156 Pa. 554 | Pa. | 1893
Lead Opinion
Opinion and reasons eor decree oe July 19,1893,
By act of 5th of August, 1870, what is known as “ The Building Commission ” of Philadelphia was created. It was authorized to erect public buildings for the use of the several courts, and other municipal purposes in the city ; to locate them either on Washington or Penn Square, as should be determined by a vote of the people at the general election in October, 1870;
Under this act, the commission organized, and has since been in uninterrupted existence down to 24th of May, 1893. An attempt was made in the Constitutional Convention of 1874, when the section which prohibited the legislature from creating such commissions was under discussion, to amend it by adding, “ And all such commissions now existing are hereby abolished,”' but the amendment was rejected. Then, when the act of 1885, providing for corporate government of cities of the first class, was passed, a saving clause against the repeal of special acts was inserted.
So that the existence of the commission, endowed with all the great powers we have mentioned, is not open to question. Whether it was wise to thus invest the servant with the right of the master over the master’s business and master’s purse, is not for us to inquire. Such special laws could be passed, and often were passed, before the new constitution went into effect.
The first section of the act abolishing the commission is as follows:
“ An act to abolish the Commissioners of Public Buildings and to place all Public Buildings heretofore under the control of such Commissioners under the control of the Department of Public Works in cities of the first class.
“ Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by authority of the same; That commissioners created by any special act of assembly for the erection and construction of any public buildings, required to accommodate the courts, and for municipal purposes, in cities of the first class in this commonwealth, are hereby abolished, and the erection, completion, construction, repair, removal and protection of all public buildings heretofore under the control of such commissioners in Said cities shall be under the direction, control and administration of the department of public works.”
The constitutional power of the legislature to repeal the special act creating the “ Building Commission,” is not denied by complainants; that it should be repealed, if the city of Philadelphia so desires, cannot be denied. But the contention here is not determined by either the right to repeal or the duty to repeal. Is the act of 24th May, 1893, a lawful repeal of the
The first section of the act, then, in pursuance of the one subject clearly expressed in its title, enacts: “ That commissioners created by any special act of assembly for the erection and construction of public buildings required to accommodate the courts and for municipal purposes in cities of the first class, are hereby abolished.” Up to this point, the commissioners are undoubtedly removed, and their offices are vacated, but the commission is still in force. The same section then goes on to say: “And the erection, completion, construction, repair, removal and protection of all public buildings heretofore under the control of such commissioners in said cities, shall be under the direction, control and administration of the department of public works.”
The first section of the bill thus follows strictly the declared purpose of the act in the title. The commissioners are removed, and all their powers and authority are conferred on the department of public works.
We now turn to the legislation for cities of the first class, to ascertain what person or persons shall perform the duties theretofore imposed upon the removed commissioners. Section 1, article 4, of the Bullitt Bill provides, that: “The department of public works shall be under the charge of one director, who shall be the head thereof.” Then article 12 of section 1 of the same bill enacts, that, among other officers: “ The mayor shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of select council, appoint the director of public works.” The vacancy
Assuming, then, that the legislature did not intend to pass a bill containing more than one subject, and that clearly expressed in its title, the first section of the bill in apt words clearly accomplished its purpose; but the special act of 5th of August, 1870, still stood in full force on the statute book, with all its special and large powers relating specially to Philadelphia, to be performed, not by the old commissioners, but by the officer appointed by the mayor.
