Case Information
UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
ROBERT PERSON,
Plaintiff, v. Case No. 8:25-cv-961-TPB-AEP ACS TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
ORDER DENYING “DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR ALTERNATIVELY TRANSFER VENUE”
This matter is before the Court on Defendant ACS Technologies Group, Inc.’s “M otion to Dismiss or Alternatively Transfer Venue, ” filed on April 23, 2025. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff Robert Person filed a response in opposition on April 29, 2025. (Doc. 12). After reviewing the motion, response, court file, and record, the Court finds as follows:
Background [1]
This case stems from an employment dispute between Plaintiff Robert Person and Defendant ACS Technologies Group, Inc., a technology company headquartered in South Carolina that develops scheduling and calendar software for churches and other faith- based organizations. Plaintiff started working remotely as a director for ACS in 2021 from his Florida residence.
According to Plaintiff, between 2020 and June 2024, he engaged in numerous discussions – including formal presentations and meetings with Defendant’s officers and employees – about a project venture that he had been researching prior to his employment with Defendant. [2] He sought Defendant ’s approval to continue with the project before investing personally, as well as provided Defendant the opportunity to determine if the venture created any conflict of interest in Plaintiff’s employment. During this time period, Defendant encouraged Plaintiff to pursue the project and supported the possibility of a partnership between Defendant and the venture; it also confirmed there was no conflict of interest.
In May 2024, Defendant began to actively recruit Plaintiff for a role in the “Emerging Ventures Department,” a new department within the company. During the interviewing process, Defendant continued to tout Plaintiff’s venture as a partnership opportunity. However, Plaintiff was concerned about a lateral shift from his existing role, and Defendant refused to provide details about the role or opportunity for career development. Instead, Defendant pressured him into accepting the position while withholding pertinent information about the role. Consequently, Plaintiff declined the new position on June 17, 2024.
On October 15, 2024, Plaintiff attended a meeting with ACS executives to provide an update on the venture. At the meeting, Defendant suggested for the first time that Plaintiff’s long-approved venture was directly competing with Defendant. On October 25, 2024, Defendant informed Plaintiff that his current position was being eliminated, and that he must take a significantly demoted position. Defendant accepted the demoted position.
On October 26, 2024, Plaintiff received an email advising him that he must abandon his already-approved venture within two months or he would be fired. When Plaintiff did not divest, he was terminated.
On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, Florida, asserting claims for breach of oral contract (Count I), promissory estoppel (Count II), and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count III). On April 16, 2024, Defendant removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. In the instant motion, Defendant seeks dismissal for improper venue or, alternatively, transfer of the case to United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.
Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, a plaintiff may bring a civil action in “(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas , 571 U.S. 49, 55-56 (2013). If a defendant challenges venue, the court must first determine if the case falls within any of these enumerated categories. Atl. Marine Const. Co. , 571 U.S. at 56. If the case does not, the case must be dismissed or transferred under § 1406(a) due to improper venue. Id .
To the extent a defendant seeks to enforce a valid forum selection clause, it must
be done through a motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a).
Id
. at 59-60;
see
28 U.S.C. §
1404(a). A forum selection clause is “pr esumptively valid and enforceable unless the
plaintiff makes a ‘strong showing’ that enforcement would be unfair or unreasonable
under the circumstances.”
Krenkel v. Kerzner Int’l Hotels Ltd
.,
Even without a forum selection clause, district courts have the discretion to
transfer venue “ [f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
[…] to any other district or division where it might have been brought […].” 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a);
see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Still, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is given deference
and, as a result, “should not be disturbed unless it is clearly outweighed by other
considerations.”
Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C.
,
Analysis
General Venue
Defendant first argues that venue is improper in the Middle District of Florida because it is not a resident of Florida and a “ substantial part, if not all, of the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in Florence, South Carolina, and a substantial part, if not all, of the property at issue in this lawsuit is located in Florence, South Carolina. ”
When venue is challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that its
selected venue is proper.
