8 S.E.2d 425 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1940
1. The accusation on which the defendant was convicted was so defective as to be absolutely void.
2. The questions raised by the motion in arrest of judgment have not become moot. The court erred in overruling the motion.
1. We think that the first question must be answered in the affirmative. The first count of the accusation is apparently drawn under the Code, § 68-301, which reads as follows: "Speed limit. No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public street or highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and safe, having due regard for the width, grade, character, traffic, and common use of such street or highway, nor so as to endanger life or limb or property in any respect whatsoever; but said speed shall not exceed that tabulated below:" And then follows the tabulation of the forbidden speeds "in miles per hour." The gist of that section is the operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway at an unlawful speed, and the provisions of the section can only be violated by the driver of a motor vehicle operating such vehicle at an unlawful speed as provided in the section. However, count 1 of the accusation fails to charge that the accused drove his automobile at an unlawful speed, the word "speed" not being mentioned therein. In Poole v. State,
2. Are the questions raised by the motion in arrest of judgment moot under the facts of the case? It is shown by the bill of exceptions and the record that after the defendant was found guilty on both counts of the accusation he paid the fine imposed and served a few days of an eight-months sentence on parole; that he was then rearrested for an alleged violation of the provisions of his parole sentence, and was put in jail; that while so incarcerated, and during the same term of court at which he was sentenced, he filed his motion in arrest of judgment. It is well-settled law that such a motion can be made at any time during the term at which the movant was adjudged guilty. Of course, if a defendant has paid his fine and been dischargedfrom custody, and his case finally disposed of, as was the case in Blakely v. State,
Judgment reversed. MacIntyre and Guerry, JJ., concur. *119