[¶ 1] Rоland C. Riemers appeals a trial court order finding him in contempt for failure to pay $23,465.84 in child and spousal support, ordering him jailed for thirty days if he did not pay the arrears, ordering entry of a money judgment, and ordering him to pay attorney’s fees. We reverse the contempt order and the money judgment аnd remand for further proceedings because Roland was not informed of his right to counsel when the contempt proceedings could have resulted in incarceration.
See Peters-Riemers v. Riemers,
I
[¶ 2] Roland and Jenese were divorced in May of 2001. Previous to this appeal, Roland has appealed three post-divorce orders.
See Peters-Riemers v. Riemers,
[¶ 3] At the conclusion of the hearing, the court asked Jenese’s counsel to draft a proposed order of contempt. Roland submitted objections to the proposed order. The trial court found Roland in contempt in its order dated February 3, 2003, and ordered him to pay $23,465.84 in spousal and child support arrears and $1,124.50 in *289 attorney’s fees. In addition, if Roland did not pay the arrеars by March 28, 2003,-Jenese could obtain a writ of attachment and Roland would be imprisoned for 30 days. Jenese filed a request for entry of a money judgment on February 4, 2003, .together with an affidavit of identification and nonmilitary service under N.D.C.C. § 14-08.1-05.
[¶ 4] The trial court ordered the entry of a money judgment as part of its contеmpt order, and a money judgment for $24,590.34 was entered on February 4, 2003. The money judgment included $23,465.84 in child and spousal support and $1,124.50 in attorney’s fees. A certified cоpy of the payment records maintained under N.D.C.C. § 50-09-02.1 included in the record as Plaintiffs exhibit number two, reflects that the $23,465.84 included $13,885.48 in child support arrears and $9,580.36 in spousal support arrears.
II
[¶ 5] Roland argues the Order of Contempt punishment was punitive not remedial. Roland made an identical argument in
Peters-Riemers III,
and we concluded his contempt punishment was remedial.
Peters-Riemers,
A remedial sanсtion is one which “includes a sanction that is conditioned upon performance or nonperformance of an act required by court ordеr.” N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.1(4). Remedial sanctions can be payment of money, forfeitures, or imprisonment. N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.4(1). A prison sentence is remedial only if it is conditional and the “contеmnors carry ‘the keys of their prison in their own pockets....’” Punitive sanctions, however, are unconditional. Thus, a punitive sanction is “a sanction of imprisonment if the sentence is for a definite period of time ...” or a sentence which “is not conditioned upon performance or nonperformance of an act....” N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.1(3). The ■most -important factor which makes a sanction punitive is its unconditional nature; if the contemnor cannot purge the сontempt by performance, the charge is punitive.
Id.
(quoting
Endersbe v. Endersbe,
Ill
[¶ 6] Roland argues the trial court violated his constitutional due process right when it fаiled to inform him of his right to be represented by counsel in a contempt proceeding where incarceration is a possible punishment. In
Peters-Riemers III,
we adоpted the procedural requirements outlined- by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and applied them to all contempt proceedings unless the cоurt makes it clear to the defendant that incarceration will not be imposed as a sanction.
Peters-Riemers,
[¶ 7] Jenese argues that Roland had counsel of record and could not be both pro se and have counsel of record. However, the authority she cites is distinguishable on the facts.
See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins,
[¶ 8] Because Roland was not advised of his right to counsel, we must reverse the contempt order and the money judgment and remand for further proceedings. Under N.D.C.C. § 14-08.1-05(l)(a), any ordered child support payment becomes a judgment by operation of law “on and after the date it is due and unpaid.”
See Baranyk v. McDowell,
[¶ 9] We conclude, however, Jenese did not satisfy the requirements of the statute. She requested a “money judgment” be entered by the trial court undеr N.D.C.C. § 14-08.1-05. The statute does not require a request for a money judgment from the trial court. It requires that the judgment ordering payment of child support be entered in the judgment docket upon filing by the judgment creditor or his assignee of a written request accompanied by a verified statement of arrears or certified copy of payment records maintained under N.D.C.C. § 50-09-02.1 and an affidavit of identification of the judgment debtor. N.D.C.C. § 14 — 08.1—05(l)(a);
see Ruscheinsky v. Ulrich,
IV
[¶ 10] We conclude Roland’s remaining arguments are without merit. Therefore, we reverse the contempt order and the money judgment and remand for further proceedings.