*1 524 could teaspoons as little as three
amount salt perhaps this; in his said testimony, caused Dr. Hydemann, have salt —an amount— equivalent that one tablespoon hy- sufficient the child’s would have been produce condition. pematremic stated, judgment
For reasons of the circuit court is reversed and court affirmed. reversed;
Appellate circuit court affirmed. (No. 63065. HOME, Ap- NURSING BELWOOD
PEORIA COUNTY al. et THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v. pellant, (Wanda Cagle, Appellee). J.
Opinion February 1987. filed *2 MORAN, J., concurring. *3 K. Allen, (Rex & of Peoria Voelker
Heyl, Royster, Henss, of for counsel), Linder and Mark D. appellant. Bowles, P.C., of of Goldfine & Lesaganich, John Peoria, for appellee. Friedman, Ltd, of
Stevenson, Chicago Rusin & curiae Il- for amicus Stevenson, counsel), F. of (Douglas . Association. linois Manufacturers’ III, E. Kinzie of Chi- Thomas D. and Nyhan Harry Fowle, Ltd., counsel), & of Ballard, Shepard cago (Pope, of Commerce for amici curiae Illinois State Chamber Illinois Self-Insurer’s Association. Janssen, Peoria, H. of for amicus curiae Illinois Jay Trial Association. Lawyers Johnson, Katz,
Jerome Schur and K. of Richard Friedman, Schur & of for amicus curiae Eagle, Chicago, UAW-CAP Council.
CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK of delivered opinion the court: claimant,
The filed for Cagle, Wanda a claim compen sation under the Workers’ Act Rev. Compensation (Ill. Stat. ch. 48, 138.1 et on par. seq.) (the Act) August 24, 1979, that she alleging developed syn drome a of as result the laundry employment room of her Peoria employer, County Nursing Belwood Home Both the (Belwood). and, review, arbitrator Industrial Commission found that the claimant had sus tained an accidental as a of injury result repeated trauma to her wrist in her operation two large wash ing machines in the room the laundry nursing home. The circuit court of Peoria County confirmed the Com decision, mission’s and Belwood appealed the appel late The court. court affirmed the circuit declared that the instant case a involved substantial question warranting consideration this court. (138 Ill. 3d App. 880.) Belwood a petition filed leave to in this court appeal to our Rule pursuant 315(a) (94 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we its granted petition.
The issue raised in this is whether an appeal a sustained as result work-related trauma repetitive compensable under the Workers’ Act Compensation with- out a finding that the occurred as result of one specific time, incident traceable to a definite place *4 cause.
In bar, the case at the claimant worked for respond- ent for 12 years, the last six in the room. years laundry
528 her to required carry bags
The duties of her employment After 25 and pounds. between laundry weighing load bags, in these she would two sorting laundry machines washing by operating 200-pound-capacity compartments. of three door into each spring-loaded times. loaded the machines six Each the claimant day that her oc- alleged claimant Although initially 5, 1976, amended the the arbitrator curred October as Oc- reflect the date of injury to application claimant’s she 4, 1976, experi- claimant testified a date when tober 1976, 5, at work. On claimant enced October symptoms McLean, regarding a neurologist, consulted Dr. John She contin- numbness, and pain, tingling. symptoms 1977, 23, when she underwent August until ued work com- carpal syndrome for outpatient surgery —“a of the me- from resulting compression plex symptoms or burning tunnel with pain dian nerve hand, sometimes in the fingers tingling parathesias Medical elbow.” Dorland’s Illustrated to the extending 1289 (26th 1981). ed. Dictionary total temporary awarded benefits The arbitrator The In- disability. total and for 25% disability permanent award, the circuit affirmed that Commission dustrial The appel- decision. confirmed Commission’s the circuit court judgment. late court affirmed issues. court, Belwood two related this raises Before whether the Industrial Commission’s The first issue is in an “accidental the claimant sustained finding of the evidence. weight to the manifest is contrary jury” that, there is no maintains since Second, spe Belwood “accident,” three-year the claim is barred cific 48, par. ch. Rev. Stat. (Ill. statute of limitations 138.6(d)). this appeal narrow issue presented
The more within injury” the term “accidental what is meant by the Act. meaning of
529 case, In the instant the claimant was found to have to that sufficient medical evidence establish presented was work related. We do not believe that find injury is the How ing against the manifest of evidence. weight ever, whether the claimant’s is “accidental” is the injury crux of this case. We believe that the behind purpose Workers’ Act is served Compensation by allowing best in a case like the instant one an in compensation where has to jury been shown be caused performance the claimant’s and has over a job developed gradually time, period of without requiring complete dysfunction. In In order to achieve this result we believe the case ternational Harvester Co. v. Industrial Com. (1973), 56 International 84, Ill. 2d and that line of cases following Harvester, should be so as to include a case interpreted like the instant one. We do not in believe that so doing we are in partaking judicial legislation; rather we are en gaging necessary proper judicial inter statutory so as to pretation implement purpose Work ers’ Act. Compensation
