delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, Adam Ferminas, sued the defendant, Montgomery Ward & Company, to recover damages for a back injury he suffered when he fell while shopping in one of defendant’s retail stores in Cliicago. Following a bench trial, the trial court enterеd judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $85,000. The appellate court reversed (
The basis for the appellate court decision was that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case on the issue of defendant’s negligence under any of the plaintiff’s several theories of liability. It is undisputed that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was a business invitee on defendant’s premises and that defendant owed him a duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premisеs in a reasonably safe condition. (Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, Inc. (1955),
In light of our conclusion that the evidence supports a finding of negligence under the well-established “ordinary care” standard, we find it unnecessary to discuss these theories at length, but several observations are appropriate before discussing the evidence. First, plaintiff’s latter two theories are, in our view, encompassed within the general rule of “ordinary care” and are nothing more thin specific ways in which a business can breach its obligation to exercise ordinary care to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. Secondly, we note that the appellate court proрerly applied the Donoho doctrine. In that case, this court held that where, as here, the substance on the floor is related to defendant’s business and “the plaintiff offers some further evidence, direct or circumstantial, however slight, suсh as the location of the substance or the business practices of the defendant, from which it could be inferred that it was more likely that defendant or his servants, rather than a customer, dropped the substance on the premises” (
We turn now to an analysis of the evidence which we believe sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. A detailed statement оf the testimony is unnecessary since it is adequately set forth in the appellate court opinion and clearly supports findings that: (1) the plaintiff fell when he stepped on a small triangular-shaped object with wheels on the bottom while walking in аn aisle in defendant’s store; (2) that object was probably an attachment to a floor polisher sold by defendant and displayed on low shelves in the area where plaintiff fell; and (3) the plaintiff suffered a serious back injury as the result of his fall. There was no evidence specifically indicating how this particular object got .on the floor, how long it had been there or whether defendant or its servants knew of the presence of the object on the floor.
The crucial tеstimony was that of Anna Stecyna, who had been a clerk in the department which handled the floor-polisher attachments until May 1, 1966, when she was transferred to another department. As the result of injuries suffered in an automobile accident, she temporarily left work on May 26, 1966, and thus was unaware of actual conditions in the store on May 31, 1966, the date of plaintiff’s accident. She testified that prior to May 1, 1966, while working in the department which handled the attachments, she personally observеd on a number of occasions both children and adults (primarily store employees on their “breaks”) using these attachments as skateboards to skate up and down the aisles. She also stated that she had often found these attachments on the floor and had picked them up and replaced them on the low shelves where they were displayed with the floor polishers. After cross-examination, defense counsel moved to strike all her testimony because it was not “remоtely connected with the facts in this case.” Up to that time, plaintiff’s counsel had made no mention of offering her testimony for a limited purpose, but in response to the motion to strike he commented that “[t]he only purpose [of the testimony] is to show these are Montgomery Ward property, and this is three to four weeks before this.” The court then denied the motion to strike and admitted the testimony “for the limited purpose to show Montgomery Ward had some of those in the store within thirty dаys from this accident.”
It seems apparent that counsel and the court were concerned about the relevancy of this evidence and we would readily agree that it could not be used to prove conditions existing in the store оn May 31, 1966, or to establish that defendant or its servants were responsible for the presence of the particular attachment on the floor at the time of the accident. However, the evidence was, in our judgment, admissible for the additional purpose of showing that the defendant, through its servant Anna Stecyna, had notice at least 30 days prior to the accident that these floor-polisher attachments were creating a dangerous condition in that area of thе store. Such notice can be inferred through evidence of previous, similar accidents (City of Chicago v. Powers (1866),
When Anna Stecyna’s testimony is considered for the additional purpose of proving notice and combined with the other evidence in the case, we believe a sufficient showing of negligence is established. She was a clerk in the same department where these floor-polisher attachments were sold and as such had the responsibility to correct unsafe conditions or at least report their existence to her superiors. Through her personal observation, she had notice that these attachments were creating a dangerous situation because people used them as skateboards and then left them on the floor. Her tеstimony does not reveal whether her superiors or other employees knew of this situation or whether she picked up the attachments on order of her supervisors or just on her own initiative. That makes no difference, however, sincе notice to her is sufficient to give notice to the defendant. Once defendant had notice of the dangerous condition, its obligation was to either correct the condition or give its customers sufficient warning to enable them to avоid harm. (Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lines, Inc. (1955),
We wish to emphasize that we “firmly adhere to the rule that a storekeeper is not the insurer of his customer’s safety.” (Olingеr v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. (1961),
In the appellate court, defendant also argued that the trial court erred in refusing to permit introduction of a certain defense exhibit and that the amount of the judgment wаs excessive. Since the appellate court reversed the trial court on the negligence question, consideration of additional issues was unnecessary but defendant is entitled to be heard on those issues. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further consideration of defendant’s other contentions.
Reversed and remanded.