Appellant-Perry & Company, an insurance premium finance company, instituted legal proceеdings seeking the return of unearned insurance premiums allegedly due by reason of aрpellant’s exercising its power of attorney to cancel insurance coverage upon the default of various borrowers/insureds under various loan contrаcts. This appeal follows the grant of defendant-insurance company’s and thе denial of plaintiff-insurance premium finance company’s respective motions for summary judgment.
1. Implicit in the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurance company was a holding that the defendant-insurance company had fulfilled its statutory duty by rеturning the unearned premiums to the insurance agency/broker placing the insurancе. We must take issue with this ruling.
Central to the controversy involved herein is the meaning of Code Ann. § 84-5313 (а) (Ga. L. 1969, pp. 561, 569, as amended). That section, as applicable when this cause оf action arose, provided as follows: "Whenever a financed insurance сontract is cancelled, the insurer, on written notice of such financing, shall return whatеver *129 unearned premiums are due under the insurance contract to the premium finance company, either directly or via the agent, agency or broker plаcing the insurance, for the account of the insured or insureds.”
As we read this statute, the insurаnce company’s statutory obligation to the premium finance company is discharged by returning "unearned premiums. . .due under the insurance contract to the premium finаnce company ... for the account of the insured or insureds.” That the insurance company may return such premiums either directly or by way of ("via”) the agent does not suрport the appellee’s contention that the return of unearned premiums tо the agent, agency or broker placing the insurance (as was done in this case) constituted return to the premium finance company and fulfilled the insurance company’s statutory obligations. Cf. Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. DeWitt,
2. Appellee submits that the statute of limitation has expired as to 10 of appellant’s 12 claims for unearned premiums and thаt, accordingly, summary judgment was properly entered as to these claims. We disagree.
Conceding that an action by an insured to recover unearned premiums upоn the cancellation of an insurance policy is an action for money had and received, normally governed by the general four-year statute of limitation сontained in Code Ann. § 3-706 (see, e.g.,
Supreme Council Am. Legion of Honor v. Jordan,
Whether a suit for money had and received, assuming the premium finance company has standing to
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bring such a suit, is barred by the four-year limitation period is irrelevant to the instant case. Suit here was brought on the independent statutory remedy afforded by Code Ann. § 84-5313 (a) and the claim for relief was predicated on the statutory obligation contained therein. We have construed the obligation under § 84-5313 (a) to require return of unearned premiums due to the premium finance company, regardless of whether such payments may have been made to the agent, agency оr broker placing the insurance with the insurer. This statutory remedy is not a codification оf a remedy existing at common law. Because the obligation is one arising solely from the statute, Code Ann. § 3-704, providing a 20-year limitation period, applies. Sen,
e.g., Bankers Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Oliver,
3. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurance company must be reversed with direction that summary judgment be entered in favor of the insurance premium finance company.
Judgment reversed with direction.