Perez v. Ransome
1:22-cv-01087
M.D. Penn.Jun 20, 2025Check TreatmentDocket
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FRANCISCO PEREZ,
Plaintiff, iCIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-cv-01087
v. (SAPORITO. J)
DR. PRINCE, et al.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Francisco Perez proceeds pro se on a complaint of
inadequate medical care at SCI-Dallas for his shoulder injuries, which he
alleges were exacerbated by the COVID-19 vaccine. Perez and defendant
Dr. Scott Prince have moved for summary judgment. (Docs. 38, 45).
Because Perez failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to most of his
claims, any claim for injury from the vaccine is barred by the PREP Act,
and the record would not have supported an Eighth Amendment
violation, the Court grants summary judgment to Prince.
I. BACKGROUND
Because his second amended complaint (Doc. 12) was dismissed in
part, see (Docs. 21, 22), Perez proceeds on claims against two remaining
defendants, Prince and Nurse “Jane Doe #2.”
As relevant to these defendants, the operative complaint alleges as
follows: On April 9, 2024, Nurse Doe administered the Johnson &
Johnson COVID-19 vaccine to Perez two days after he received a
cortisone shot. Perez told Doe about the cortisone shot, and Doe allegedly
“assured/guaranteed” Perez that the vaccine “would not have any adverse
effects or complications.” After receiving the vaccine, Perez suffered pain
and numbness, and “developed severe/catastrophic complications to
where [he] lost mobility on the left side of his chest/arm/bicep and
shoulder.” Upon examination, an unnamed provider at SCI Dallas “could
not identify the cause” of his symptoms. Perez requested to see an outside
provider, but “SCI Dallas Medical Dep’t/Sick Call personnel refused to
consider the option.”
In August 2024, Perez had an appointment with Dr. Prince,
another provider at SCI-Dallas. Prince allegedly “agreed” that the
vaccine “should have been delayed for a few weeks due to the prior
cortisone shot.” Perez repeated his request to see an outside provider, but
Prince allegedly “ignoreld]” the request and “ilnldicated that the State
lacks funding.” Perez “continued to encounter . . . unbearable
pain/impairment/lack of mobility,” which he attributes to side effects
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from the vaccine. He also asserts that his “[nleurological system and/or
nervous system has been compromised.”
The intended scope of Perez's claims is unclear, but he alleges that
the defendants failed to properly investigate potential side effects of the
vaccine: violated the Eighth Amendment by administering the Johnson
and Johnson vaccine while it was “in the trial stage”; placed Perez “in a
treatment plan contrary to the cause of the injury”: and generally failed
to “follow protocol/policy/procedure/laws of the Commonwealth [and]
Federal laws.”!
Prince and Perez have moved for summary judgment. (Docs. 38,
45). Also before the Court are four discovery motions filed by Perez (Docs.
36, 442, 46, 53); Perez's motion for an award of attorney fees as a
“prevailing party” (Doc. 47); and Perezs renewed request for
1 The Court does not construe Perez to assert a state law claim of
medical negligence, and any such claim would be subject to dismissal for
failure to timely file a Certificate of Merit. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3.
2 Perez's June 21, 2024, motion is titled “Motion for Summary
Judgment,’ but he also refers to it as a “Motion for Default Judgment.”
See (Doc. 44). In substance, the motion requests “full disclosure of
discovery from January lst 2024 to June 24th 2024,” including certain
medical records from that period. Accordingly, the Court construes this
filing as a motion to compel production of documents.
= 3
appointment of counsel (Doc. 52).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson,477 U.S. at 248
. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non- moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa.,24 F.3d 508, 512
(3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
ede
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
the jury.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a prima facie showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Celotex, 477
U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
III. MATERIAL FAcTs
Based on the evidence presented with the parties’ motions for
summary judgment, the following facts are undisputed.
3 Perez did not respond directly to Prince’s statement of material
facts, or submit his own statement of facts, but attached evidence to his
response brief and in support of his own motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3) (in addition to properly cited materials, the court “may consider
(continued on next page)
A. Pre-existing Shoulder Issues
In March 2021, before receiving his COVID vaccine, Perez
repeatedly complained to prison medical staff of pain in his neck and left
shoulder, which he had been suffering for at least a year. An X-ray
revealed “no radiographic evidence of an acute fracture or
acromioclavicular separation,” but showed “soft tissue calcifications
adjacent to the humeral tuberosity suspicious for changes associated
with calcific tendinopathy?.”
