Lead Opinion
At 3:30 а.m. on February 25, 1988, officer Ken Edmunson was on duty ás a Searcy policeman. He was driving a city patrol car on his route to check buildings when he saw a dark-colored car circling around the parking lot of Searcy Skаteland. He turned his car around to get a better look at the dark-colored car but, by the time he had turned around, it was gone. He did not attempt to pursue the car, but instead, resumed his regular route to check buildings. He drоve a few blocks and came to the area where the Elks Lodge is located. The land on which the lodge is located is outside the city, but is bordered by the city on three sides. Officer Edmunson started to drive across the lodge parking lot in order to get to another part of his route inside the city, and, as he was driving across the lot, he saw a car parked with its lights on and the motor running. He turned his patrol car so that its headlights illuminated the parked car, and he saw a man slumped over the steering wheel. He did not know if it was the dark-colored car he had seen earlier. Officer Edmunson got out of his car to check on the man. He found it was appellant, and that appellant was drunk. Officer Edmunson knew he was outside the city, and in an unincorporated part of White County, so he “detained” appellant and radioed for a White County deputy sheriff to come “arrest” aрpellant. After a short interval the deputy sheriff arrived, arrested appellant, tried to give appellant a field sobriety test but he was too drunk to take it, took him to the police station, and gave him a breathаlyzer test, which registered .17.
In the trial court the appellant argued that he was illegally arrested and, therefore, the evidence obtained by the officers should be excluded. The trial court held that appellаnt was not arrested by Officer Edmunson, but instead, was arrested by the deputy sheriff and, accordingly, denied the motion.
The trial court was in error in finding appellant was not arrested by Officer Edmunson. Within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, a pеrson is “seized” if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. U.S. v. Mendenhall,
The applicable rule is black letter law, well-established and reasoned precedent. A local peace officer acting without a warrant outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction under which he holds office is without official power to apprehend an offender, unless he is authorized to do so by state statute. Logan v. State,
The authority of municipal corporations to exercise powers beyond their territorial limits must be derived from some state statute. City of Argenta v. Keath,
The traditional concept of territorial jurisdiction for peace officers is a sound one since a local community is best served by the requirement that local officers familiar with local nеighborhoods make arrests in the community. People v. Hamilton,
Officer Edmunson, acting outside his jurisdiction, only had the authority of a private citizen. Blevins v. State;
That leaves the question of whether the evidence, which was obtained as an incident to the illegal arrеst, should have been suppressed. That question was squarely answered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.721(1969). In that case the Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to an unlawful detention, аnd evidence obtained as the direct result of an unlawful detention is subject to the exclusionary rule. In Mapp v. Ohio,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. The fact that a Pocahontas policeman cannot make an arrest in Paragould or a Texas Ranger in Fordyce, unless in fresh pursuit, does not (or should not) lead to the conclusion that police officers on the borders of their own area of authority (here the city limits of Searcy) may not lawfully act in response to an offense occurring in their presence and immediately adjacent to such borders, if only to detain the offender until an officer from the aрpropriate jurisdiction can arrive to effectuate an arrest. The rule of law now adopted by the majority means that an officer confronted, as was Officer Edmunson, with a highly inebriated motorist, is powerless to prevent an offense potentially dangerous to the public and must stand helplessly by while the drunken motorist drives away. Nothing I can find nor cited by the majority suggests that the law if so compartmentalized that police offiсers are legally impotent under these facts. Neither Logan v. State,
Moreover, I submit a sound argument exists that even a privatе citizen could act under the circumstances of this case. It was certainly true at common law that private citizens could arrest for misdemeanors committed in their presence where a breach of thе peace was involved. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest, § 35 (1962). This is the rule adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 119:
Arrest Without Warrant by Private Person for Criminal Offense.
Subject to the rules stated in §§ 127-136, a private person is privileged to arrest another without a warrant for a criminal offense.
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(c) if the other, in the presence of the actor, is committing a breach of the peace or, having so committed a breach of the peace, he is reasonably believed by the actor to be about to renew it. . . .
That rule of common law has never been expressly overruled in Arkansas (dictum in Brewer v. State,
There is nothing so hallowed about geographical boundaries of police officers that the law restrains them from acting beyond those boundaries in certain instances, that is, when in fresh pursuit of: a suspected felon, any offender whose offense was committed in their presence, or anyone for whom they have a warrant. [See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-301 (1987)]. Thus if their authority has some flexibility where exigent circumstances exist (as in fresh рursuit), it is equally plausible that they have the authority to detain any offender acting in their presence whose conduct endangers the public, even though the offense may be occurring just beyond their jurisdictional boundariеs. I would affirm.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. The majority correctly states that an officer who seeks to make an arrest outside his territory, without a warrant or statutory authority to do so, must be treated as a private citizen. Nevertheless, the сommon law accorded a private person extensive powers to arrest without warrant for felonies and breaches of peace committed in his presence. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 50 (1962). Arkansas, of course, reсognizes the common law. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 1-2-119 and 16-13-201 (1987). Although the majority cites A.R.Cr.P. Rule 4.1 and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-106 (1989), those provisions merely codify by rule and statute a private citizen’s authority to make an arrest when he has reasonable grounds for believing a person has committed a felony—they do nothing to repeal or alter a private person’s right to arrest a person who has committed a breach of peace in the arresting citizen’s presеnce.
In my judgment, the only issue in this case is whether finding appellant intoxicated behind the steering wheel of his parked, but running car with its lights on can be defined as a breach of peace or disorderly conduct. If his conduct can be labeled a breach of peace, then his arrest was valid and the evidence seized was admissible. Under a statute authorizing peace officers to arrest without warrant for disorderly conduct, drunkenness in a public place has been held to be disorderly conduct, through the individual is not otherwise creating a disturbance. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 41 (1962). Arkansas has such a statute. See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-11-110 (1987); but see also Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71 -207 (1987). That being so, appellant’s conviction should be affirmed.