Robey v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
,
The defense argument is not well-developed and does not include analysis or
explanation as to the events or property at issue. Here, although Defendant is based in
South Carolina, the events did not occur exclusively in South Carolina. Defendant was
aware of Plaintiff’s remote employment in Florida for years and expected that he would
perform work for the company while based in Florida. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that he was terminated while residing in Pasco County, Florida, and that Florida is
where he subsequently suffered damages related to his termination. The Court is
satisfied that the Middle District of Florida is at least one proper venue for this matter.
See Fentriss v. Gateway Bank FSB,
No. 8:15-cv-2675-T-23MAP,
Forum Selection Clause
Defendant argues that Plaintiff signed a non-disclosure agreement that contained a forum selection clause. It appears that Plaintiff signed a non-disclosure agreement regarding Defendant’s confidential information, intel lectual property, and trade secrets. The clause reads in full:
Jurisdiction: Employee consents to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the Court of Common Pleas, County of Florence, State of South Carolina in any action arising out of or relating to this Agreement. Employee waives any other venue to which Employee might be entitled by domicile or otherwise.
Again, the defense argument is not well-developed. Defendant does not explain why a forum selection clause in a non-disclosure agreement should govern this contractual or quasi- contractual dispute concerning Plaintiff’s employment.
While forum selection clauses are “ presumptively valid and enforceable ,” the NDA
simply does not control all possible claims emanating from Plaintiff’s employment with
Defendant. This is because a plaintiff’s claim only “relates to” an agreement when “the
dispute occurs as a fairly direct result of the performance of contractual duties.”
Telecom
Italia, SpA v. Wholesale Telecom Corp
.,
Forum Non Conveniens
Finally, Defendant argues that transfer to South Carolina is warranted under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties. Courts
engage in a two-step inquiry to determine whether transfer would be appropriate under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Healthe, Inc. v. High Energy Ozone LLC
,
In the second step, the court considers “whether convenience and the interest of
justice require transfer.”
Id
. (internal quotation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has set
out factors to consider, including: “(1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of
relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience
of the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the
attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) a forum’s
familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded a plaintiff’ s choice of forum;
and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice, based on the totality of the
circumstances.”
Manuel v. Convergys Corp.
,
Most of these factors are neutral at best. The Court specifically notes, however, that Plaintiff is accorded weight to his choice of forum, and that the relative means of the parties would slightly favor a Florida forum. Defendant’s arguments concerning witness availability are unavailing – it fails to identify any particular witnesses and the materiality of their testimony, and it fails to sufficiently explain any potential hardships of those witnesses associated with a Florida venue. Defendant also does not provide sufficient information to explain how the location of corporate documents would favor transfer , and due to the remote nature of Plaintiff’s position, it would appear that many documents would be electronic. Defendant’s position on Plaintiff’s lack of inconvenience is not convincing and not supported by the record evidence as a whole.
Defendant additionally contends that a South Carolina federal judge would be in
the best position to rule on the issues in this case because the NDA contains a South
Carolina choice-of-law provision. As the Court previously explained, the NDA does not
appear to apply to Plaintiff’s contractual and quasi -contractual claims.
[3]
Even if the
application of South Carolina law were appropriate, federal courts are competent in
applying the laws of other states, and nothing about the law of South Carolina appears to
be particularly complex in this case.
See McKesson v. Doe
,
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED , ADJUDGED , and DECREED :
1. “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Transfer Venue” (Doc. 3) is DENIED . 2. Defendant is directed to file an answer on or before August 18, 2025. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 29th day of July, 2025.
__________________________________________ TOM BARBER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
[1] The Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint for purposes of ruling on the
pending motion to dismiss.
See Erickson v. Pardus
,
[2] At an initial case management conference held on July 16, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel described the venture as a software-based application that would match mentors and mentees within the church.
[3] Although Defendant references counterclaims, the Court notes that no counterclaims have been filed in this case at this time.