Dr. Dreyer, testified that MacKenzie suffered from a long-standing personality fectionism tually of compulsive per- defect job, that centered on that his even- pressures the job him. disabled This was subjective analysis based on MacKenzie’s view of job. his Fink, psychiatrist, General Motors’ Dr. testified it perfectionistic was MacKenzie’s need in impairments conflict with the duced his aging pro- anxiety although and that MacKenzie perceived causing the stresses of job his anxiety those stresses were usual occurrences and

did not his problems. cause emotional This was an objective analysis based on the normal worker’s view job. MacKenzie’s Mich [394 473-474.] 2. Hearing Referee and Compensation Workers’

Appeal Board Decisions that, The finding referee awarded although job great the stresses were not enough to cause ill average person, effects the stress cause did MacKenzie to become disabled. Appeal Board in majority its five to two opinion rejected reversed the referee and the sub- jective analysis objective favor of an analysis and ruled that an actual a not injurious caused perception claimant’s his work environment compensable when that environment is not average to the worker.

Two members of the board dissented and would have by aрplying awarded the sub- jective analysis finding on-the-job 423 Mich pre-existing person- aggravated stress MacKenzie’s ality disorder. 474.] [394 Deziel, Bahu, and MacKenzie D. *17 Court, reiterated the majority to this appeal On MCL requirement, act compensation the workers’ 17.237(301X1), must injuries that 418.301(1); MSA to employment in the course of’ "out of and arise this interpreting statutory compensable.11 be three-step analysis forth a set Court language workers’ compensability a the determine recognized Court also claim. This compensation preexist- in of these consolidated cases each ing existed: condition as these which are asserted In cases such question the pre-existing conditions

involve employment disability arose out of the whether only upon inquiry the fact finder by resolved legal principle regarding the work connection. Larson set forth Professor applied is that to be treatise, Compensation Workmen’s in 12.20 of his § Law, at 3-231: accelerated, aggravated, employment "the whether infirmity pro- the disease or combined disability.” . . . duce the must principle the decision maker apply To law: questions of fact and resolve three 1) Is claimant disabled? the 2) so, on account of If is the claimant disabled injury”? "personal some 3) aggravate, the claimant’s Did accelerate, internal weak- or combine with some produce personal injury? ness disease affirma- questions answered If are those record, the decision supported tive as matter of law must then find maker personal injury, arose out had a which claimant 11 Deziel, supra, Peters Opinion Dissenting employment, and that must be

awarded. token, support if there is for a By same questions, compensa- negative any answer to may not awarded. With this mind we tion be [Deziel, supra, independently. examine the cases 475-476.]

Thus, in these cases this Court concluded that Compensation Appeal Board denied the Workers’ indicating the rea- clearly without the denials. This Court remanded sons for cases, stating that jurisdiction, but retained before Compensation the Workers’ applied by the law reviewed, used in Appeal Board could be facts needed to established reaching its conclusion detail.12 more Compensation Appeal

E. Workers’ Board —On

Remand *18 Laboratories, Inc 1. Deziel v Difco completely testimony under oath is Plaintiffs Brewer, previous by to ailments Dr. a rebutted as medical prior her witness who treated her to employment with the defendant and was called purpose impeachment. the defendant for the have a situation where this Board has the of We preroga- disregarding plaintiffs complete testimony tive of testimony unless her is corroborated other evi- dence. being plaintiff This not the case we find that has proof employ- met the of to show her

not ment burden accelerated, aggravated, or combined with produce injury. internal weakness to an some problems Plaintiffs medical of coincide alleged disabling by to with those now finding plaintiffs plaintiff. negates This fact 12 Deziel,supra, 423 Mich 594 Opinion by Dissenting Riley, J. any way.

disability company-oriented is disability finding and The record calls for aggravating, personal accelerating injury. employment As to combining some internal with personal injury produce weakness we disease plain- than the fact negative. in the Other find tiff dropping promote of the obvious since the second test tube has not worked little evidence incident we can find plaintiff’s light especially case (On credibility gap. Re- [Deziel mand), 1976 WCABO 835.] Chrysler Corporation

