87 N.J. Eq. 134 | New York Court of Chancery | 1916
The object of this bill is to compel the Publie Service Railway Company to carry the complainants over its railroad between Trenton and Riverton for life, free of charge, in compliance with a contract to that effect made by the lessor of the railway company, in consideration of grants of land for the route of the railroad. The-history of the case, as shown by the pleadings and as represented by counsel in their oral and written arguments, is briefly this: In 1900, the complainant Mitchell B. Perkins and his associates promoted the Camden and Trenton Railway Company and built and operated its line of railway between Camden and Trenton. The route extended across lands of Perkins, in Beverly towiiship, Burlington county, for which he gave a right of way in consideration, of the company agreeing to carry him and the members of his family over the line for life. The agree
These principles of the common law applicable to common carriers demanded nothing more than that the carrier should provide, reasonably, adequate facilities for all who applied for transportation in the order of application, and that the charges therefor should be reasonable. So long as the charges were reasonable, the passenger had no cause for complaint, even though others were carried at a lesser rate or free. The relative rights of the individual were apparently not considered, and, correspondingly, a carrier who bartered his transportation for land or other considerations obviously could not be tolerated to escape the performance on the grounds of failure of a public duty to charge all reasonably equal. To remedy the evil incursions upon the public’s right to travel for a compensation equitable to all—to level the obligations and rights of common carriers in their relation to the public—the state intervened by the Utilities act. Section 18 o'f the statute provides that “no public utility as herein defined shall (a) make, impose or exact any unjust or unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential * * * rate,” &c.; or (d) “make or give, directly or indirectly, any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person or corporation, or to any locality.” Later sections make it a misdemeanor for any public utilities corporation or any
It is true that the limitations in the act are concise declarations of common law principles, but the contention of the complainants that they have no wider significance or effect than they had at common law, is not admissible. It must be a matter of common observation that the legislature in defining these principles in an act in which the government assumed the regulation of the public agencies of the state, and in this the delegation of power to the utility commission to command an equality of facilities and accommodations and adjust and fix rates equitable to the great body Of the traveling public and the imposition of severe penalties for violation, emphasized a policy unrecognized at common law. Then they meant that the charge must be reasonable to the individual passenger and now they signify that they mtist be reasonable and also not unreasonable or preferential, talcing into consideration the rights, as to charge, of all patrons collectively.
Our Utilities act is not in phraseology as precise and exacting as the Federal Interstate Commerce act, which prohibits the carrying of persons or property for fare “greater or loss or different,” but its purpose and spirit of equality is not dissimilar and in principle forbids any difference in charge which is not based upon difference in service, and viewed in this light the contract under consideration, which grants to the complainants the privilege of riding over the line of the defendant an indefinite time and unlimited mileage for a fixed consideration, viz., the value of the land, is manifestly an unreasonable preference and advantage, and within the inhibition of the Public Utilities act. It was contended by the complainants that because there was no proof in the case showing that the value of, the land was not equal to the services to be rendered, it could not be held that the preference and advantage were “undue or unreasonable.”
The contract made in 1900 bjr the complainants with the Camden and Trenton Railway Company plays no part in this litigation, save as a matter of history,' and because it may have formed a part of the consideration for the contract of 1911. The complainants lost all right under the earlier contract when the Camden and Trenton Railway Company was sold out under foreclosure proceedings in 1910. The bill is not maintainable upon the theory that the contract relates to a time anterior to the enactment of the public utilities statute, which was declared in Public Service Electric Co. v. Board of Public Utilities Commissioners, supra, to be prospective.
Thebill will be disniissed, with costs.