52 So. 481 | Miss. | 1910
after stating the facts as above, delivered the-opinion of the court.
It is insisted that section 4267 of the Code of 1906 is violative of section 181 of the Constitution, because it provides for the taxation of the property of private corporations for pecuniary gain in a different way from and to a greater extent than the property of individuals. That section and section 112 of the Constitution are to be construed together in determining the question involved. Section 181 provides that “the property of all private corporations for pecuniary gain shall be taxed in the same way and to the same extent as the property of'
The cases of Panola County v. Carrier & Son, 89 Miss. 277, 42 South. 347, and State v. Simmons, 70 Miss. 485, 12 South. 477, are decisive of the constitutionality of section 4267. The requirement of section 181 that the “property of private corporations for pecuniary gain shall be taxed in the same way and to the same extent as the property of private individuals” must be construed in connection with the power given the legislature in section 112 to “provide for a special mode of valuation .and assessment for railroads, and railroad and other corporate property.” By section 4267 of the Code the legislature has undertaken to carry out the grant of power conferred by section 112 by providing a special mode of valuation and assessment ■of private corporations for a pecuniary gain.' Where the aggregate market value of the shares exceeds the value of the real and personal property, as it does in the instant case, it is contended that a tax on this difference is a tax on thrift and earning capacity, which is violative of section 181 of the Constitution, because no such tax is levied against individuals. Such contention is unsound. This difference represents the value of the right of the corporation to exist, which is a franchise incident to all corporations, and of value, and constitutes part of its property; and this is true, notwithstanding the corporation is chartered under general laws at small expense.
And from Adams Express Company v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185, 11 Sup. Ct. 604, 41 L. Ed. 965: “It is a cardinal rule, which should never be forgotten, that whatever property is worth for •the purpose of income and sale it is also worth for the purpose of taxation. Suppose an express company is incorporated to transact business within the limits of the state and does business only within such limits, and for the purpose of transacting that business purchases and holds a few thousand of dollars’ worth of horses and wagons, and yet it so meets the wants of the people dwelling in that state, so uses the tangible property which it possesses, so transacts business therein, that its stock becomes in the markets of the state of the actual cash value of hundreds of thousands of dollars. To the owners thereof, for the purpose of income and sale, the corporate property is worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Does substance of right require, that it pay taxes only upon the thousands of dollars of tangible property which it possesses? Accumulated wealth will laugh at the crudity of taxing laws which reach ■only the one-and ignore the other, while they who own tangible property not organized into a single producing plant, will feel the injustice of a system which so misplaces the burden of taxation. * * * The value which property bears in the market, the amount for which its stock can be bought and sold, is the real value. Business men do not pay cash for property in moonshine or dreamland. They buy and pay for that which is of value in its own power to produce income or for purpose ■of sale.”
Applying these principles to the.case in hand, the $20,000 the difference between the aggregate value of the shares, and the value of the real and personal property, is the value fixed by law of the franchise of this corporation.
Affirmed.