Case Information
*1 Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
PETCO Animаl Supplies Stores, Inc., appeals from a grant of summary judgment by the district court [1] in favor of Insurance Company of North America *2 (“ICNA”). PETCO sought a declaration that ICNA was obliged to defend аnd indemnify the company in its underlying litigation with Medtronic, Inc. We affirm.
I.
Meiko Pet Corporation purchased a products liability insurance policy from ICNA that was effective from September 20, 2006, to September 20, 2007. The policy extended coverage to the vendors оf Meiko’s products, including PETCO and its subsidiaries. The policy required ICNA to defend and indemnify any insured party in the event of a covered “ocсurrence” causing “property damage.”
On May 20, 2007, an aquarium heater malfunctioned at a Medtronic plant and
started a fire. Medtronic sued PETCO, from whom it had purchased the heater,
seeking approximately $1,800,000 in damages. PETCO tendered the defense of the
action to ICNA, but ICNA denied the claim, and PETCO sued the insurance company.
PETCO sought a declaration that it was entitled to defense costs and indеmnity in the
Medtronic action. The underlying action was later settled, with an agreement that
PETCO would assign its claims against ICNA to Medtronic.
See Miller v. Shugart
ICNA moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion,
concluding that PETCO had failed to prove that the policy covered the damagе caused
by the aquarium heater. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue of material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). We review
de novo
the district court’s interpretation of the
insurance contract and its decision to grant summary judgment.
FACE, Festivals &
Concert Events, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.
,
II.
This appeal turns on whether the aquarium heater satisfied a condition precedent to coverage under the policy. The relevant portion of the policy, entitled “Products Warranty,” provides as follows: “It is warranted, and a condition precedent to recovery hereunder, that Air Pumps, Heater, Filters, Heating Stone, Heated Mat, Heated Bowl and Heated Bucket are UL/CSA approved and/or complied with thе mandatory and/or voluntary safety standards of importing countries.” The parties agree that the heater was not “UL/CSA approved,” so ICNA was obliged to defend and indemnify PETCO only if the heater complied with “the mandatory and/or voluntary safety standards” of the United States. The parties further agree that the condition precedent is disjunctive, so PETCO satisfied the condition if the heater complied with eithеr the mandatory or the voluntary safety standards of the United States.
The district court granted summary judgment for ICNA on the ground that PETCO failed to identify any mandatory or voluntary safety standard with which the heater complied. PETCO appeals, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the phrаse “voluntary safety standards” and also failed to recognize that the heater complied with the mandatory standards of the United Stаtes.
In this diversity action, Minnesota law governs the interpretation of the policy.
Langley v. Allstate Ins. Co.
,
PETCO contends that the phrase “voluntary safеty standards” is ambiguous, and thus should be construed in favor of coverage. Because “voluntary” means *4 “proceeding from the will or from оne’s own choice or consent,” Appellant’s Br. 9, PETCO maintains that a “voluntary safety standard” reasonably could be interpreted to mean a standard that is “optional.” On this view, PETCO is entitled to coverage even if the heater did not comply with any voluntary standard, beсause a voluntary standard is satisfied whether or not one chooses to comply with it. Thus, the argument goes, the district court erred by interpreting the policy to require compliance with some safety standard.
PETCO’s interpretation of the phrase “voluntary safety standard” in this
insurance contract is not reasonable. “A contract must be interpreted in a way that
gives all of its provisions meaning.”
Current Tech. Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enters., Inc.
PETCO argues alternatively that the heater complied with the mandatory standards of the United States. Relying on the following statement from guidelines of United States Customs and Border Protection, the company contends that Customs *5 authorities would have seized the heater if it did not comply with the government’s mandatory safety standards: “Any consumer product offered for importation will be refused admission and/or seized if the product fails to comply with an applicable safety standard or regulation . . . .” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Importing into the United States: A Guide to Commercial Importers, CBP Pub. No. 0000-0504, at 115 (2006). Because the heater was admitted to the country and nоt seized by Customs authorities, PETCO concludes that the heater must have complied with the mandatory standards of the United States.
Although Customs authorities did not seize the heater, it does not follow that the heater necessarily complied with mandatory safety standards of the Unitеd States. The Customs guide provides that an item will be refused admission or seized if it does not comply with “an applicable safety standаrd.” It is possible, however, that no particular safety standard applies to aquarium heaters, or that the heater did not comply with an applicable standard and Customs failed to seize it. It is PETCO’s obligation under the policy to identify a mandatory safety standard with which the heater complied, and it has failed to do so.
* * *
The judgment of the district court is affirmed
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Notes
[1] The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable Janie S. Mayeron, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.