2. Bahu v plaintiff may summary, have been an emo- waiting happen,” but the acci- tional "accident happen stipulated) per his (injury dent did testimony the have unimpeached continued residuals thereof is him. That all having have disabled capable plaintiff knows or all he is insight regarding. expert witnesses tell us remaining except physical disability there no is real plaintiff’s mind a [remains]. "precipitated” This is a including injury (per sequence Dr. the work of events he Dorsey), which was ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍a "hook which Forrer). Dr. (per can attach causation” awarding writer submits Rеferee’s This during periods of of partial subsequent the brief open employment, award support. are record There weekly benefits [have] proofs justify reversal. not believe, affirmatively fact-finding, I answers This questions: all the Court’s test 1) the claimant disabled? Is 2) so, on account of If claimant disabled "personal injury”? some 3) aggravate, Did the claimant’s accelerate, internal weak- or combine some *19 personal injury? produce ness or disease to [Emphasis (On Remand), original. in Bahu WCABO 968.] Michigan Bell Peters v Corporation v General Motors MacKenzie questions The first two of the three —whether personal injury we

plaintiff disability has and (see 1972 WCABO again answer in the affirmative [1370]). aggravation, To the acceleration third — negative, again answer in the combination —we and compensation. deny retrospect, perhaps the choice of the Again "perception” yielded should have to a more word attempted descriptive then, term —hallucination. We now, accept proposition that devastating ordinary stimulus can most thus compensable when it causes then, attempted predisposed individual. But we now, where the claimed and compensable perceived-hallucinated to exclude situations imagined- from an arose has not stimulus that been proven place, took even in the most existed or except recipient. mind of the normal form — case, Applied psychi- to the facts of this we have testimony paints plaintiff a man atric as begun adaptive mechanisms had to fail. His job. whose compulsions centered around his While [sic] specific his characterizations work situations "unrebutted,” normally be would characterized as description plain- we are forced tiffs the medical personality it likely to find that is at least as imagined. inference that There was these were corroborating testimony. Compensation no is not un- payable simply employee because an becomes perform cope job hinges his able —it relationship proven causal can be be- whether inability (disability) physical tween that or mental gone that has work before. plaintiff In this case we believe and find that brought workplace predisposition his both condition, the mental and the internal stimulus eventually led to We are not his disablement. even the convinced that this record demonstrates plaintiff having aggra- normal work duties of *20 423 Mich Dissenting Opinion Riley, J. vated, personal- his or combined with accelerated disability. [Emphasis produce in ity disorder to (On Remand), original. 1975 WCABO MacKenzie 3372.] Remand) (After Deziel

F. the Following Compen- the decisions of Workers’ remand, three on these casеs Appeal sation Board (After Re- Deziel appealed were to Court. mand), supra, this Court noted that same issue before it: complex controversial are mental dis- alleged Under what circumstances orders, not limited including psychoneurosis but to the Workers’ compensable under psychosis, Court then Compensation Act?13 This Disability decision, expanded prior particular paying its in the requirement to the causal nexus attention first Deziel Conse- step analysis. third that a claimant must requirements quently, alleged for an order obtain benefits establish were redefined. wcab, referees, conjunction with the (1) determining charged with whether remain (2) is disabled whether worker/claimant (a personal precipitating, work-related injury event) only requiring This occurred. Court subjective nexus standard be utilized causal (3) deciding the claimant’s whether weakness or disease combined with some internal disability. questions All three must produce the supported by answered in the affirmative and be the record for compensation to be awarded. The competence the wcab have referees and these three levels of malingerers at one of detect (After Remand), supra, inquiry. [.Deziel 37.][14]_ (After Remand), supra, Deziel compensability has not been well received test to determine This compensation, Booms, Workers’ Sеe commentators. some Peters analysis step of indicated The third this Court’s if it is is entitled that a claimant factually "honestly claimant established personal injury perceives” oc- some or believes ordinary employ- during his course of curred ment which caused though disability, his

his even alleged subjective perception work-related disability may mistaken.15 his caused why then five reasons This Court enumerated *21 honest-perception the standard would be applied proper in these mental standard disability objective First, would cases. an standard in cases because not be sufficient mental psychoses psychoneuroses are, to all "almost degree, origin”16 "in latent in involve some most cases tors,” psychodynamic fac-

a constellation impossible weigh making it "almost any "Psycho- significance one factor.”17 causal neuroses and psychoses many take so shades logical pattern vis-á-vis as to show no and forms legal objective any Accord- notion of causation.” ingly, objective would causal nexus standard Compensation and the Workers’ force referees Appeal manipulate nexus Boards to the causal deny grant in order to standard on an ad hoc basis.18 This reason first.

