87 N.J.L. 670 | N.J. | 1915
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This ease presents the question whether a landlord of an apartment-house, which is divided into six apartments and a store, is liable for injury to a tenant occupying the top apartment, from the falling of the ceiling, caused by it having become moist, from water coming from the roof, at the times of rain or storms. Both the tenant and the
The trial court in the charge to the jury applied the principle of that case to the facts of the ease under discussion, where the defective roof was the cause of the injury, charging the jury that it made no difference in its application to this ease between passageways and stairways retained for the use of the tenants, and’a roof which is used to cover all the tenants in the house; that a defective roof of a building containing several apartments is governed by the same rule of law as applies to passageways, stairways, and the like. The tenant had no control over the roof; the landlord is the only one who had such control, and it is his duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the roof in such repair that its condition will not be a source of injury to the tenants underneath.
An exception was noted to this part of the charge and it is urged before this court as error.
We think it is not. The trial court properly applied the principle laid down by this court in the case of Siggins v. McGill, supra, io the caso under discussion. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Gilland v. Maynes, 216 Mass. 581; 104 N. E. Rep. 555, held that the landlord having retained control of the outside of a building, including the roof and glitters, upon him rested the responsibility.
The appellant also assigns as error, the fact that the plaintiff was permitted to testify, over the objection of the defendant, that the son of the defendant, after the accident, painted the roof, and another witness was permitted to testify that Mr. Levy, the landlord, after the accident sent a mason to fix it, i. e., to fix the patch which fell down, and that a man came to fix it.
It is quite true that the great weight of authority, in the courts of the United States and England, is that evidence of changes and repairs made subsequently to-the injury, or as to precautions taken subsequently, to prevent recurrence of injuiy, is not admissible as showing negligence or as amounting to an admission of negligence. The reason for the rule is declared to be that the effect of declaring such evidence competent would be to inform a defendant that if he makes changes or repairs, he does it under a penalty, for, if the evidence is competent, it operates as a confession that he was guilty of a prior wrong. The cases, which are numerous, will be found collected in 29 Cyc. 616. But the evidence was competent for another purpose, that is to show the possession of the landlord, and also to show there was a leak in the roof, as charged by the plaintiff. It bears on the landlord’s liability, not his negligence.. The trial judge should have been requested by the defendant to charge a cautionary instruction, limiting its consideration by the jury to such a purpose. Evidence,- legal for one purpose, cannot be excluded because the jury may erroneously use it for another purpose. The court, on request, will always guard against such an error, or, if not, a -party aggrieved may take his exception. Trenton Passenger Railway Co. v. Cooper, 60 N. J. L. 219; Hill v. Maxwell, 77 Id. 766. We think it was not error to admit this evidence under-the situation as presented in this case. There is no legal merit in the other points assigned by the appellant for reversal.. They need no further discussion.
The judgment is therefore affirmed. ■ ■ ■ .
For reverml—None.