On March 16, after a sick call with PA Devon Woolfolk, Perez was
scheduled for a doctor’s appointment “to discuss injection vs. PT,” and
“agreeld]” with this plan. However, the following day, Perez requested to
other materials in the record”). However, Perez's factual allegations in
the motions and briefs themselves, unless linked to evidence in the
record, are not competent evidence at the summary judgment stage. See
(Docs. 45, 54); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Where Perez has not presented
competent evidence to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact,
Prince’s fact statements are deemed admitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2);
M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.
+ In general, calcific tendonitis refers to inflammation caused by
calcium buildup within the tendons, potentially causing pain and
reduced range of motion. “Calcific tendinopathy” refers specifically to
tendon pain. See Calcific Tendonitis: Symptoms, Causes, and Treatment,
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/21638-calcific-tendonitis
(last accessed June 18, 2025).
a 6 on
have surgery on his shoulder, rather than injections or physical therapy.
He was told that he must have one or the other before surgery would be
considered. He received prescriptions of Motrin and prednisone on a trial
basis. On March 30, Perez reported that his symptoms were not
improving. Woolfolk prescribed Naprosyn and requested a physical
therapy consultation.
On April 7, for the first time documented in the record, Perez saw
defendant Dr. Prince. Perez reported that his pain and numbness was
“getting worse.” Prince prescribed a Kenalog® injection and physical
therapy, with a follow-up in one month.
B. COVID-19 Vaccine and Aftermath
On April 9, Perez received the Johnson & Johnson COVID-19
vaccine, which was administered in his right (non-injured) arm by nurse
Taylor Mack. The records of the vaccination do not indicate that Prince
was involved in any way.
On May 5, Perez reported no improvement from the Kenalog or
> Kenalog, a trade name for the drug known as triamcinolone, is a
corticosteroid that can reduce inflammation. See Triamcinolone.
https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/triamcinolone-injection-
route/description/drg-20074674 (last visited June 18, 2025). The Court
infers that this is the “cortisone” injection Perez refers to in his filings.
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physical therapy. Prince prescribed another injection and continued
physical therapy exercises, with a follow-up in two months. On July 9,
Perez reported that his May injection had helped for several weeks but
had begun to wear off. He received another Kenalog injection, and a
follow-up was scheduled for September.
On July 23, Perez was seen at a sick call by PA Woolfolk. Perez
reported “left arm weakness and muscle atrophy for 2 months
lalssociated with mild numbness to his left arm and left leg,” which he
attributed to the COVID vaccine. He stated that he was “noticing the
muscle mass in his left arm get progressively worse.” An examination
revealed decreased grip strength in his left arm and “significant muscle
atrophy [in his] left triceps region compared to his right.” After
consultation with Prince, Woolfolk prescribed Prednisone and more
physical therapy. The notes indicate that Perez “agreel[d| with” this plan.
C. Follow-up Treatment
Over the next two years, Perez had more than 20 encounters with
various medical personnel to address his left arm or shoulder. See (Doc.
38-1 at 6-20). The Court summarizes these visits to the extent relevant
to his deliberate indifference claims against Dr. Prince.
-g-
On August 5, 2021, Perez attended another sick call with Woolfolk,
reporting no improvement the last visit. An EKG showed unremarkable
results, and Woolfolk ordered a carotid ultrasound, which showed no
significant stenosis. The next visit with Prince was September 10, where
Prince noted “some atrophy of muscles in the left chest and left upper
arm. His assessment was “disuse atrophy,” and he advised Perez to
continue doing physical therapy exercises.
On December 23, after a series of sick calls with other providers,
Perez saw Prince again. Perez reported numbness, tingling, and scapular
pain. Prince prescribed Pamelor and scheduled Perez for a three-month
follow-up. On April 1, 2022, at the follow-up, Perez reported that the
Pamelor made his symptoms worse. He continued to have numbness and
tingling. Prince assessed pectoral atrophy and neuropathy, and
prescribed Trileptal. On July 25, 2022, Perez again complained that his
muscle atrophy was worsening. He claimed that Trileptal gave him
nosebleeds, and Prince prescribed a three-month trial of Cymbalta.