The second was similar Law, 877, (1980), Survey Michigan Wayne Annual 26 LR 879 1979 Michigan’s Laboratories, response Lane, Note, Inс: Deziel Difco v awarding injuries, Det for mental worker’s beneñts (1979). 173,190-192 LR Col Co, 15, Spring 20-21; Bentley v App Associated 133 Mich See also Corp, (1984), Ins McGarrah v State Accident Fund 296 347 NW2d 784 Co, (1983), Electric 145; Williams Western 178 NJ 675 159 P2d Or Hirschberg (Í981), Com 571; v Workmen’s Super 1063 429 A2d (1984). Board, Appeal 579; pensation 82 474 A2d Pa Commw (After Remand), supra, Deziel 30-31. 16 Id., 17 Id., 28.

18 Id. "only conceptually Court determined that analyzing psychoses psycho- sound method for neuroses is to tute, recognize that these illnesses consti- 'subjective’ injuries definition, and disabili- although ties.”19This Court indicated that individ- a distorted sense uals with of disabilities have reality, which results from unconscious mental reality just causes, their distorted sense of is average concept real to them as an reality.20 edges individual’s subjective Thus, standard acknowl- misperceiving reality. that a claimant is attempt inquiry objective "Any to take the to an employment really level, i.e., 'did claimant’s com- some internal or disease to bine with weakness produce disability?’ to lead to frustra- bound eventually manipulation. tion and true because most cases the ad hoc This is question is unan- swerable.”21 subjective

The third for the standard was reason reasoning this Court’s impliedly requires that case law in in mental

its use pointed to the fact that cases.22This Court expert quoted testimony Carter, from su- medical pra, subjective that a standard was em- indicated determining compensability рloyed of a *22 disability claim: mental Court, quoting proffered psychiatric testi- The

mony, clearly employed nexus. The Court and the cerned with strictly subjective a causal psychiatrist con- were himself,” "patient how the saw how himself,” really "he felt etc. so, Court, stating precisely analyzed The without particular injured and disabled claimant how this though probable perceived reality, very even it is 19id. 20 Id.,29.

21Id., 31.

22Id. Peters Opinion Dissenting

that, misperceived he psychoses, to latent his due situation.[23] Moreover, agreed Judge this Court with Bron- MacKenzie "recognized which dissent son’s ultimately depen- nexus the critical causal [that] himself, per- psychotic, how Carter upon dent relationship misperceived between ceived or his environment. his and work disability/injury comports our strictly The analysis employed standard.”24 subjective subjective

The for the stan justification fourth stated, risk. The research in the that Carter confirm the even disability sion and from within himself and of may be genetically course, between those eral diagnosis expert Obviously, society forensic some country, degree tional factors.” 66-67. ed), 17.35, pp [23] Id., 32. "The Carter case was controversial "The Carter case is "The Carter decision and those which § original information, simpler. nonoccupational should 'There was unmasked psychiatric courts have job arose prognosis, inheritable system minоrity purpose of appears mental was a perform being employees Nothing (Emphasis biology out of the impairment nothing and be as must draw a line practice was simple job borne aggravated, illness and now and are not caused opinion. Schizophrenic psychoses not a careful injury. more emanated from the predisposition, becoming workers’ have hurt while added.) more plaintiffs genetics agreed unjustly by industry should completely.’ this case speeiñc suffered are now Through than and the foreman’s instructions were however. evaluation, forming 3A 'social sickness hold in on this may of mental illness would on the because, Lawyers’ twenty years own identifiable followed at with characteristic have resulted some feelings by job possible this area job, issue. rely as the years Medical opinion brought and those who suffer point had been on extensive stresses. insurance,’ old, known to as The and employment. when as in minority opinion and across an and Cyclopedia regarding misapprehen- from principles outcries that occupational others. distinguish Symptoms making the recent consumer. perverted appear history, have occupa- collat- type The cost (3d concepts See, also, Selzer, legal Psychological stress and disease (1971), R, 56:951, ID, causation, pp L and Brill & § Cornell Vol 954-958 disorders, Glass, 193 JAMA Workmen’s (August 2,1965). 24Id., 33. *23 Mich that recognition causality judicial dard of compensa legislation such as workers’ remedial acts, progressively be read always tion "should Thus, in mental disabil compensation liberally.”25 any over subsid "preference should take cases ity of an objective the existence doubts about iary nexus.”26 causal requiring subjective for justification

The final responses from anticipated from arose standard standard application of this employers shamming, malingering, encourage would concern, Court, addressing This fraud.27 alia, stated, inter referees, expert psychi- the assistance eye of the detecting malingerers at the the watchful testimony and under atric wcab,

are skilled

fact-finding level: malingering problem of analysis, the "In the last fact, the skill and must be left to which

is one experts, and medical and experience of administrators, usually man who compensation facility develop considerable age in time to factfinding level.” See malingerers detecting Larson, at L Rev 23 Vanderbilt 1259.[28]_ 25Id., 34.

