delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal involves an insurance coverage dispute. The issue in this case is whether defendant-appellant, Economy Fire & Casualty Company (Economy), gave its insureds, Oscar Perry and Minnie Perry, plaintiffs-appellees (the insureds), proper notice of a change in coverage in their insurance policy at the time of renewal. This change was a newly added exclusion for injuries resulting from exposure to lead-based paint (lead paint exсlusion). The other party involved in this appeal is defendant-appellee, Tyrone Morris, a minor, by Angela Morris, his mother and next friend (the minor tenant), who has filed suit against the insureds alleging injuries caused by his ingestion of lead-based paint on property that his family rented from the insureds. Economy now appeals from thе trial court’s order of April 2, 1999, denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion for summary judgment of the minor tenant and the insureds. We conclude that Economy did not givе proper notice of the lead paint exclusion and is obligated to afford a defense to the insureds under the terms of their insurance policy. We affirm.
An insured bears the burden of knowing the contents of insurance policies. Furtak v. Moffett,
“§ 143.17a. Notice of Intention Not to Renew, a. No company shall fail to renew any policy of insurancе, to which Section 143.11 applies, except for those defined in subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Section 143.13, unless it shall send by mail to the named insured at least 60 days advance notice of its intention not to renew. ***
b. This Section does not apply if the company has manifested its willingness to renew directly to the named insured. Provided, however, that no company may increase the renewal premium on any policy of insurance to which Section 143.11 applies, except for those defined in subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Section 143.13, by 30% or more, nor impose changes in deductibles or coverage that materially alter the policy, unless the company shall have mailed or delivered to the named insured written notice of such increase or change in deductible оr coverage at least 60 days prior to the renewal or anniversary date. ***
c. Should a company fail to comply with the notice requirements оf this Section, the policy shall terminate only as provided in this subsection. In the event notice is provided at least 31 days, but less than 60 days prior to expiration of the policy, the policy shall be extended for a period of 60 days or until the effective date of any similar insurance procured by the insured, whichever is less, on the same terms and conditions as the policy sought to be terminated. In the event notice is provided less than 31 days prior to the expirаtion of the policy, the policy shall be extended for a period of one year or until the effective date of any similar insurance proсured by the insured, whichever is less, on the same terms and conditions as the policy sought to be terminated unless the insurer has manifested its willingness to renew at a prеmium which represents an increase not exceeding 30%.” 215 ILCS 5/143.17a (West 1992).
The Act is controlling here. The lead paint exclusion constituted a material changе in coverage to the insureds’ original policy, which did not contain the lead paint exclusion. As the trial court correctly noted, the new exclusion would have the ultimate effect of excluding a form of coverage and protection to the insured such as that now involved in the underlying lawsuit of the minor tenant.
We find meritless Economy’s arguments that the exclusion did not materially alter the policy. Economy claims that, at the time it added the lead paint exclusiоn, it believed that another exclusion in the original policy, the absolute pollution exclusion, would have also barred coverage for injuries from lead-based paint. Ergo, Economy argues, this “belief” on its part rendered the lead paint exclusion a mere policy “clarification.” Economy hаs pointed to nothing in the record that indicates that the modification was in fact considered to be, or presented to the insureds as, a clarificаtion of the absolute pollution exclusion rather than a newly added separate exclusion. In any event, Economy is wrong. Whether a change is material is not determined by what an insurer claims it believes to be material. Rather, “as a matter of law, the standard pollution exclusion found in general liability policies does not preclude coverage for personal injuries arising out of a minor’s ingestion of lead.” Insurance Co. v. Stringfield,
Economy’s arguments regarding constructive notice are irrelevant in view of the clear statutory mandate regarding proper actual notice. Econоmy contends, nevertheless, that it provided actual notice. The pertinent document is Form FF-115, which was entitled “NOTICE OF CHANGE” for the 1988 through 1991 renewals and “NOTICE OF RENEWAL CHANGE” for the 1992 and subsequent rеnewals. A subheading states as follows: “THE COVERAGES AFFORDED BY YOUR POLICY MAY HAVE BEEN CHANGED.” The relevant language then states: “In order to provide you with the most up-to-date coverages we have revised your policies [’] coverages, forms and/or endorsements. Please refer to your policy and its endorsements for the exact changes.” The fоrm contains additional language to the effect that the insureds should contact their independent insurance agent if they have any questions. As a matter оf law, this is insufficient notice. The insured would still be required to “read the fine print” of the policy, including forms and endorsements, in order to determine what the changes might bе, a burden which cannot be imposed on an insured at the time a policy is renewed. See Government Employees Insurance Co. v. United States,
The parties have raised additional issues, such as whether Economy complied with statutory mailing requirements and whether the exclusion’s “lead рaint” language barred coverage for alleged injuries from “lead dust” under the facts of the underlying case. We need not address these issues, however, in view of our conclusion that the terms of the insured’s original policy apply due to Economy’s lack of notice of the addition of a lead paint exclusion. The trial court’s order denying Economy’s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to the insureds and the minor tenant is affirmed.
Affirmed.
O’MARA FROSSARD, EJ, and RAKOWSKI, J., concur.