26 Cal. 372 | Cal. | 1864
In December, 1863, the plaintiff, who had become the owner and holder of certain county warrants of the County of San Mateo, applied by petition to the District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, for a writ of mandamus to be directed to the defendant, as Treasurer of said county, requiring him to pay the amount due thereon uj>on their presentation to him for that purpose. The defendant appeared and filed an answer setting forth the grounds why the petition should not be granted, and thereupon the matters in controversy were submitted to the Court, and a judgment was rendered directing a writ of mandamus to be issued in accordance
In April, 1862, the roadmaster of one of the road districts in the County of San Mateo, with the consent of the Board of Supervisors, after having first given the notice required by law, entered into a contract with, one Lloyd, to build a bridge over one of the highways in such district, for a price stipulated; and in due time the bridge was constructed by Lloyd, and the work was approved by the proper authority, when the Auditor of the county, in pursuance of an order before then made by the Board of Supervisors, drew two warrants or drafts, each of which was dated August 2, 1862, and directed to the Treasurer of San Mateo County, requesting him to pay to the order of the said Lloyd two hundred and fifty dollars out of the road fund, for the building of the bridge. On the same day, Lloyd presented these warrants to the Treasurer for payment, and, there being no funds in the Treasury with which to pay them, the Treasurer registered the same and indorsed them “Fot paid for want of funds,” and signed his name thereto as County Treasurer. After the plaintiff became the owner of the warrants, he presented them for payment to the Treasurer, in whose hands there was at the time sufficient money applicable to the payment of the warrants, to pay the same with the interest that had accrued thereon. The Treasurer refused and still refuses to pay the warrants, on the ground that the contract with Lloyd was not authorized by the Act of the Legislature of this State, passed in 18-57, entitled “An Act to reorganize and establish the County of San Mateo;” and that therefore the warrants were issued without authority and are void. (Laws 1857, p. 222.)
The decision of the case depends upon the effect of this Act of 1857, and the Act of 1861, entitled “An Act to provide for the establishment, maintenance and protection of public and private roads.” (Laws of 1861, p. 389.) If the Act of 1857, so far as it applies to the question involved in this case, is to control, then it is admitted, on the part of the plaintiff',
The defendant relies upon the ninth and tenth sections of this Act in justification of his refusal to pay the amount alleged to be due by these warrants. These sections read as follows:
“ Sec. 9. The Board of Supervisors shall also have powers to levy and collect an annual tax in the manner prescribed by law, not exceeding fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of taxable property in said county, to provide for the current expenses of the county; but no part of the money so collected shall be applied toward the payment of any expenses, debt or liability incurred during any preceding year.
“ Sec. 10. Neither the Board of Supervisors, nor any officer or citizen of said county, shall have power to contract any debt or liability against the said county; and no person or property therein shall ever be liable or subject to be taxed for any debt .whatever hereafter contracted against the said county by the Board of Sujservisors •, provided, the provisions of this section shall not be held to prevent the' paying out of money actually in the Treasury, to the objects contemplated by law.”
The plaintiff’s counsel contends that these sections of the Act of 1857 are necessarily repealed by the Act of 1861.
The Act of 1861 is a law general in its nature, and was evidently designed to have application to the whole State, except in so far as certain counties and portions of counties are exempted from its operation. The twenty-first section excepts certain counties by name, and all incorporated cities and towns, from its provisions, and the Counties of Sonoma and Marin are exempted from the provisions of certain of its sections; from which it is plainly to be inferred that the Act applies to those counties not excepted in terms. The exceptions made operate as a limitation of the exempted counties. Expressio unius est exdusio alterius is a maxim of general application in the construction of statutes.
The process and mode by which the county road fund is to be created, is provided in the thirteenth section of the Act. It consists of a poll tax of two dollars upon all able bodied men of a particular description, and a road tax upon all taxable property in the county, not to exceed twenty-five cents on the hundred dollars.
That it was designed by the Legislature that the provisions of the Act of 1861 should be extended to the County of San Mateo, we see no reason to doubt; nor do we understand the counsel for the appellant to maintain in argument, that the Act was wholly inoperative as to that county, but rather that a promise to pay for services rendered and performed under and in pursuance of the contract made in 1862, could not be enforced, except in the contingency that the road fund of that year was sufficient for the purpose of paying the debt or liability thus created; the result of which would be that the person who had rendered his services upon the faith of the contract and in confidence that the officers of the county, having the matter in charge, would provide the means to pay him the price stipulated, would be entirely without remedy, for the reason that the fund of the designated year proved inadequate for the payment. Thus while the creditor might have the right to compensation for the work performed and accepted on the part of the county, he would be without remedy to enforce his right.
