PEREZ v STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
Docket No. 49723
105 MICH APP 202
Decided April 8, 1981
Submittеd December 9, 1980, at Lansing. Leave to appeal applied for.
The trial court erred in ruling that State Farm was not entitled to subtract workers’ compensation benefits which are required to be provided by law. Defendant is entitled by statute to a setoff equal to the amount of such benefits regardless of whether the benefits were paid in fact to plaintiffs.
Reversed.
T. M. BURNS, P.J., dissented. Hе would hold that under the no-fault act a defendant is entitled to set off personal protection benefits under the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act only where such benefits are actuаlly received by the plaintiff. He would affirm.
OPINION OF THE COURT
1. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION — SUBTRACTION OF BENEFITS — PERSONAL PROTECTION INSURANCE BENEFITS — STATUTES.
Benefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of
2. STATUTES — JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION.
A statute is to be applied by a сourt as written, and judicial interpretation of the statute is impermissible where the Legislature has made its intent known through the clear, explicit, and unambiguous language of the statute.
3. STATUTES — JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The judicial branch of government is not empowered by the constitution to nullify a clear and unambiguous act of the Legislature unless it determines that the act is unconstitutional; where a statute is unfair, unreasonable, or unwise, any remedy lies with the Legislature, and a court must apply the statute as written.
4. INSURANCE — NO-FAULT INSURANCE — WORKER‘S DISABILITY COMPENSATION ACT — SUBTRACTION OF BENEFITS — STATUTES.
A defendant who is found liable to pay personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act may deduct an amount equal to workers’ compensation benefits required to be provided under Michigan law notwithstanding the fact that no such benefits were in fact paid to the plaintiff (
DISSENT BY T. M. BURNS, P.J.
5. INSURANCE — NO-FAULT INSURANCE — WORKER‘S DISABILITY COMPENSATION ACT — SUBTRACTION OF BENEFITS — STATUTES.
The no-fault act should be held to require a setoff of benefits to which a plaintiff is entitled under the Worker‘s Disability Compensation Act only where such benefits are actually recеived by the plaintiff (
Abood & Abood, P.C. (by William E. Rheaume), for plaintiffs.
Fraser, Trebilcock, Davis & Foster, P.C. (by Everett R. Trebilcock and Joel E. Dowley), for defendant.
D. F. WALSH, J. Plaintiffs brought an action for no-fault automobile insurance benefits. Summary judgment was granted in plaintiffs’ favor against defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance company. Accelerated judgment was granted in favor of defendant Aetna Casualty & Surety Company. Defendant State Farm, hereinafter defendant, brings this appeal.
In the spring of 1979, plaintiffs, employeеs of International Mini-Plaza, Inc., were driving to Detroit in a vehicle insured by defendant. They were involved in a collision with a semitrailer and sustained serious injuries. The corporation employing plaintiffs did not carry any workers’ compensation insurance. Plaintiffs submitted claims for personal protection insurance benefits from defendant for approximately $85,000 in medical exрenses and lost wages. Defendant denied liability, and plaintiffs filed suit. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted plaintiffs’ motion.
The court ruled that defendant was not entitled, under
“Benefits provided or required to be рrovided under the laws of any state or the federal government shall be subtracted from the personal protection insurance benefits otherwise payable for the injury.”
Workers’ compensation benefits are “benefits provided or required to be provided” under Michigan law. Mathis v Interstate Motor Freight System, 408 Mich 164, 186; 289 NW2d 708 (1980), Wolford v Travelers Ins Co, 92 Mich App 600, 604; 285 NW2d 383 (1979).
Plaintiffs argue that a setoff should not be allowed in this case because no benefits were аctually paid. Plaintiffs’ theory is that since the purpose of
The most basic rule of statutory construction is that judicial interpretation of a statute is impermissible where the Legislaturе makes its intent known in the clear, explicit, and unambiguous language of the statute. In such a case the statute is to be applied as written.
“If the language employed in a statute is plain, сertain and unambiguous, a bare reading suffices and no interpretation is necessary.” Grand Rapids v Crocker, 219 Mich 178, 182; 189 NW 221 (1922).
“It is a cardinal rule that the legislature must be held to intend the meaning which it plainly expressed, and in such cаses there is no room for construction, or attempted interpretation to vary such meaning.” MacQueen v City Comm of Port Huron, 194 Mich 328, 342; 160 NW 627 (1916).
See also Dussia v Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244; 191 NW2d 307 (1971), Avon Twp v State Boundary Comm, 96 Mich App 736; 293 NW2d 691 (1980), Cronin v Minster Press, 56 Mich App 471; 224 NW2d 336 (1974).
In the present case, the terms of
Had the Legislature foreseen and carefully considered the facts presented to us in this appeal, it may have provided for a result othеr than that mandated by the precise language of the statute. Application of the statute here leads to consequences which are tragically unfortunate for the plaintiffs bеcause their employer failed to provide required workers’ disability benefits. But the constitution gives us no power to amend legislative enactments. If the statute is unfair, or unreasonable, or unwise, the remedy lies with the Legislature. We have no alternative but to apply the statute as the Legislature wrote it.1
We conclude that the trial court erred in its disposition of this case. Defendant should be allowed to subtract from no-fault benefits otherwise payable an amount equal to workers’ compensa-
Reversed.
ALLEN, J., concurred.
T. M. BURNS, P.J. (dissenting). Respectfully, I dissent.
In Mays v Ins Co of North America, 407 Mich 165; 284 NW2d 256 (1979), the Supreme Court addressed an issue somewhat similar to that at bar. In that case, the defendant insurance company argued that it was entitled to offset against its liability to the plaintiff under a disability insurance policy those benefits to which the plаintiff theoretically was entitled but which had not been paid to him under the Workmen‘s Compensation Act. The insurance policy provision in question stated:
“The Weekly Benefit Amount shall be reduced by the weekly pro-rata portion of any benefits payable under the Workmen‘s Compensation Act and the primary disability monthly benefit payable under the Federal Social Security Act regardless of actual receipt of such benefit due to the Insured‘s failure to apply therefor * * *.” 407 Mich 170-171.
The Court held that no setoff for workers’ compensation benefits could occur under this policy provision unless the benefits were actually paid:
“A setoff of such benefits, even if no application was filed, cannot be countenanced under the instant provisiоn, except when such benefits are actually received.” 407 Mich 172.
In spite of the difference between Mays and the case at bar, the similarity between them is suffi-
Contrary to what the majority believes, I do not believe that the Legislature intended to leave accident victims such as the plaintiffs in the present case without some source of recompense for their injuries. The purpose behind