Certainly, it needs no argument to show that the special powers enumerated in the act of 5th August, 1870, when conferred on any officer, is a violation of section 20, article 3, of the constitution : “ The general assembly shall not delegate to any special commission .... any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects .... or perform any municipal function whatever.” The special commission which, by the general assembly of 1870, was delegated to certain commissioners, was, by the general assembly of 1893, simply withdrawn from them and delegated to the head of the department of public works, another commissioner. The fact is not material that the new commissioner was already by general law an officer of the city; the special and unusual power given him, to be exercised in a special manner, with reference to one particular building, constituted the special commission delegated to him. The first section, then, which fulfills the promise of the title, creates a vacancy in the office of commissioner, and fills it with the nominee of the general assembly. The authority of the general assembly of 1870, under the constitution of 1838, to delegate such power to a special commission, was clear; that of the general assembly of 1893, under the constitution of 1874, was peremptorily forbidden. This is not an act increasing the duties and enlarging the powers of the head of the department of public works in cities of the first class, but an act abolishing commissioners of public buildings, and transferring their powers to another in such cities. There is just one city of the first class, Philadelphia ; just one set of commissioners to erect public buildings for the use of the courts and municipal purposes, created by any
If the powers of the commission, bjr a simple repeal of the act of 1870, had passed to the city, the department of public works, as such, would have taken nothing. If the city decided to proceed with the work of building, the direction of the actual labor would have fallen, by virtue of the subdivision of executive powers of the city, upon this department. But the act of 1893 proceeded to gather up carefully all the powers of the old commission, and deposit them, not with the city, but in the lap of the director of public works. By a repeal, the extraordinary powers of the commission would have ended with its own life; the ordinary powers would have fallen back upon the city to be exercised in the ordinary manner; the department of public works would have performed such work and onty such as councils, in the exercise of their paramount “ direction, control and administration” of municipal affairs, might have seen fit to direct. Under the Bullitt bill the department of public works can only take through the city; if the powers of the commission had passed to the city, the department, as such, would have taken nothing; the direction of the actual labor would have been with it, by virtue of being one of the nine subdivisions of the executive power of the city. But under the act of 1893 this department is named as the sole legislative donee of the powers of the commission. It takes not from or through the city, but independently of it, and directly from the commonwealth. Its title is subject to no condition or trust, but is absolute and independent; as much so as that of the old commission.
Taking the title and first section of the act together, and treating the second section as surplusage, it is legislation prohibited by section 20, article 3, and therefore cannot stand.
But does the second section, when read in connection with it, enable us to sustain the act as a whole ? This second section contains three legislative declarations: (1) Repeals the act of 5th of August, 1870. (2) Repeals the proviso to section 1, article 4, of the general act of 1st of June, 1885, saving the act of 5th August, 1870, from repeal. (3) Saves from repeal the act of 6th of March, 1867, appropriating grounds
It is argued by counsel for the city that the second section of the act is supererogatory, and that all of the first section except the first sentence was needless. With all but the first sentence eliminated, the act would stand thus: “ Commissioners created by any special act of assembly for the erection and construction of public buildings required to accommodate the courts and for municipal purposes in cities of the first class in this commonwealth are hereby abolished.”
Treating this as the whole of the act and all the rest as surplusage, it is averred there is such a positive repugnance between it and the old act as necessarily works the repeal of the commission.
We have given this point most careful consideration, with a desire, if possible, to treat the act of 1893 as simply a repeal of that of 1870. But the significant language of the later act warrants no such construction; abolishing the commissioners does not touch their commission; there is only a vacancy in the office. Besides, the legislative intent is so manifest in the
The plaintiffs further aver that this bill violates section 7, article 3, of the constitution : “ The general assembly shall not pass any local or special law. . . ¡ regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, boroughs, or school districts.”
This act purports to be a general law applicable to cities of the first class. We have held, and now adhere to it, that the legislature may lawfully classify cities for corporate purposes, and that an act to promote such purposes is not local or special, merely because, at the date of its passage, there was but one city to which it applied. But it has been decided in case after case, since the constitution of 1874 went into effect, in positive unmistakable language, that if the act was intended to apply to but one particular city, county or township, and was not intended to and could never apply to any other, it was local and therefore unconstitutional. This act is nominally general ; applies in terms to cities of the first class; abolishes commissioners of public buildings for the use of courts and municipal purposes in such cities, created by special acts of assembly, and places all buildings heretofore under their control in the control of the department of public works. At the date of its passage there was just one city, one set of commissioners, one special act of assembly, one public building, to which it could apply ; from the very nature of the case, there never could be another city in the first class to which the.act could apply, for it transfers to the department of public works buildings heretofore under the control of such commissioners ; no matter how many cities come into this class, nor how soon they reach it, this act cannot apply to them, for their affairs have not heretofore been regulated by the special provisions of airy such act as that of 1870.