The Workers’ Act was intended to Compensation pro vide financial protection workers injured regardless of a or showing negligence contributory negligence, while from common law tort precluding employee Co. v. Industrial Com. (Pathfinder remedies. 62 (1976), 556, end, Ill. 2d To that it 563.) has been consistently held that the Act should be construed accom liberally its 62 Ill. 563. plish objects. 2d purpose Requiring complete a case like the instant collapse one not to the would be beneficial or the em- employee it force ployer might needing because employees pro- tection of the Act to their bodies to a mo- push precise ment of because an collapse. Simply employee’s work-related rather than sudden and gradual, should not completely disabling, protection preclude The Act was intended to compensate benefits. workers employment. a result of their as injured who have been for a work-related an benefits employee To deny or completely of a sudden mishap that is not the result performs who faithfully an disabling employee penalizes and damage. discomfort bodily duties job despite stated, an employee correctly As must still trauma repetitive based on alleges injury who al- as other claimants proof standard of meet the same showing There must be an accidental injury. leging result of a and not the is work related the injury *6 aging process. normal degenerative that she ex- instant case testified The claimant the work- in her left arm while and tingling pain perienced informed 4, 1976. She shift on October her ing regular extreme 1976, that she had 5, Dr. McLean on October to 4, due doors on October the washer gripping difficulty testimony The medical experiencing. the she was pain Therefore, was uncontroverted. claimant presented the finding Commission’s the Industrial we now hold under an accidental injury suffered that the claimant the evidence. weight the manifest against Act is not respond- raised by the second issue address We now of limitations: statute ent, three-year regarding her claim from bringing is barred the claimant whether traceable to specific is not allegedly since her injury date of accident. Act (Ill. Compensation of the Workers’
Section 6(d) in perti 1985, 48, 138.6(d)) provides ch. par. Rev. Stat. compensa file a claim for claimant must nent that a part accident. of the after the date tion three years within possibilities the various analyzed The court like the in cases an accident the date of determining in- suffers a work-related an employee one where instant held The appellate trauma. due to repetitive jury trea- in his Larson Professor by rule that a propounded logical, most would be compensation tise on workers’ Larson, and we A. agree. (1B Compensation Workmen’s sec. 39.50 We therefore hold that the date of an (1985).) accidental in a injury repetitive-trauma compensation case is the date on which “manifests itself.” injury “Manifests itself” means the date on which both the fact of the and the causal injury relationship the claimant’s would have become employment plainly ato apparent person. reasonable
The claimant the instant case worked on October 4, 1976, and of her experienced symptoms On injury. 5, 1976, October she sought medical treatment and was told that her was caused activi- job-related ties. Therefore, 1976, October date was the last day the claimant worked before the fact of her injury and its causal connection to her became employment ap- to her. parent Claimant filed her claim August 24, 1979, within three of the years date of her injury.
Accordingly, we now affirm the ap- court, pellate which affirmed the circuit court’s confir- mation of the Industrial Commission’s and arbitrator’s award of benefits to the claimant.
Judgment affirmed. MORAN, JUSTICE *7 concurring: While I the join court, and opinion the I write to focus attention separately on proof causality where, here, as the alleged compensable is a con- sequence trauma. repetitive
This court stated in Johnson v. Industrial Com. 89 Ill. 2d (1982), 438, that repetitive-trauma injuries are under compensable the Workers’ Compensation Act where there is sufficient evidence of in causation the rec ord. The Johnson conclude, was unable to the it, record before that the alleged repetitive-trauma injury was work related because none of the numerous “[i]n in medical reports evidence was an opinion expressed caused, that her condition was or could have been caused, steering (89 her of the carts.” Ill. 2d Thus, Johnson, in to re the claimant was unable 443.) a under Act she failed to cover the because establish loading between her work of “daily causal connection the development and the cart” and maneuvering [food] of bilateral tunnel carpal syndrome. same case,
In the as we have the Johnson, instant in repetitive-trauma syn carpal —bilateral Also, Johnson, drome. are faced with determin as we to es whether or not the record contains evidence ing tablish that nature of claimant’s repetitive the finds caused While injury. majority employment it and connection, does so tersely causal requisite testi that medical stating without elaboration by “[t]he (115 was uncontroverted.” the claimant presented mony true. record, this is Ill. of the 530.) my reading 2d at On as to However, guidance alone it little standing gives causality repet what evidence is sufficient to establish itive-trauma, cases. workers’ compensation rec- case, in this unlike the
I that record believe Johnson, ord in contains facts sufficient affirm tun- that the claimant’s finding arbitrator in- work-related, nel repetitive-trauma was syndrome that oper- For the claimant testified she jury. example, machines. She stated two commercial laundry ated washing compart- each machine contains three separate The each with a door. ments, spring-hinged equipped six that she usually completed claimant further testified load machine, with each requiring of laundry per loads compart- close of the three that she the door open the spring-hinged ments. She testified that opening on the out” doors that she down required “pull pull aon testimony, typ- to claimant’s According door handle. down using the doors “pull ical she day, opened work also closed times. She out” maneuver 36 pull *8 doors 36 times. Claimant’s on this was testimony point uncontradicted.
The record in the instant also at least case contains three In separate diagnoses carpal syndrome. R. addition, claimant submitted a Horacio report by Rivero, M.D., her medical who con- expert, expressly cluded that claimant’s was a result of the “repeti- tive continuous motion and strain impossed [sic] tunnel, element of the while in the carpal process of employment (handling large laundry machines), whereby she developed typical of bilateral tun- symptoms nel, being side, worse on the left immediate requiring surgery, having right one contin- aggravated by ued work in this same job, further necessitating equal Dr. surgery.” Rivero’s report was unrebutted.
These facts clearly distinguish the case from present Johnson. The claimant’s specific unrefuted testi- mony repetitive movements involved in her em- ployment, together with Dr. Rivero’s unrefuted conclu- sion that claimant’s employment caused her injury, amply supports arbitrator’s finding causality affirmance majority’s thereof. Because the claimant did establish requisite causal connection to sustain claim Act, under the I concur.