On November 2, 2022, Perez reported some improvement with pain,
but numbness and tingling persisted. Prince advised him to “continue
Cymbalta, it seems to be starting to help.” However, on February 2, 2023,
age
Perez complained to Prince that Cymbalta made him sleepy, and his
neuropathy was no better. Prince changed Perez's Cymbalta to evening
distribution and advised to continue his physical therapy exercises. At
this point, given the neuropathy diagnosis, Prince “discussed with Perez
that this will probably never improve, especially the atrophy and
decrease in strength.” On May 8, 2023, the last interaction with Prince
documented in the records, Perez reported that “[t]he symptoms are
better, but still happen.” There was less pain and numbness, but muscle
weakness and atrophy persisted. Prince’s treatment plan was
unchanged.
D. Prison Grievances
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) provides a
three-part procedure for inmate grievances: initial review by a Grievance
Officer, appeal to the Facility Manager, and final appeal to the Secretary’s
Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). See (Doc. 38-5).
Perez pursued two grievances relevant to this action. On July 24,
2021, Perez lodged Grievance No. 937929, alleging that the COVID-19
vaccine had caused him to “start experiencing side effects such as in my
left arm and left side of my chest.” As relief, he sought to be “compensated
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for . . . injuries sufferled] by the COVID 19 J&J shot.” On appeal, he
further explained: “I[’]m not a [doctor] but I believe . . . the cortisone in
my body mixled] with the Johnson and Johnson COVID vaccine,” causing
the left arm and chest to “collapse.” The grievance was denied at all levels
of review.
On May 16, 2022, Perez filed Grievance No. 980999. Therein, he
alleged that he was receiving too many different medications, which were
ineffective and causing side effects: that the prison doctors could not
diagnose him or were “trying to hide something”: and that his request to
see an “MRI specialist” had been refused “with no logical explanation.”
This grievance was denied, with the grievance officer explaining that
“neuropathy isn’t curablel[,] it’s only treatable,” and that there was no
indicated medical need for an MRI, but Perez could sign up for further
sick calls to discuss treatment. Although Perez argues that he satisfied
“all 3 stages of the grievance process” for all grievances, the record
indicates that Perez did not appeal to SOIGA, the last step in the
erievance process.
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal of Jane Doe #2
Perez proceeds against Prince and “Jane Doe #2,” a nurse allegedly
involved in administering his COVID vaccine. Because discovery has
closed, and Jane Doe #2 has not been identified’, that defendant will be
dismissed. See Blakeslee v. Clinton Cnty., 336 F. App’x 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009) (“If reasonable discovery does not unveil the proper identities . . . the John Doe defendants must be dismissed.”): Cole vy. RHU Officers John Doe, No. CIV. 1:04-CV-1218,2005 WL 2648342
, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17,
2005).
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners
complaining about the conditions of their confinement must exhaust
available administrative remedies before they may file suit in federal
court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA requires proper exhaustion,
meaning plaintiffs must administratively grieve their claims in
accordance with the procedural rules of the prison in which they are
6 Perez filed an amended complaint after the close of discovery, but
it was stricken because he filed it without seeking leave to amend.
Nonetheless, it named Prince as the sole defendant, suggesting that
Perez has abandoned any claim against Jane Doe #2. See (Docs. 57, 61).
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incarcerated. Downey v. Pa. Dept of Corr. 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo,548 U.S. 81, 88
(2006)). Therefore, exhaustion within the Department of Corrections requires appeal to SOIGA, the third and final step of the process. See Spruill v. Gillis,372 F.3d 218, 232
(3d Cir. 2004). To exhaust remedies on a particular issue, the grievance in question must “alert prison officials to [the] problem,” but need not “provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued.” Williams v. Beard,482 F.3d 637
, 640 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Jones v. Bock,549 U.S. 199, 219
(2007)).