In fact it is not denied that the act applies solely to Phila
It cannot be pretended that the act of 1893 can have any application to any other city than Philadelphia which may subsequently come into the first class. If a dozen cities, by reason of increase of population, had come into the class since the act of classifying cities was passed, no one of them would have been affected by the act of 1893, because, while each would, under the general act of 1885, have hada department of public works, no one of them would have had, in such department, the special powers here transferred to the department of public works in Philadelphia.
The act stands before us, as if the legislature had given it this form: “ The Commissioners of Public Buildings in the city of Philadelphia, holding office under the act of 5th of August, 1870, are hereby removed, and all their powers and duties
This is the act of 1893 stripped of a disguise so thin that it can scarcely be called one, and brings it directly within the prohibition of section 7, article 3, of the constitution, as clearly as was decided in Seowden’s Appeal, the act of April 18,1878, regulating the affairs of the city of Titusville and Crawford count}7, came within the same prohibition. To the same effect as Scowderi’s Appeal, are Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. 377; McCarthy v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. 246; Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa. 191; Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322; Ayar’s Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, and many others.
It may be asked, then, cannot a city or other municipality, because of the constitutional prohibition, rid itself of obnoxious local and special laws antedating the present constitution? We answer, certainly it can, if that be the real end in view, The very same article 3, section 7, which forbids local and special legislation, points the way so plainly, that, of all forms of legislation, it is subject to the least uncertainty. ' It says, after enumerating what laws shall not be passed: “ But laws repealing local or special laws may be passed.” Under this express constitutional authority, an act of a dozen lines, repealing the act of 5th of August, 1870, would have ousted the commissioners and obliterated the commission. All the rights of the city over its own property, with the control of its own purse, would at once have been resumed. Then, through councils, the direct representatives of the people, by ordinances, City Hall could have been completed, the old buildings on Independence Square removed, in a time and way and at such cost as to the city seemed proper. Why this easy path to the professedly desired end was not followed, we do not know; we do know, however, that, whether this act was designed with a view to evade the
The argument, that every reasonable intendment should be made in favor of the constitutionality of a law enacted by a co-ordinate branch of the government, appeals to us with much force. But the matter to be determined is purely judicial; a spirit of comity can only impel us to a careful consideration of the question; it cannot determine the answer; that must be found in the language of the act, and the manifest intent of the constitution. If this act be sustained, the same sort of legislation can regulate the affairs of the most insignificant borough in the commonwealth, and we may expect a flood of the same vicious local laws which preceded the adoption of the constitution of 1874. It is certainly not forgotten, that the well-nigh unanimous demand which brought the convention of 1873 into existence, was prompted by the evils springing from local and special legislation. That convention, direct from the people, composed of the ablest and most experienced citizens of the commonwealth, framed this article 3 on legislation. Assuming, what was the settled law, that the general assembly had all legislative power not expressly withheld from it in the organic law, they set about embodying in that law prohibitions which«hould, in the future, effectually prevent the evils the people complained of. Article 3 is almost wholly prohibitory; it enjoins very few duties, but the “ thou shalt nots ” number more than sixty, among them sections 3, 7 and 20, which we here decide to be transgressed by this act. That constitution, with this article the most prominent feature of it, was adopted by an unprecedented majority on a direct vote, indicating a settled determined purpose on part of the people to hold back from the legislature the power to enact local and special laws. Every department of the government is bound by its provisions, but especially is this court, for on it is the duty of judicially determining any violation of it. The state as a whole is subject to it; the largest municipality as well as the'smallest township. Yet it is a fact that, notwithstanding the respect which, as citizens of a free commonwealth, we all have for the fundamental law, since 1874 more than three hundred bills have been passed by the legisl a
But, being the fact, what reasonable intendment in favor of the constitutionality of an act is to be made from its passage by the general assembly ? What is the reasonable presumption of law from that fact? The law presumes all departments of the government will observe the constitution, for all are alike sworn to do so; but if an infringement of it be alleged, we can only determine that question by an impartial scrutiny of the statute, and by giving the constitution its fair, natural and obvious meaning; in so doing, caution in arriving at an opinion adverse to the statute is a duty; so is firmness in pronouncing one when formed. This is all the law enjoins.
Neither the law controlling us in the exercise of the duty, nor, since 1874, any extreme rarity of unconstitutional acts of assembly, warrants such intendment in favor of a bill as relieves us from the necessity of a judicial inquiry, which, itseems to us in this case, leads, inevitably, to a conclusion adverse to its constitutionality.
