36 Mass. 364 | Mass. | 1837
This case depends on the question, whether the plaintiff was not, by his contract, as it was offered to be proved by the defendants, bound to support the pauper, for the expenses of whose support the defendants are charged ; and we are of opinion that he was so bound by his contract with the pauper’s father. This was clearly a valid contract, unless, being by paroi, it was void by the statute of frauds, as an agreement not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof. St. 1788, c. 16, § 1. But this clause of the statute extends only to such agreements as, by
This construction of the statute is fully confirmed by the case of Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278. In that case the defendant’s testator had promised the plaintiff, that if she would become his house-keeper, he would pay her wages after the rate of £ 6 per annum, and give her, by his last will and testament, a legacy or annuity of £ 16 by the year, to be paid yearly The plaintiff, on this agreement, entered into the testator’s service, and became his house-keeper, and continued so for more than three years. And the contract, though by paroi, was held to be valid and not within the statute. Mr. Justice Dennison declaring his opinion to be, (in which opinion the other judges coincided,) that the statute of frauds plainly means an agreement not to be performed within the space of a year, and expressly and specifically so agreed, that a contingency was not within it, nor any case that depended on a contingency, and that it did not extend to cases where the thing might be performed within the year.
But if it appears clearly, that an agreement is not to be performed within a year, and that such is the understanding of the parties, it is within the statute of frauds, although it might be
From these authorities it appears to be settled, that in order to bring a paroi agreement within the clause of the statute in question, it must either have been expressly stipulated by the parties, or it must appear to have been so understood by them, that the agreement was not to be performed within a year. And this stipulation or understanding is to be absolute and certain, and not to depend on any contingency. And this we think is the clear meaning of the statute.
In the present case, the performance of the plaintiff’s agreement with the child’s father, depended on the contingency of her life. If she had continued in the plaintiff’s service, and he had supported her, and she had died within a year after the making of the agreement, it would have been fully performed. And an agreement by paroi is not within the statute, when by the happening of any contingency it might be performed within a year.
Judgment of the Court of Common Pleas reversed, and a new trial granted.
This case came again before the Court. 20 Pick. 506.