124 Iowa 386 | Iowa | 1904
Nor the purposes of the ruling on the demurrer the allegations of the pleadings in so far as they assert
The court, in State v. Kean, 69 N. H. 122 (45 Atl. Rep. 256, 48 L. R. A. 102) in declaring a hay Avindow eight feet above the sidewalk an obstruction, said: “ The public, however, is entitled to the full and free use of the territory within the limits of a highway, not only for actual passage, but for all purposes that are legitimately incident thereto. Every actual encroachment upon the highway by the erection of a building or fence thereon, or any other permanent or habitual occupation thereof, is an invasion of the public right, even though it does not operate as a natural obstruction to public travel.” See, generally, as to things overhanging streets, note to Hagerstown v. Witmer, 39 L. R. A. 667 (86 Md. 293, 37 Atl. Rep. 965). The people are entitled to make use of all parts of the street. Goodrich v. Railway, 103 Iowa, 412. In a recent Indiana case the court declared that “ the permanent and exclusive use and occupancy of any public street or highway by any person by the erection or maintenance of any structure thereon, beneath or above its surface, which wrongfully obstructs such street or highway, is a public nuisance, punishable as a misdemeanor.” Bybee v. State, 94 Ind. 443 (48 Am. Rep. 175). These general principles are too well established to call for an extended citation of the authority. The main difficulty arises in determining whether a cellar or area way is an obstruction, and, if so, whether their construction may be permitted by municipal authority. In this State the title to the streets is in the city, and by section 751 of the Code power is conferred upon it “ to establish, lay off, open, widen, straighten, narrow, vacate, extend, improve and repair, streets, highways,” etc., and by section 753 it is given “ the care, supervision, and control of all public high
But it does not follow that the municipality may authorize the location or construction of an area way so as to work an injury to the property of an adjoining owner. While the council is to- exercise control over the streets, this is coupled with the restriction that in doing so it “ shall cause the same, to be kept open and in repair and free from nuisances.” This does not mean that nothing shall be allowed in the street, but that the street shall be kept free from 'obstacles which impede public travel. In exercising control over the streets, however, the council ought not to be allowed to encroach on private rights. The abutting owner has an interest in the street peculiar to his situation, and distinct from any he may claim as a citizen of the municipality. Long v. Wilson, 119 Iowa, 267. lie is not only entitled to freedom of.
We conclude that the demurrer should háve been overruled.— Reversed.