Another point made in the argument before us — that the public sentiment of Philadelphia with practical unanimity demanded tlio passage of this law, was doubtless more effectively urged before the legislature. But the question presents itself to us in a different shape; we do not believe the intelligent public sentiment of the greatest city of the commonwealth demands the accomplishment of a lawful purpose by unlawful means ; unconstitutional statutes are the very essence of lawlessness. Even if the unanimous public sentiment of the city demanded the enforcement of this act, we could not heed it. Public sentiment, properly, may move courts, in matters wholly discretionary, such as the adoption of rules to speed causes, afford quick relief to suitors, and eradicate abuses in the administration of justice; but such sentiment can have no place in the interpretation of a constitution; the public sentiment expressed in that instrument is the only sentiment of which a court can take notice; it contains the deliberate,- emphatically expressed sentiment of the whole people; they, and they alone, can change ox amend it in the way provided in it, but even they cannot trample upon it. If laws in conflict with it be passed by the legislature,
As to the averment, that the act also violates section 8, article 3, because notice of the proposed legislative action was not published in Philadelphia at least thirty days before the introduction of the bill, we can only say, it is not our duty to go behind the law to inquire whether all the precedent formalities have in fact been complied with. The evidence that notice has been published is to be exhibited to the general assembly; it is not directed to be entered on the journals. The law before us is certified by both houses and approved by the governor. We must presume the requirement as to notice was complied with; to this effect are all the authorities of "numerous adjudicated cases on the same question.
Note. The court being pressed for a speedy decree in this case by^both parties, within half an hour after it was agreed upon in consultation, it was filed. There was no time then to prepare and file an opinion with the decree. Therefore, I was requested by the Chief Justice to prepare an opinion embod}1'ing the reasons of a majority of the court for granting the preliminary injunction, to be filed at October term at Pittsburgh. While I feel sure the subject could have been more ably discussed by any one of my brethren, I am, nevertheless, confident, no one of them is clearer in his conviction that the decree is right on both reason and authority.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
October 2, 1893:
The intention of the legislature in the act of 1893 is perfectly clear, and its object entirely constitutional. The objections to the act are to the mode in which that intention and object are
I make these observations and this illustration to call special attention to the necessity of reading the constitution, where it relates to the powers of the legislative branch of the government, in a broad and liberal way, looking to its spirit as more controlling than its mere words. If a statute does not offend against the spirit, does not really do the thing which the constitution means to prohibit, then it should be sustained, although its form may be liable to objection under the strict words of the prohibition.
The act under consideration is drawn with great carelessness or over-confidence. The objections to its form are manifest and admitted. Even the argument of the very skillful and learned counsel for the respondents is an apology, and a plea to save it notwithstanding its undeniable faults! In this argument I entirely concur. As already said the general intent of the act is clear, and its object entirely constitutional. Looking at this object and intent the objections to its form do not seem to me sufficiently deep-seated to require us to hold that it transgresses the real meaning of the constitutional prohibitions. It will be sufficient without elaborating the discussion,-to indicate-in a general way, the reasons why I think it can and-ought to* be sustained.
Secondly. The objection that the act covers more than one subject, rests on the view that it creates a new commission. If the construction indicated in the preceding paragraph be adopt ed, this objection disappears.
Thirdly. The act is applicable to all cities of the first class, and relates to a subject of municipal government. It therefore comes within the decisions sustaining the classification of cities and is a general law.
Fourthly. Even if the first section of the act be construed to create a new commission, and therefore to be unconstitutional, the second section is free from that objection and can stand by itself as a valid repeal of the act of 1870. It is clearly sever-able, and therefore not involved in the invalidity of section first, if that be conceded for the argument’s sake. Nor do I find the objection that section second contains more than one subject insuperable. The only real subject is the repeal of the act of 1870, and having expressly enacted that, the section proceeds to repeal a section of the act of 1885 which had preserved
In all this there is nothing but the one subject, the repeal of the act of 1870 and thereby the abolition of the commission created by it. The repeal of the section of the act of 1885 was a part of the same purpose, and the proviso as to the Park Commission was necessary in order to limit the repeal to the object really intended. It no more introduced a new subject than the usual clause repealing all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with a new enactment.
