{¶ 2} Having reviewed the entire record and the applicable law, we find that Carter Lumber has not demonstrated that it was prejudiced by the magistrate's failure to include in its decision the statutorily required notice language. Accordingly, the trial cоurt did not commit reversible error by adopting the magistrate's decision and refusing to consider Carter Lumber's untimely objections to the magistrate's decision. Therefore, those objections can not be considered by this Court on appeal, аnd the judgment of the trial court adopting the magistrate's decision is affirmed.
{¶ 3} Sometime around February of 2003, Brian Heyman, a salesman for Carter Lumber, approached Carla Cooper, a project manager for Performance Cоnstruction, and proposed to Cooper that Performance Construction purchase OSB in order to avoid an imminent price increase in the product. Per this conversation, Performance Construction purchased 540 sheets of OSB from Carter Lumber at a cost of $4.99 per sheet. According to findings made by the magistrate, Carter Lumber agreed to store the OSB for Performance Construction until it was needed. Under this arrangement, Performance Construction would call Carter Lumber for dеlivery of specific amounts of the prepaid OSB as it was needed.
{¶ 4} Subsequently, in February of 2004, Performance Construction called Carter Lumber to request the delivery of its remaining OSB. However, Carter Lumber informed Performance Construction that it had sold the OSB and credited Performance Construction's account $952.09. The $952.09 represented the undelivered OSB at the original purchase rate of $4.99 per sheet.
{¶ 5} Accordingly, Performance Construction was forced to purchase OSB on the oрen market at $16.99 per sheet. Performance Construction then filed suit against Carter Lumber in small claims court based upon the tort of conversion of property. Performance construction's suit sought $3,000.00, which represented the difference bеtween the original purchase price Performance Construction paid to the Carter Lumber for the OSB and the price Performance Construction was forced to pay on the open market to cover its OSB requirements. After the suit was filed, Carter Lumber issued a check to Performance Construction for the $952.09 it had originally credited to Performance Construction's account.
{¶ 6} At trial, Heyman testified that he had worked for Carter Lumber for the previous three years and that it had always been Carter Lumber's policy not to hold inventory for customers for longer than ninety days. He also testified that he spoke with Cooper and informed her in October of 2003 that Performance Construction had two weeks to either take delivеry of the remaining OSB or receive a credit for the original purchase price. Cooper denied that such a conversation had ever taken place. She testified that Heyman never informed her that Performance Construction had a limited time to accept delivery of the OSB.
{¶ 7} After considering all of the evidence and the conflicting testimony, the magistrate found that Performance Construction had proven its case by a preponderance of the evidence and awarded judgment to Performance Construction in the amount of $3,000.00. In finding for Performance Construction, the magistrate found that the agreed upon arrangement between the parties was that Carter Lumber would store the prepaid OSB fоr Performance Construction and deliver it as needed. The magistrate also found that Carter Lumber never informed Performance Construction that it must take immediate delivery of the OSB. In making this finding, the magistrate considered the conflicting testimony of Cooper and Heyman and found Cooper's testimony to be more reliable. The magistrate also considered the fact that Performance Construction's prepaid OSB was never separately marked or segregated from Carter Lumber's gеneral supply of OSB. The magistrate's decision was filed on May 12, 2004.
{¶ 8} Thereafter, on May 27, 2004, Carter Lumber filed objections to the magistrate's decision with the Findlay Municipal Court. However, the trial court refused to consider these objections becаuse they were not filed within fourteen days of the magistrate's decision as required by Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(A). Therefore, with no proper objections to the magistrate's decision before it, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision in whole and ordered judgment in favor of Performance Construction in the amount of $3,000.00. From this judgment Carter Lumber appeals, presenting three assignments of error for our review.
{¶ 9} Due to the nature of these assignments of error, we elect to address them out of order.
{¶ 11} Civ.R. 53 allows a trial court to refer certain matters to magistrates. Under Civ.R. 53(E)(3), a party has fourteen days to file objections to a magistrate's decision with the triаl court. If such objections are timely filed, the trial court is required to rule on those objections. Garwood v.Garwood, 3rd Dist. No. 15-03-14,
{¶ 12} Herein, it is undisputed that Carter Lumber did not file objections with the trial court until fifteen days after the magistrate's decision was filed. Therefore, the trial court was entitled to disregard Carter Lumber's objections and adopt the magistrate's decision in whole. Civ.R. 53(E)(4)(a); Garwood at ¶ 10. Furthermore, Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(d) bars Carter Lumber from assigning as error on appeal those portions of the magistrate's decision that the trial court has adopted. Id. Under ordinary circumstances, this would require us to overrule all of Carter Lumber's assignments of error without further consideration.Garwood at ¶ 10. Nevertheless, Carter Lumber maintains that the conspicuous absence of the notice language requirеd by Civ.R. 53(E)(2) from the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law excused Carter Lumber's non-compliance with Civ.R. 53(E)(3)'s fourteen day time limit.
{¶ 13} Civ.R. 53(E)(2) provides that "[a] magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law shall indicate conspicuously that a party shall nоt assign as error on appeal the [trial] court's adoption of any finding of fact or conclusion of law unless the party timely and specifically objects to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(E)(3)." Nowhere in the magistrate's findings of fact or сonclusions of law did it state that Carter Lumber would waive any error on appeal unless it timely and specifically filed objections to the magistrate's decision. Thus, Carter Lumber contends that the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate's deсision because it did not include the statutorily required notice language.
{¶ 14} "A trial court may not be reversed for failure to comply with Civ.R. 53 unless the appellant shows that the alleged error has merit and that it prejudiced the appellant." Stout v.Stout, 3rd Dist. No. 14-01-10,
{¶ 15} The case lаw discussing prejudice based upon a trial court's violation of Civ.R. 53 focuses on two issues: (1) whether the violation prevented the appellant the opportunity of filing objections to the magistrate's decision; and (2) whether the trial court was аble to conduct an independent analysis of the magistrate's decision. In re Estate of Hughes,
{¶ 16} Appellate courts have found prejudice in the factual situation where the trial court adopted the magistrate's outcome without a magistrate's decision having been filed. In reBortmas supra; Erb v. Erb (1989),
{¶ 17} Additionаlly, the trial court had before it enough information from which it was able to conduct an independent analysis of the magistrate's decision. The magistrate's decision made both factual and legal findings and discussed the relevant testimony and evidence that was presented at the magistrate's hearing.
{¶ 18} The record is devoid of any evidence that the trial court's failure to comply with Civ.R. 53(E) caused Carter Lumber any prejudice. Therefore, the trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision and refusing to consider Carter Lumber's objections. Accordingly, Carter Lumber's third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed. Shaw, P.J. and Bryant, J., concur.