119 Iowa 586 | Iowa | 1903
A judgment becomes a lien on any present' interest of the judgment defendant in real estate owned by him as soon as entered of record. Code, section 3801: Taylor v. Taylor, 118 Iowa, 407. One of plaintiff’s judgments attached the day before the sheriff’s sale under Marshall Field & Co.’s judgment, and the other eleven months thereafter. Curtis v. Millard, 14 Iowa, 128; Barnes v. Cavanagh, 53 Iowa, 27. Redemption from this sale was made by the defendants precisely one year thereafter, and on the very day they acquired the property by conveyance from the Aborns. The effect thereof was to extinguish the indebtedness and destroy the lien, for the equitable interest in the land represented by the
The difference in the situation of the debtor and the grantee is this: Redemption by the former leaves the realty exposed to the satisfaction of his debts, while in the hands of the latter it is relieved from all these, not existing liens at the time of the transfer. The same principle has been applied to mortgage foreclosures. Harms v. Palmer, 73 Iowa, 446; Todd v. Davey, 60 Iowa, 532. In the latter case appear dicta to the contrary, as is made evident by the decision of Campbell v. Maginnis, supra, rendered some years later. In Harms v. Palmer, 73 Iowa, 446, the court held that upon the foreclosure of a mortgage, and sale of the property for one installment of the debt secured, the grantee of the mortgagor might redeem from the sale, and take the property devested from the lien of any unsatisfied portion or installment, and is. clearly within .the doctrine of the cases already mentioned. In Moody v. Funk, 82 Iowa, 1, and Bevans v. Dewey, 82 Iowa, 85, junior lien holders were made parties to the decree, and the court held that, because of this, their liens expired upon the failure to redeem from the sale within the period prescribed, and the mortgagor’s grantee took the land freed from their claims. The ground of the decision is thus stated in Bevan's Case: “We think her rights are the same as thfey would have been had she fore-, closed her mortgage in an original proceeding, instead of doing so by means of a cross-petition in the action commenced by Fullerton. She was a party to the Fullerton decree, and is chargeable „with the notice of the sale under it. She has had the opportunity of redeeming from it, but neglected to improve it. As a junior incumbrancer, by permitting redemption to be made, not by the judgment
In the instant case, neither plaintiff nor its assignor were made parties to any other action, nor have their liens been affected by any decrees, and in these respects are distinguishable from the decisions last cited. Expressions may be found in several opinions somewhat inconsistent with Curtis v. Millard, but it has never been overruled, and, as already indicated, we regard it'as sound in principle. The judgment creditor, in order to acquire the right of the certificate holder, must redeem within nine months from the sale. Jack v. Cald, 114 Iowa, 349. And on failure to do so, his lien may be devested by a sheriff’s deed. Nothing in the Code indicates that his lien is otherwise terminated at the end of that period. In declaring that the equity of redemption is the subject of levy and sale, a contrary conclusion is necessarily involved. See Harrison v. Wilmering, 72 Iowa, 727, where such equity was sold by the sheriff eleven months after the first sale. Barnes v. Cavanagh, 53 Iowa, 27.
As plaintiff’s liens were never devested by-virtue of a decree of court, or the execution of a sheriff’s deed, and are not barred by any statute, they may be enforced against the lots of defendants acquired subject thereto.
The ruling on the demurrer was erroneous, and must be REVERSED.