[26] Id., 35. 27Id. Deziel MacKenzie wcab to the board’s the cause of compensable decision, this Court perceived the work-related disability. After Id., 36-37. [28] fact, wcab, there was opinion, this Court decision elaborating jurisdiction 403 Mich upheld that, decisions this Court no supported had vacated the the wcab’s competent 41-42. on the causation not on remand. It was strictly then being would the conclusion remanded personal award evidence wcab orders of the applied retained. have been awarded. subjective the cases standard set support 403 Mich honest-perception standard concluded the claimant again which the board’s forth in the the cause been stating to the board Therefore, be- in Deziel and had found no 43. In utilized standard honestly that the findings Bahu, first Peters *24 Dissenting by Opinion Riley, J.

Ill Standards (After Remand), In revisiting Deziel it should be this Court’s purpose out today carry spirit intent and of the Workers’ Disability Compensa- tion Act by setting forth a equita- reasonable ble ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍standard for determining a compensable men- tal disability claim. I would hold that in order for a claimant to recover benefits for alleged an men- tal disability under following act the standards must be met:

1) The And, claimant-worker must be disabled. further, the claimant’s mental disability must be established aby preponderance of the evidence. Given the abstract and complex nature of mental disabilities, expert must testimony produced the claimant to establish the mental disability.29

2) The claimant must establish aby preponder- evidence, ance of the as a matter of objective reality, that a precipitating trauma, physical event or events actually occurred. Prеcipitating physical trauma, event or events are the "personal injury” as set forth in 17.237(301X1). MCL 418.301(1); MSA (Har- "Personal injury” physical includes trauma ris, Redfern, Johnson, supra), event, Le., (Klein, mental stimulus supra), events, or i.e., stimuli (Carter, period over a su- of time pra).30 In dealing with a situation where the claim- ant is alleging a mental disability as a result of the continuing stress of employment occurring time, over a period of general conclusions of stress 29See, Larson, generally, Compensation Law, 79.54, Workmen’s § testimony indispensible. When medical Regarding exper [is] medical relating psychiatric disabilities, 79.54(h). tise see § injury” physical trauma, 30 "Personal in the form of a mental stimulus, period or mental stimuli over a of time will hereafter be opinion trauma, physical referred to in this event or events. 423 requirement. satisfy anxiety not would enough specific incidents, shown must be

There to determine detail for specific factfinder actually addition occurred.31 events preponderance the evi- the establishment physical precipitating trauma, dence objective occurrences, I would events were event or physical precipitating require also events, trauma, as work- or be established event physical Consequently, precipitating if the related. relationship events, be- trauma, or the event precipitating physical traumа, event or tween events, sional, imaginary, employment, delu- and the requirement hallucinatory, this second *25 would not be satisfied.32

3) prepon- Finally, given a the establishment of the a mental evidence derance physical precipitating trauma, work-related of a events, hold that the claimant I would event preponderance a then must establish precipitating phys- evidence, the work-related trauma, events, to a substantial ical event degree, aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the or disease of claimant The claimant internal weakness some disability.33 produce the mental to produce expert testimony required would be precipitating physi- work-related that the establish cal claimant and that trauma, the or events were stressful event

