53 Conn. App. 646 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1999
Opinion
The defendants have appealed to this court following the trial court’s orders denying their motion to set aside the plaintiffs verdict and their motion for remittitur. The plaintiff now moves to dismiss the defendants’ appeal for lack of a final judgment because the trial court has not yet decided the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages under the Connecticut Unfair Trade
The plaintiff, Thelma Perkins, brought this action against the defendants, Colonial Cemeteries, Inc., doing business as Fairfield Memorial Park, and its president Phyllis O. Dowd, alleging that they had illegally and improperly moved her daughter’s grave. The plaintiffs complaint alleged, inter alia, breach of contract, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation and violations of CUTPA.
On December 11, 1998, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the verdict and a motion for remittitur, both of which the trial court denied on December 17, 1998. The disposition record indicates that judgment was entered on the verdict on that date. See Gordon v. Feldman, 164 Conn. 554, 557, 325 A.2d 247 (1973). The defendants appealed following the trial court’s denial of their motions, and the plaintiff moved to dismiss the defendants’ appeal, arguing that there was no final judgment because the trial court had not yet decided whether to award the plaintiff punitive damages under CUTPA. The defendants filed an objection to the plaintiffs motion to dismiss.
This court has previously determined that no final judgment exists until common-law punitive damages have been decided. Lord v. Mansfield, 50 Conn. App. 21, 28, 717 A.2d 267, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 943, 723
In Paranteau v. DeVita, 208 Conn. 515, 544 A.2d 634 (1988), our Supreme Court considered whether there was a final judgment in an action involving a CUTPA claim when the trial court had rendered a judgment on the merits of the case, but had not yet determined the issue of attorney’s fees.
Unlike in Paranteau, no judgment on the merits has been rendered in the present case. Under CUTPA, once
In the present case, although the jury has found the defendants to be liable under CUTPA, the trial court has yet to determine the plaintiffs punitive damages under General Statutes § 42-1 lOg (a). Therefore, while the defendants are aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court; General Statutes § 52-263; their appeal does not satisfy the final judgment test established in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). That test permits an interlocutory appeal “in two circumstances: (1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” Id., 31. Because the trial court has yet to exercise its discretion to award the plaintiff punitive damages under the CUTPA count of her complaint, the rights of the parties have not been “so conclud[ed] . . . that further proceedings cannot affect them.” Id; see also Pinnix v. LaMorte, 182 Conn. 342, 343, 438 A.2d 102 (1980). In fact, because the courts generally award punitive damages in amounts equal to actual damages or multiples of the actual damages, the rights of the parties may be substantially affected by the further proceedings that remain in this case. We, therefore, conclude that the second prong of the Curdo test is not satisfied.
The appeal is dismissed for lack of a final judgment.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The plaintiffs prayer for relief included a request for compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
The Paranteau court, however, expanded “the scope of [its] inquiry beyond claims brought under CUTPA to include any claim where a judgment on the merits is rendered prior to an award of attorney’s fees.” Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 208 Conn. 516.
General Statutes § 42-110g (d) provides in relevant part: “In any action brought by a person under this section, the court may award, to the plaintiff, in addition to the relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery. . . .”