For these reasons I am of opinion that the injunction should be dissolved.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
October 2, 1893:
The contention of the plaintiffs is that the act of the general assembly, approved May 24, 1898, is within the inhibition of the constitution, because it conflicts with its prohibition of amendments, revivals or extensions of acts of assembly by their titles, because it violates its mandate forbidding the enactment of special or local laws regulating the affairs of any city or county, because it was not advertised as required in cases of special or local laws and because it is an attempted delegation of a municipal duty to a special office or department.
The act of Aug. 5,1870, constituted certain citizens, together with the mayor and the president of the select and common councils, commissioners, for the erection of the public buildings required to accommodate the courts and for all municipal purposes, and authorized them to make their location upon either Penn Square or Washington Square, to be determined by a vote of the people, and to execute contracts for their construction. It empowered them to make requisition upon the councils for the money necessary in each year for their expenditures, for which special taxes were required to be levied. This act thus authorized the heads of executive and legislative departments of the city, and those citizens who were associated with them,
But this conclusion is resisted because, it is contended, the act overlaps repeal with affirmative legislation. A repeal alone, would, without doubt, have placed the public buildings of a member of the first class of cities in the charge, control and under the direction of the department of public works, for the act organizing the government of such cities provides, “ the construction, protection and repair of public buildings,” shall be “under the direction, control and administration of the department of public works.” The present act, after abolishing commissioners, provides that all public buildings heretofore under the control of commissioners in said cities, “shall be under the direction, control and administration of the department of public works.” These words are thus identical with those used in the governing act, and therefore cannot be said to constitute new or additional legislation. With or without the words in question the effect of the repeal would have been the same. Their use was unnecessary, but doubtless the legislature by using them with the words of repeal intended .an iteration of the absolute extinction of building commissioners in a manner more clear and emphatic than would have been indicated by a simple repeal. The proposition that the act as a repealing statute is brought within the inhibition of the constitution, because in addition to repeal it contains a substantial iteration of it, would seem like refinement run mad, and, if subtle, would appear to be beyond ordinary comprehension.
But the plaintiffs contend that the repeal is incidental and the act is “ intended to apply to one particular city or county and cannot have any application to any other city within the designated class ” and is “ an attempt to regulate by a special law the affairs of the particular city to which it is applicable,” and therefore comes within the grasp of the constitutional prohibition. The history of legislation in this state will attest that the promotion of the public welfare has been best accomplished by a resort to classification, and the exercise of this power for such purpose has never been questioned. Where the popula
In Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 349, it is said by Mr. 'Justice Paxson : “ But it is contended that even if the right to classify exists, the exercise of it by the legislature in this instance is in violation of the constitution for the reason that there is but one city in the state with a population exceeding three hundred thousand, that to form a class containing but one is in point of fact legislating for that one city to the exclusion of ali others and constitutes local and special legislation prohibited by the constitution. The argument is plausible but unsound.” Again, he says: “ In the mean time is the classification as to the cities of the first class bad because there is only one of the class? We think not. Classification does not depend upon numbei’s.” Again: “ If the classification of cities is in violation of the constitution, it follows, of necessity, that Philadelphia as a city of the first class must be denied the legislation necessary to its present prosperity and future development, or that small cities must be burdened with legislation unsuited to their needs. For if the constitution means, what the complainants aver that it does, Philadelphia can have no legislation that is not common to all other cities of the state.” Again: “ Must the legislation for a great commercial and manufacturing city with a population approaching one million be regulated by the wants and necessities of an inland city of ten thousand ? If the constitution answers this question in the affirmative, we are bound by it, however we might question its wisdom. But no such construction is to be gathered from its terms and we will not presume the framers of that instrument, or the people who ratified it, intended that the machinery of