there a substantial causal psychodynamics nexus, of which could be iden- by expert testimony a tified and elucidated Michigan language parallels in Miklik This that set forth v (1982). Co, 364, 370; Special 415 Mich NW2d 713 Machine establish, by produce expert testimony to not The claimant need evidence, precipitating preponderance of work-related trauma, objective physical event or events were occurrences. accelerated, with, language Aggravated, synono or combined Larson, taking employee as he is See 1 Work found. mous with men’s Law, 12.21, p Compensation 3-336. § Peters Dissenting Opinion by Riley, degree psychiatric certainty, reasonable between precipitating physical injury, work-related disability.34 events, event or and the mental requirement effectively replace This third would (After honest-perception Re- test of Deziel mand) determining the establishment of a precipitating causal nexus between work-related physical trauma, events, event or and a mental disability. my Deziel, reevaluation of I conclude change necessary. that a in this area the law is (After Remand), pointed In Deziel this Court out that a constellation of factors were involved in a might very mental difficult case and that it be weigh modern medicine to for. significance any the causal one factor’s effect in producing resulting the mental disorder and disa bility.35 This determination led this Court to hold objective that an causal nexus standard would not honest-perception be sufficient and that an stan prove nexus, dard to the causal under the circum appropriate requirement.36 stances, would Under a "strictly subjective causal nexus” stan- dard, a claimant is entitled to if it is factually per- established that honestly claimant personal ceives during some incurred ordinary work of his employment "caused” his disability. applies This plain- standard where the allegеs tiff disability resulting from either a physical or mental honestly, stimulus and even *26 though mistakenly, believes that he is disabled due to that resume inal. Deziel injury work-related and therefore cannot employment. [Emphasis his normal orig- in (After Remand), supra, 26.] subsequent practical application However, in the 34See n 29. (After Remand), supra, Deziel 36Id., 30-31. Mich tribunals, the claimant lower

of this standard personal mechanically select allowed to has been injury event, of his it to be the cause declare Essentially, compensation. disability and receive honest-perception standard, it has been the provides applied, authority medical the with the claimant disability, his what caused determine misperceive may when, definition, the claimant sup- judgment reality. the about The claimant’s products disability may posed be of his causes given very the same and cannot be expert psychiatric of informed as that credence judgment the mental cause of as to the substantial disability. persuaded

Therefore, the Workers’ I am Compensation requirement Disability Act injury employment in the must out of and course arise compensable more necessitates

to be connecting causally evidence perception. occupation than the claimant’s honest psychiatry may is not an exact It true that may thus, it for modern be difficult science psychiatric consistently to determine medicine degree of the causal nexus cases the individual disability. employment Neverthe- between less, source available it is still best given complex fact, nature of mental finder of disability claims. reasoning addition, the that mental disabili- In involving origin, degree latent

ties are some making psychodynamic factors a "constellation” it any significance impossible weigh causal ignores factor, claim- one the existence and concentrates ant’s total life circumstances determining causation. apparent significant many else- stress instances to, includes, limited marital is not where. This problems, but problems, problems, family financial *27 Peters v Dissenting Opinion by Riley, J. physical problems, aging process, drug and problems. honest-perception alcohol The standard proved simplistic practice has too and does not may, take into consideration other factors that disability. fact, be causative the mental Conse- quently, the claimant can attribute his life’s trou- to a bles work incident or incidents in order to "remedy” major problems in his life. person will, A afflicted with a mental disorder course, almost precipitating as matter of claim palatable explanation

trauma as a more her of his or symptoms. Responsibility inability for the to resolve mental and emotional shifted makes for may conflicts quite unconsciously employment. to the It

satisfactory accept- results —a socially disability, responsibility, able cial freedom from finan- compensation, sympathy understanding— and creates a secure external environment. The inability consciously accept the fact that he she is neurotic leads to the claimant’s search for a psychically pleasing problems. more excuse for his (Añer Remand), J., supra dis- [Deziel (Coleman, senting), 55-56.] honest-perception Moreover, standard does possibility not take into consideration the claimant that a may history have had a problems.37 many psychiatric prob- instances, prior allegedly precipitating lems existed to the physical trauma, events, work-related event or prior employ- even the commencement of the Again, honest-perception ment itself. under only honestly perceive standard, the claimant need prac- work-related, and, to be for all purposes, any previous problems tical irrelevant are

to the issue of causation. Because the my opinion requires forth in standard set cases, Psychiatric factor in 193 JAMA 389 1965). (August 423 expert testimony medical produce

claimant link causal between establish substantial the psychiatriс the disability, *28 impor- an claimant would become of the history expert psychiatric in connection tant element turn, which, in determining causality in opinions true cause factfinder’s search for the aid the would disability. to note that rehabilita- important it is Finally, important public policy is an employee tion of an Disability Com- embedded in Workers’ factor honest-perception standard Act.38 The pensation of the claim- basis awards interpretation disability, of his subjective ant’s his as- claimant for neurotic rewarding thus effect, In the honest- of his condition. sessment stamp its places approval standard perception instances, disability. many employee’s on the insight-ori- patient of a involves the rehabilitation patient’s realization of wherein the therapy ented a step true of his toward causes However, honest-perception standard the cure. psychological a kind of reinforcement acts as which, cases, and antitherapeutic will be many hope claimant’s delay any thus further of the discussion, 3A Medi- Lawyers’ See return work. (3d 18.21(C), ed), 17.34, 61-66, pp Cyclopedia cal § § Disease, Trauma & 151-156, Heiberg, Moritz & pp Moore, Compensation Neuroses & & Pokorny Co, 1959), 104- Book pp NY: Central (Brooklyn, 112.39 17.237(319) 418.901-418.941; 418.319; MCL See MCL MSA 17.237(901)-17.237(941). MSA psychoneu also, Cohen, for See, Workmen's awards (1961). reactions, 1129,1147-1150