Perez’s only exhausted grievance, No. 937929, sought compensation
for injuries allegedly caused by medical staff administering the COVID
vaccine two days after his cortisone shot. Perez did not, at that time,
contend that he was being improperly treated for the injuries
themselves’, so his grievance would not have “alertled] prison officials to
a problem” with Prince’s treatment of his shoulder after the vaccine. The
7 Perez's grievance noted that the “sick call doctor . . . couldn’t
identify the cause” of his injuries. The context indicates that Perez was
not alleging improper treatment by Woolfolk based on the failure to
diagnose, but that Perez believed the unknown etiology showed that the
COVID vaccine was to blame.
fo
later grievance in which Perez claimed inadequate treatment was not
appealed to SOIGA.® Even though the two grievances were “generally
related to the same subject matter,” they addressed discrete issues, and
exhaustion of the initial grievance does not preserve new claims filed in
the later, unexhausted grievance. See, e.g., Alexis v. Connors, No. 23-
2502, 2024 WL 3534480, at *4 (3d Cir. July 25, 2024). Therefore, any
claim against Prince would have to be premised on his involvement in
the allegedly improper administration of the COVID vaccine.
C. PREP Act
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP
Act”) makes Prince immune from Perez's sole exhausted claim related to
the COVID-19 vaccine. The PREP Act protects a “covered person” from
“hability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss
8 Perez generally alleges that he exhausted all available remedies,
but he presents no evidence that he appealed Grievance No. 980999 to
SOIGA. See (Doc. 54 at 5-6, Doc. 54-2) (Perez's exhibits allegedly
“showling] that, at all 3 stages of the grievance process, Perez did file
them”: the alleged appeal of Grievance No. 980999 to SOIGA is not
included). Perez also claims that the DOC generally “failed to respond to
grievances in a timely manner.” However, the record does not show any
improper delay as to this grievance: the responses to the grievance and
the initial appeal were each dated within 15 working days of receipt, as
required by DOC policy. See (Docs. 38-4, 38-5).
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caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration
to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure’ to address a
public health emergency. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d(a)(1),(b)(1). Covered
persons include those who “prescribed, administered, or dispensed” the
countermeasure and were licensed to do so. Jd., §§ 247d-6d()(2)(B),G)(8).
On March 17, 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
declared the spread of COVID-19 a public health emergency. See
Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15198
(Mar. 17, 2020). That declaration defined “covered countermeasures” to
include “any antiviral, any other drug, any biologic, any diagnostic, any
other device, or any vaccine, used to treat, diagnose, cure, prevent, or
mitigate COVID-19, or the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 or a virus
mutating therefrom.” See id. at 15202 (emphasis added). Therefore, the
Act preempts claims? against health care providers who administered the
° The PREP Act contains an exception in the form of an exclusive
claim for “death or serious physical injury proximately caused by willful
misconduct.” See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1). However, a_ willful
misconduct claim under the PREP Act must be brought in the District of
Columbia; the Act forecloses “any other civil action” raising such a claim.
See §§ 247d-6d(e)(1), 247d-6e(d)(1); Magilioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC, 16
F.4th 393, 409 (3d Cir. 2021).
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COVID-19 vaccine, such as those who were negligent in “prescribing the
wrong dose.” See id. at 15200.
As noted, Perez's only exhausted claim is his request for
compensation for injuries caused by the vaccine. To the extent that claim
would be viable against Prince, it would be based on a contention that
Prince “prescribed, administered, or dispensed” the COVID vaccine, but
Prince is immune from any such claim under the PREP Act. The record
indicates that Perez’s vaccine was administered by a nurse, but even
assuming Prince was somehow involved, he is immune from Eighth
Amendment liability. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 15200 (“laldministration” of
covered countermeasures includes “activities and decisions directly
relating to . . . dispensing of the countermeasures to recipients’).
Therefore, the PREP Act, combined with Perez’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, compels summary judgment for Prince.
10 Regardless, the record in this case would not have sustained an
Eighth Amendment claim. While Perez is convinced that the vaccine
caused his shoulder injuries, the record indicates that his shoulder issues
predated the vaccine and were intensifying before he received the
vaccine; the vaccine was administered in his non-injured arm, which was
unaffected: and his symptoms actually improved in the months
immediately following the vaccine. Further, even if Perez's claims of
inadequate treatment had been properly exhausted, his disagreement
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, Jane Doe #2 will be dismissed,
summary judgment will be granted to Prince, and Perez’s remaining
motions will be denied as moot. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: June 20, 2025 s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
with Prince’s diagnosis and treatment would not show an Eighth
Amendment violation, nor is he constitutionally entitled to a second
opinion from an outside provider. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106- 07 (1976): Arroyo v. Primecare Med. Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2039,2016 WL 3457723
, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 23, 2016).
ss 17 i