Philadelphia having its municipal government organized under the general act for the government of cities of the first class and by reason thereof having become a city fixed and established as such among the first class, legislation of a municipal character for that class, although applicable to it alone, as its onljr member, is general and not special, and the reason for it is that it is based upon classification which has its foundation in legislative necessity. In Weinman v. Passenger Railway Company, 118 Pa. 203, Mr. Justice Williams says: “ For the purpose of local government, the state is subdivided into counties, township and other municipal and quasi-municipal corporations. Each class of these subdivisions has purposes to subserve that are peculiar to it and need to be invested with the powers necessary to that end. Generally speaking, all the members of each class have some local function to perform. Classification therefore upon this basis has been recognized and a statute relating to all the townships, all the school districts, or all the members of any particular class of the municipal divisions of the state has been held to be constitutional. It has been found desirable to divide cities into classes upon the basis of their population. The needs of a great city with a hall’ of a million or more of people are somewhat different in many respects from the needs of a city with ten thousand. The organization of their local governments and the management of their municipal affairs will be quite unlike. Each requires legislation peculiar to itself.” In Ruan Street, 132 Pa. 257, it is said by Mr. Justice Williams, in delivering the opinion of the court: “ The force of the argument in support of classification in Wheeler v. Philadelphia, and it is the only line of argument by which it can be sustained, lies in the evident necessity for the possession and exercise of other and somewhat different corporate powers by the city on the seaboard from those required by the inland city — by the city with the population of one million from those required by the city of ten thousand. These great differences in population render it necessary that there should be corresponding differences in the number, character, powers, and duties of the officers by whom municipal
In Reeves v. Railway Company, 152 Pa. 162, Mr. Justice Mjtoiusll in delivering the opinion of the court sustaining the constitutionality of the act of May 8, 1876, relating to the use of motive power upon passenger railways in cities of the first class, said: “ It is claimed however that it transgresses the prohibition of article 8, section 7, of the constitution in that it is a local or special law amending or extending the charter of a corporation. But under the settled construction of this section classification of subjects including cities is permissible and legislation which applies alike to all the members of a class is not local or special but general.”
It is contended that the act in question is an act prohibited by the constitution, because it attempts to regulate the affairs of a particular city by a transfer of the functions of the commissioners tó a special department or officer. The act, under which its government is organized, creates a department of public works and places under its direction, control and administration and in charge of its director “the construction, protection and repair of public buildings.” If when it was passed the proviso excepting the act creating the commissioners had not been incorporated in it, the performance of their functions would have devolved upon that department, and if the commission by its repeal should cease to exist, the same result would necessarily follow. This act, then, in designating a department to which the performance of the functions belong by law, does not thereby create for it any new duty or establish any new commission, body, or department to perform it. It is not an attempt to trench upon the rights of the people to control local administration, but is a general law, having for its object the removal of all restrictions upon such control in cities of the first class, and springs from an imperative demand that the public buildings necessary for their business shall be under the direction of municipal administration. As the city would thus
It is said that this act transgresses the article of the constitution which prohibits the enactment of any law containing* more than one subject, and requires the one subject to be clearly expressed in the title, but an examination will demonstrate that, it in fact contains but one subject and that which is germane to it. The first section provides for the abolition of the commissioners and follows it with the buildings, the erection, completion, repair, removal and protection of which, had been in their control, shall be under the direction and control of the-department of public works. The second section provides for the repeal of the laws creating the commissioners. The title expresses clearly the subject of the legislation. The words of the act designating the department of public works to have control, direction and administration of these buildings, upon the abolition of the commissioners, do not express any new or distinctive subject of legislation. They indicate, as shown,, only the department of the city upon which would devolve the duty of their control, direction and administration upon the abolition of the commissioners. The warrant for a judicial annulment of a law upon the grounds of its unconstitutionality should be found in a clearly expressed prohibition or one necessarily implied. And a doubt should always resolve in favor of its constitutionality. To apply the constitutional prohibition to this abt, is to extend it beyond reasonable limits and those of judicial determination. In Myers v. Com., 110 Pa. 224, it is said, in holding an act to 'be constitutional, “ we see no merit as to the insufficiency of the title to this act. It authorized the reconstruction of county bridges destroyed or partially destroyed^ and empowered the commissioners to borrow money for that purpose. The purpose of the act is sufficiently expressed in the title, and the authority to borrow money is germane to the reconstruction of bridges.”
In Fredericks v. Penna. Canal Co., 109 Pa. 55, involving the constitutionality of “ An act to authorize turnpike plank-road
I am of opinion that the act is constitutional.