PERALTA SHIPPING CORP. v. SMITH & JOHNSON (SHIPPING) CORP.
No. 84-559
Supreme Court of the United States
1985
470 U.S. 1031
Nо. 84-6140. ACHAWAMETHEKUL v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.; No. 84-6142. DAY v. UNITED STATES. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.; No. 84-6162. SMITH v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.; No. 84-6163. CHUA HAN MOW v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.; No. 84-6169. LEVINE v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.; No. 84-6177. SILVA v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorаri denied.; No. 84-6178. SMITH v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.; No. 84-6184. BARNARD v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.; No. 84-6185. GREER v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
Thе admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts extends generally to a transaction that “relates to ships and vessels, masters and mariners, as the agents of commerce.” Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731, 736 (1961), quoting 1 E. Benedict, Admiralty 131 (6th ed. 1940). Notwithstanding the broad sweep of the admiralty jurisdiction, this Court, since thе time of its single-page opinion in Minturn v. Maynard, 17 How. 477 (1855), has refused to extend admiralty jurisdiction to disputes involving general agency contracts that call for “husbanding” a vessel, that is, arranging for the performance of the various services that are preliminary to maritime movеment. This case presents an opportunity to address the continued vitality of this much-criticized exception to admiralty jurisdiction, an exception that has been
Petitioner Peralta is the general agent in the United States for an operator of several oceangoing сargo vessels. In 1979, it executed a sub-agency agreement with respondent Smith & Johnson whereby it appointed respondent as “Gulf agents” responsible for arranging services for the principal‘s vessels calling on ports between Brownsville, Tex., and Tampa, Flа. Under the agreement, respondent promised to act as the “husbanding agen[t]” by providing for services such as
“arranging for entrance and clearance of vessels at the Custom House, execution of all Custom House documents incidental thereto, аrranging for fuel, water, provisions, emergency repairs, port charges and other similar matters, and for stevedoring, storage and other cargo handling; arranging for tugs,”
and a number of other services directly involved with the operation of vessels while at port preparing for departure. See 739 F. 2d 798, 799 (CA2 1984).
Two years after the agreement was signed, petitioner commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Relying on the court‘s admiralty jurisdiction, petitioner alleged that respondent had breached the agency agreement. It sought an accounting and recovery of money said to have been wrongfully retained by respondent. In particular, Peralta sought to recover freight collected on vessels and not turned over to it, аnd money advanced by petitioner to pay suppliers but diverted by respondent. Addressing cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court on its own questioned its subject-matter jurisdiction. It concluded that the sub-agency “husbanding” contract under which respondent acted as loсal port agent for the principal was not a maritime contract within the court‘s admiralty jurisdiction. It therefore dismissed the cоmplaint pursuant to
The Court of Appeals affirmed, 739 F. 2d 798 (CA2 1984), holding that it was constrained by Minturn, supra, and those Second Circuit cases that had faithfully adhered to the rule established in Minturn that admiralty jurisdiction does nоt extend to general agency or sub-agency “husbanding” contracts. 739 F. 2d, at
“The bоundaries of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts—as opposed to torts or crimes—being conceptual rather than spatial, have always been difficult to draw.” Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S., at 735. Generally, however, contract actions that relate to maritime service оr maritime transactions have been understood to fall within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Though the need for bright-line rules in this аrea is evident, the line drawn in Minturn has been criticized widely and severely because it excludes so much that obviously concerns mаritime transactions. Thus G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 28, and n. 94b (2d ed. 1975), regard the rule as one of “dubious defensibility,” and have predicted that, when this Cоurt reaches the issue, it will hold that general agency and other vessel-management agreements fall within the admiralty jurisdiction, and will оverrule Minturn and its progeny. See also 7A J. Moore & A. Pelaez, Moore‘s Federal Practice ¶.250, p. 3006 (1983) (“Quite clearly, such agreements are an integral part of, and in furtherance of, maritime commerce and, consequently, should be cognizable within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts“).
Not only is the Minturn rule of dubious validity, but in efforts to narrow its application, the Courts of Appeals have developed a number of equally questionablе exceptions to the rule that have
The conflict between the approaches to this question taken by thе Courts of Appeals is reason enough to grant this petition, for uniformity and predictability in the maritime industry were the ends sought in the Constitution whеn federal-court maritime jurisdiction was created in the first instance. A substantial argument has been advanced that the rule establishеd in Minturn improperly excludes from federal maritime jurisdiction disputes that directly concern the business of maritime commerce. In light of the strength of that argument, of the confusion and conflict in the courts, and of the need for a uniform rule, I would grant this petition.
I therefore dissent.