Dаrlene Percival appeals from the judgment of the district court for Lancaster County which affirmed the decision of the State Personnel Board of the State of Nеbraska regarding Percival’s demotion and transfer within the Department of Correctional Services (department).
In an appeal from a judgment pursuant to the Administrativе Procedure Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-901 et seq. (Reissue 1987), the Supreme Court tries factual questions de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent оf the trial court’s findings.
Heithoff
v.
Nebraska State Bd. of Ed.,
Before the disciplinary action reviewed in this appeal, Percival was the assistant superintendent at the Nebraska Center for Women (NCW) in York, Nebraska, and became acquainted with Carolyn Stansberry, an inmate at NCW. In June 1986, Stansberry was released from NCW on parole to a halfway house in Hastings, Nebraska. In June and July of 1986, Pеrcival visited Stansberry on four occasions, some of which related to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, while other visits were social. On June 30, 1986, Percival wrote a check to Stansberry in the amount of $350 for Stansberry’s purchase of an automobile. Percival’s personal contacts with Stansberry and the automobile loan were not authorized by the parole administration and were not disclosed by Percival to her supervisor at NCW.
On August 19, Percival was charged with violating the department’s administrative regulation No. 112.31A1, which *510 provides:
No employee will give, accept, or exchange property, services, or favors with an inmate or parolee or with the friends or relatives of аn inmate or parolee outside the scope of the employee’s official duties. No employee will fraternize with an inmate or parolee or with friends or relatives of an inmate or parolee. If an employee has reason to believe that he or she may have violated one of the provisions оf this section, the employee shall immediately notify his or her chief executive officer in writing. The chief executive officer of each institution may permit exceptions to the prohibitions set out in his [sic] paragraph, after considering all relevant information.
She was also charged with violating 273 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 13, § 001 (1986), of the state’s clаssified personnel rules and regulations, which states in part: “Appropriate disciplinary action may be taken for any of the following offenses: 001.01 Violation of, or fаilure to comply with, State constitution or statute; an executive order; published rules, regulations, policies or procedures of the employing agency or thе State of Nebraska Classified Personnel System.”
After a hearing on the charges against Percival, a departmental committee found that Percival had violated the department’s administrative regulation No. 112.31A1 and § 001.01 of the state’s rules and regulations. The superintendent of NCW sent a letter to Percival on September 19, 1986, which letter, as notice of departmental disciplinary action, stated that on account of the violation of departmental regulation No. 112.31A1 and the state rule, § 001.01, Percival was dеmoted in rank and grade from assistant superintendent II, grade 15, to unit manager, grade 13, and was transferred to the Lincoln Correctional Center. Also, Percival’s salary was reduced by 10 percent, and she was put on 6 months’ probation regarding her new position at Lincoln.
Percival appealed to the State Personnel Board, which, aftеr a hearing, affirmed the disciplinary action imposed by the department.-Percival then appealed to the district court for Lancaster County, which affirmed the State Personnel Board’s *511 decision.
Percival does not contend that there is no rational relationship between the conduct proscribed by regulation No. 112.31A1 and legitimate dеpartmental purposes or activities. Rather, Percival concedes that her conduct violated regulation No. 112.31A1, but argues that the nature and degree of thе imposed discipline were contrary to the state’s policy on progressive discipline of state employees, the departmental disciplinary actiоn was arbitrary, and the imposed discipline is disproportionate to the infraction.
The state’s personnel rules and regulations provide under 273 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 13 (1986):
003 Disciplinаry Actions. The following types and levels of disciplinary actions are prescribed in a progressive manner, however, the nature and severity of the violation will dictate the level of discipline imposed. More severe levels of disciplinary action may be imposed when a lesser action is deemed inadequate or has not achieved the desired results____
003.01 The type and extent of disciplinary action shall be governed by the nature, severity and effect of the offense; the type and frеquency of previous offenses; the period of time elapsed since a prior offensive act; and consideration of extenuating circumstances.
Administrative regulation No. 112.6 of the department provides in part:
IV. This Department advocates the principle of progressive discipline when it is possible. Unless the security оf the program is compromised or the employee has committed an offense of serious magnitude, all employees should be given the opportunity to imprоve and discipline should be progressive in nature.
Under administrative regulation No. 112.6, an employee’s conduct which compromises the security of a departmental program or constitutes an offense of “serious magnitude” renders the progressive discipline policy inapplicable. In
Kemper
v.
State,
A commission’s or agency’s action is arbitrary if taken in disregard of faсts or circumstances and without some basis which would lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion.
In re Application of Renzenberger, Inc., 225
Neb. 30,
Percival next claims that the discipline imposed is disproportionate to the infraction, especially since there was no injury tо the security or departmental program at NCW. The record reflects that on at least four occasions before disciplining Percival, the department terminаted employment of personnel who had violated the same rules and regulations which were the bases for the disciplinary action against Percival. The recоrd also shows that, but for Percival’s satisfactory work history, her employment might have been terminated. We are unable to conclude that the discipline imposed is disproportionate to the infraction examined in this appeal.
Finally, Percival asserts that because her actions caused no “residual harm” to the departmеnt, the discipline was excessive. Percival knew about the regulation prohibiting financial transactions and fraternization with Stansberry as an NCW parolee. Yet, Percival violated the department’s rules. *513 Under the circumstances, actual harm is not required to impose discipline; an employee’s violation of a departmentаl rule, thereby compromising the security or integrity of NCW, is sufficient for disciplinary action. The fact that no adverse effect resulted from Percival’s conduct does not preclude discipline under the circumstances.
The district court’s judgment, affirming the decision of the State Personnel Board, is, therefore, affirmed.
Affirmed.