147 Ga. 527 | Ga. | 1918
(After stating the foregoing facts.) The first.contention made by the plaintiffs in error is that defendants in error were not entitled to be heard in opposition to the intervention filed by them, and had no interest in the subject-matter of the litigation and funds arising from the sale of the property of the Perkins Lumber Company by the receivers, because they had failed to file their claims with the chairman of the receivers by May 1, 1915, as required by order of the court. This contention must be dismissed with the observation that the order of court requiring all parties to present their claims to the receivers by a day fixed was passed upon the application of the receivers appointed in the very proceeding in which the defendants in error were allowed a decree setting up and declaring the rank of their respective liens. The ex parte order of the court, if it referred to defendants in error at all, certainly did not have the effect to set aside the judgment and decree of the court in favor of the defendants in error, which decree was the foundation of all future proceedings in the case, including the application of the receivers themselves to have all claims against the Perkins Lumber Company, and the properties of the company sold by them, presented to them by a date certain. Did the intervention set forth a cause of action? Plaintiffs in error came into court on May 5, 1916, under the familiar rule in equity that an intervenor takes the case as he finds it. On that date they found a decree of the court establishing and declaring liens in favor of the defendants in error. This decree was rendered more than three years prior to the filing of the intervention, and, both under § 4358 of the . Civil Code and the rule in equity referred to, the intervenors are not entitled to have the decree annulled. They expressly declared that they elected to follow the proceeds of the sale of the property made by the receivers. The
Affirmed.