rotic L 70 Yale J Michigan Bell Peters v

IV

Conclusion Upon previous reevaluation standards compensable mentаl claim as set forth (After Remand), Deziel I change conclude that a in this area of the law is The honest- necessary. standard, perception although apparently via- inception, proven upon ble standard at its has practical application not to be accordance with Compensa- the intent of the Workers’ Disability I requiring expert tion Act. believe that testi- mony preponderance establish the evi- employ- dence substantial causal nexus between proven spirit' ment and a mental disability, of the act will I philosophy be carried out. recognize precept and reaffirm the established disabilities can arise from a physical *29 (Harris, Redfern, Johnson, supra), trauma and (Klein, supra), specific from a mental stimulus (Carter, from mental a period stimuli over of time Moreover, supra). I recognize and reaffirm the long-standing principle Michigan’s of workers’ law that must take em- employers ployees purpose find them. The they standards set forth in to make opinion this are possible the award of benefits to all those entitled them, to receive while at the same time eliminat- grants of ing benefits to those claimants whose disabilities do not arise "out of and in the course Further, of’ employment. the standards articu- opinion applicable lated would be to all "personal injury” mental cases with a 1, 1982, filed, prior date to be filed January yet referee, hearing to be heard the and yet but pending also to those now wherein the issue was appeal. for preserved it treatment of this issue would render

My 423 Ryan, Opinion remaining issues raised to address unnecessary Company. Telephone Michigan Bell appellant, judgments I reverse would Accordingly, remand the cases Morrish and Peters and opinion. with this consistent proceedings being costs, a issue public I award no would involved. Riley’s dissenting Justice J. I concur with

Ryan, respect. in all but one opinion "expert hold that dissenting opinion would the claimant must produced by testimony 623) (ante, p disability,” the mental establish and that required would be claimant "[t]he to establish testimony expert produce trauma, event physical work-related precipitating to the claimant stressful or events were nexus, the psycho- a substantial causal there was and eluci- identified of which could be dynamics degree reasonable testimony a by expert dated precipitating certainty, between events, event physical injury, work-related 624-625.) (Ante, (Empha- pp disability.” the mental added.) sis be neces- fact expert testimony may

While cases, large to establish sary, majority in the agree I compensable disability, cannot requir- automatically se rule adoptiоn per First, nothing in there is ing testimony. such supporting Compensation Act Disability Workers’ act, particu- requirement. Chapter such 17.237(853), regu- 418.853; MCL MSA larly § hearing before process procedure lates *30 provisions of these and the None referee wcab. the introduction of as interpreted requiring can be prove to testimony in order expert disability claim.

Second, expert Court has held that while 631 Peters v Ryan, J. Opinion to establish required generally testimony, it has also malpractice, for medical cause of action the lack exception "cases where recognized an it manifest would care is so professional experience knowledge the common within careless the conduct was ordinary layman profes- not conformable standards in the commu- employed practice and care sional Monson, 135, 140-141; 108 v Lince nity.” (1961). the possibility there is Similarly, NW2d manifest clearly be so disability may that a mental use of through lay it could be established Lay members. family as that of testimony, such of a mental competent evidence testimony may be Cicotte, e.g., Beaubien v See, 12 Mich condition. 453, 465; (1864); People Murphy, 416 Mich 2d, (1982); also 31 Am Jur see 331 NW2d Requi- Evidence, 85; Anno: Expert Opinion § nonexpert predicate permit site foundation action, in a civil give opinion, witness condition, or mental sanity, competency, mental ALR2d 15. reasons, adopt Justice I would not For these

Riley’s expert testimony per requiring se rule ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍cases. Ryan, Brickley, J., concurred with

Case Details

Case Name: Peters v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.
Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court
Date Published: Nov 22, 1985
Citation: 377 N.W.2d 774
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 71928, 71931. (Calendar Nos. 13, 14)
Court Abbreviation: Mich.
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