| Aрpellant Richard Percefull was convicted by a Hot Spring County jury of manufacturing marijuana and sentenced to four-years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. He appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the marijuana as the fruit of an unreasonable search; by overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s voir dire questions suggesting that marijuana was a “gateway drug”; by allowing the introduction of a crime-lab submission sheet that had not been provided to him in discovery; by denying his motions for directed verdict; and by refusing to instruct the jury to consider possession of marijuana as a lesser-included offense of manufаcturing marijuana. We affirm his conviction.
Lieutenant Jim Bailey with the Malvern Police Department testified that he was contacted by a man who claimed to own pigs that were being raised on appellant’s property. 12This man had worked as a confidential informant for Lt. Bailey in the past. The informant told Lt. Bailey that appellant had marijuana growing on the property and that he was concerned and did not want to check on his pigs without contacting someone to go with him. Lt. Bailey testified that he saw signs advertising “pigs for sale” at 204 Camp Road, which is appellant’s address. He spoke with detectives before going onto the property, noting that he suspected marijuana growing on the property. When he and the informant arrived at the property, appellant was not home.
Appellant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the evidence was the result of an illegal search.
Appellant testified that he had gone out of town during the time the marijuana was found at his residence and that he was not growing marijuana there before he left. He denied having any signs advertising “pigs for sale.” He further claimed that the confidential informant was a “prime suspect in a stream of burglaries and this is how he keeps from going to jail.” He claimed that he did not have any of the informant’s livestock at his residence.
At the close of all the evidence, appellant’s motion to suppress was renewed and denied, as were appellant’s motions for directed verdict. The jury found appellant guilty of manufacturing marijuana and sentenced him to four-years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction and a fine of $5,000. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
I. Motions for Directed Verdict
Although appellant raises his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in his fourth and fifth points on appeal, double-jeopardy concerns require that this court review them first. See Morgan v. State,
Appellant, argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions for directed verdict on the charge of manufacturing marijuana, asserting that the State failed to introduce any direct evidence that he possessеd, planted, or cultivated the marijuana found on his property. We affirm because the State was not required to prove literal, physical possession of the growing and harvested marijuana that the police found on appellant’s property.
At trial, the State introduced testimony establishing that marijuana was growing in pots and in the ground in the backyard of the property at 204 Camp Road and that there was a trash bag containing harvested marijuana and several smaller plastic bags containing marijuana in the house. The State also established, through records from the county assessor’s office, that appellant was the sole owner of the property and his residence was owner occupied. ^Substantial evidence supports appellant’s conviction for manufacturing marijuana; accordingly, we affirm.
II. Motion to Suppress Evidence
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence taken from his property. In reviewing the circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances. Gilbert v. State,
Appellant recites the testimony of Lt. Bailey and claims that his motion to suppress was based upon the four factors in United States v. Dunn,
Next, appellant recites the testimony of Corporal Hall, a Malvern police officer, and Corporal Scott Jones of the Hot Spring County Sheriffs Office, who testified that they had been notified by Lt. Bailеy, prior to his initial visit to appellant’s residence, that marijuana might be growing there. Appellant also contends that his own testimony was that the | (¡confidential informant had no livestock on his premises and did not have permission to be there. He argues that his motion to suppress, therefore, should have been granted.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 2, section 15 of the Arkansas Constitution identically protect “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and the touchstone of analysis under both is whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area entered or searched. See, e.g., McDonald v. State,
III. Voir Dire Question
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to question jurors about whether they knew anyone with a hard-drug problem.
“The purposes of voir dire examination are to discover if there is any basis for challenges for cause and to gain knowledge for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.” Hutcheson v. State,
The State contends that the prosecutor’s question, which followed his successful for-cause challenge to a panel member who declared, “well, I just don’t think there’s anything wrong with growing a little pot,” apparently was designed to explore the remaining panel members’ attitudes toward marijuana. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to ask questions exploring the link between marijuana and the use of hard drugs.
IV. Introduction of Evidence
Appellant objected during trial to the State being allowed to introduce a crime-lab submission sheet that was not provided to him during discovery. The trial court overruled appellant’s objection, and appellant contends that the ruling was in error because it violated | «Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1 (2010). Rule 17.1(a) requires that the prosecuting attorney provide to defense counsel certain information upon request, including:
(i) the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at any hearing or at trial;
(ii) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant or a code-fendant;
(iii) those portions of grand jury minutes containing testimony of the defendant;
(iv) any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the par-tieulаrcase, including results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments or comparisons;
(v) any books, papers, documents, photographs or tangible objects, which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in any hearing or at trial or which were obtained from or belong to the defеndant; and
(vi) any record of prior criminal convictions of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at any hearing or at trial, if the prosecuting attorney has such information.
Additionally, the prosecuting attorney must promptly disclose to defense counsel “any material or infоrmation within his knowledge, possession, or control, which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged or would reduce his punishment therefor.” Ark. R.Crim. P. 17.1(d).
The key in determining if a reversible discovery violation exists is whether the appellant was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s failure to disclosе. Lacy v. State,
| ^Appellant does not argue that the form falls intо any specific category outlined by Rule 17.1, but contends that the prosecution is required to cooperate with defense counsel and the trial court must exclude evidence not properly provided to the defense. The evidence-submission form falls into the category of Rule 17.1(a)(v), which includes any document that the prosecuting attorney intends to present at trial. Even though allowing the evidence-submission form was error pursuant to subsection (v), the trial court’s error was harmless. Appellant does not express how he was prejudiced by the trial court’s admission of the form. The exhibit at issue is a list of items submitted to thе State Crime Laboratory for testing. The report of the crime laboratory’s analysis was admitted, and appellant did not dispute the report’s conclusions about the composition or weight of the marijuana. Therefore, because no prejudice was demonstrated by admitting a list of items submitted to the crime laboratory, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
V. Jury Instruction
In his final point, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury to consider possession of marijuana as a lesser-included offense of manufacturing marijuana. A trial court’s ruling on whether to submit jury instructions will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Cook v. State,
|KAt trial, appellant completely denied manufacturing marijuana, testifying that none was growing on his property when he left for the Bahamas on July 10, 2009, and asserting that the confidential informant actually planted the marijuana in order to avoid prosecution for “a stream of burglaries.” Therefore, because appellant completely denied manufacturing— and possessing — the marijuana that was on his property, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
Affirmed.
Notes
. Appellant’s motion to suppress was heard by the trial court on March 10, 2010, and the trial court denied the motion prior to the beginning of trial on July 19, 2010. Appellant renewed his motion to suppress at the conclusion of the State’s evidence and at the end of appellant's case and the State’s rebuttal witnesses, and it was denied by the trial court each time.
. The voir dire referred to by appellant in this point on appeal was not included in the abstract, although the trial court's earlier ruling sustaining appellant's objection regarding gateway drugs is included. We have not directed appellant to cure the deficiency only because we were able to reach the merits of the case in spite of his inadequate abstract. See Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 4 — 2(b). Moreover, we can go to the record to affirm. See Klines v. State,