It must be admitted that if the contract entered into between the roadmaster and Lloyd was unauthorized, and therefore void,
It is maintained on the part of the appellant that the direct object of the Act of 18-57 was that each year’s expenditures should be limited to its income, and that no part of the money collected in any one year can be applied toward the payment of any expenses, debt or liability incurred during any preceding year. This may be so as to the matters within the purview of the Act of 1857, in respect to which the inhibitions of the ninth and tenth sections of that Act had reference. The Act of 1861 conferred upon the Supervisors and the roadmaster additional duties, and the powers to perform those duties as therein prescribed; and so far as such additional duties and the powers to perform them are repugnant to the restrictions contained in the ninth and tenth sections of the organic Act of the county, to that extent such restrictions were repealed by the Act of 1861, the last section of which repeals “all Acts or parts of Acts in conflict with the provisions of this Act.”
The Act of 1857, as already seen, prohibits the application of money collected in one year to the payment of any expenses, debt or liability incurred during any preceding year, and also declares that neither the Board of Supervisors, nor any officer or citizen of the county shall have power to contract any debt or liability against the county; and it further declares that no person or property in the county “ shall ever be liable or subject to be taxed for any debt whatsoever hereafter contracted against said county by the Board of Supervisors.” But the Act of 1861 authorizes the roadmaster, with the consent of the Board of Supervisors, to make contracts for the purchase of lumber or other material for building bridges or culverts, for grading roads, or any other necessary work upon
The judgment is affirmed.
[After the above opinion was pronounced, a re-argument was granted on the petition of the appellant, and the following opinion delivered:]
The point discussed on the re-argument of this case is as to whether the Act of 1861 is repugnant to the Act of 1857. In the consideration of the question suggested, the Act of 1861 is to be examined, in the first instance, without reference to the senior Act, in order to ascertain its meaning and the extent of the powers of the officers therein named in relation to the matters committed to their charge. This Act, as may be seen by reference to it, gives to the roadmaster authority to make certain contracts, subject to one condition only, to wit: the consent of the Board of Supervisors. The Act does not limit the amount of debt which may be incurred for the objects contemplated; hence it follows that the'roadmaster,
The Act of 1857 denies to all officers the power to contract any debt or liability against the county. The Act of 1861 empowers the roadmaster to contract debts or liabilities against the county, and fixes no limit as to their amount. It is obvious that both of these Acts cannot be operative. If the Act of 1857 is to have effect in the particular mentioned, then a roadmaster in San Mateó County can have no authority, with the consent of the Supervisors or otherwise, to enter into any contract specified in the Act of 1861. In Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill, 221, the Court say: “ As all laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the Legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable.” This authority, cited on the part of the appellant, we concede states the rule clearly and correctly, and the inquiry is reduced to the point as to whether the Acts under consideration are irreconcilably repugnant to each other. That they are so, we think is manifest upon first impression. The first Act says no officer shall have power to contract any debt against the county, and the last says the roadmaster shall have the power, provided he first obtains the consent of the Board of Supervisors to the exercise of it.
Upon the theory that both Acts cannot have full and entire effect, it is argued on behalf of aj>pellant that the powers granted by the Act of 1861 can be exercised in a limited and restricted degree in subordination to the law of 1857, and if so, then the power so conferred is to be construed as granted with the intention that its exercise shall be thus limited and restricted; and thus it is sought to give effect to the former law as a limitation upon the power of the roadmaster under the latter to making contracts by which the county could only become liable to the extent of the income to the road.
The appellant has made an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court below on constitutional grounds, which, if tenable, demands a reversal of the judgment. The objection is, that the Court below had no power to render the judgment in the case, on the ground that the Supreme Court only, had, at the time, jurisdiction in cases of mandamus.
In the enumeration of the powers of the Supreme Court, the fourth section'of the Sixth Article of the Constitution as amended, among other things, declares, that “ the Court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus, and also all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.” By virtue of this provision this Court has exercised original jurisdiction in the cases enumerated; but until now we have not had occasion to determine the question as to the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the State in the same class of cases. By the sixth section of the same Article of the Constitution as amended, it is provided that “ the District Courts shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity; also, in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, and in all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to three hundred dollars.” The power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, was not granted in terms to the Supreme Court by the old Constitution. The power to issue all writs and process necessary to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was granted, and beyond this the Court never pretended to exercise jurisdiction by the use of this class of writs. Bor did the old Constitution confer upon the Dis
When the Constitution as amended was adopted by the people, it must be presumed they knew what were the provisions of the old Constitution as to the subject of the powers of the Supreme Court and the District Courts, respectively, and were informed as to the extent and effect of the changes made, and also that it was not designed that the general language of the sixth section of the Sixth Article of the Constitution as it was amended, should be of less comprehensive import than the same or equivalent words were in the original instrument.
At the time of the adoption of the amended Constitution it had been decided in effect that the constitutional provisions which conferred appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, in all cases where the matter in dispute exceeded two hundred dollars, exclusive of interest, and which conferred in substantially the same language, original jurisdiction on the District
In examining the constitutional question raised, we have considered not only the Constitution as amended, but also the
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Sawyer expressed no opinion on the rehearing.