33 A. 729 | N.H. | 1891
The contract between Pratt and Keyes as to the personal property was made bona fide for a valuable consideration, did not contravene public policy, might be performed within a year, and was valid. Whatever may have been its operation in respect to title and ownership, the contract gave Keyes an equitable right and interest in the property, at least; and that was enough to enable him specifically to enforce the contract against Pratt's administrator. Having transferred a portion of his right to Hartshorn to secure the payment of his indebtedness to her, as he might properly and lawfully do (2 Sto. Eq. Jur. (12th ed.) s. 1040 c; Cudworth v. Scott,
What might be done in that proceeding may be done in this. It is immaterial that the bank is plaintiff rather than Keyes, and that Hartshorn is made a defendant rather than joined as a plaintiff. Cox v. Leviston,
It is also immaterial whether the order operated as a legal assignment or not. It is enough that it gave Hartshorn an equitable right to the money. 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., supra. Being good as against Keyes, it is, in the absence of fraud, equally good against his assignee. Assignees in bankruptcy take only such rights and interests as the bankrupt had, and could himself claim and assert, at the time of bankruptcy; and they are affected with all the equities that would affect a bankrupt himself if he were asserting those interests. Kittredge v. Warren,
It is therefore adjudged and decreed, that the plaintiff pay to the defendant Hartshorn, from the deposit standing on its books in the name of Daniel Pratt, the sum of $600; that the remainder of the deposit be paid to the defendant administrator; and that whatever balance may remain in his hands, after the payment of debts and expenses of administration, be paid to the defendant assignee.
SMITH, J., did not sit: the others concurred.