119 Kan. 212 | Kan. | 1925
The opinion of the court was delivered by
On December 9, 1922, the Peoples National Bank of Kansas City, Kan., brought this action of replevin for possession of-
The defendant asserts that at the request of the plaintiff he expended $739.83 in the fall of 1922 in shipping the cattle from Council Grove to Larned and in feeding and caring for them after their arrival there. He complains of the ruling of the district court in striking out his testimony in this connection. There was evidence that he had sold forty-two head of the mortgaged cattle to farmers near Council Grove, taking notes and mortgages which he indorsed to the plaintiff, and which were held by it as collateral. On direct examination he gave this version of a conversation with two representatives of the plaintiff:
“What did you tell Mr. Browne and Mr. Gulick about it? Well, I thought it advisable to move the cattle to where they could be sold.
“That is, to take them up under your mortgages that you had? Well, I went to the people that owned them.
“Well, did you tell Mr: Browne and Mr. Gulick about that? Yes, sir.
“What did they say? Well, they agreed with me that they ought to be moved and sold.
“Tell what they said? Well, they wanted the cows sold. They said they wanted them sold.
“Well, what did they say about taking them back from these farmers, if anything? They said see the farmers and see who will give up their cows.
“Did you go and see the parties about it? Yes, sir.
“And these forty-two head of cattle taken .up from farmers, .you went to see about that on the talk with Mr. Gulick and Mr. Browne, did you? Yes, sir.
“Were these the same cattle you shipped here to Larned? Yes, sir.”
This testimony does not show any agreement to give the defendant a lien on the cattle for his expenses in moving and caring for them, or even to reimburse him therefor. It indicates rather that he was handling them in his own interest in order that the mortgage debt might be paid. There was evidence that he told the plaintiff’s representative he expected to be able to sell the cows at Larned to people who would use them to furnish milk to a new milk plant there. Correspondence between him and the plaintiff shows that
“Please let us know by return mail how you are getting along with the shipment of cows? You will remember that under the agreement you only have another week in which to get two more carloads under shipment or sold. It is absolutely necessary that we have a material reduction on this loan, and if you are not going to sell the cattle it will be necessary for us to take the matter in hands ourselves.”
Moreover, the defendant made no such showing of having incurred expenses as to preserve for review the question of his right to reimbursement. His offer of proof on this point was rejected and was not followed up by an affidavit or other sworn evidence of what he would have been able to prove. Therefore the ruling cannot be made a basis of reversal. (R. S. 60-3004.)
On February 5, 1920, twenty head of the cattle included in the plaintiff’s mortgage were sold by the defendant to J. S. Hughes, who paid for them with a note and mortgage, which were transferred to the plaintiff and later fully paid, the last payment being made about June 29, 1922. Hughes afterward sold these cattle, or a part of them, to the defendant. On November 20, 1922, the defendant-executed to W. H. White, the interpleader, a chattel mortgage on thirty-one head of the cattle he had shipped to Larned. The defendant and the interpleader assert, and the plaintiff denies, that these thirty-one head are a part of the Hughes cattle which he sold to the defendant, with their increase, and are not covered by the plaintiff’s mortgage, such of them as were originally covered by it having been released by the payment by Hughes to the plaintiff of the mortgage and notes he had given for them. The defendant and the interpleader produced direct testimony in support of their claim in this regard, and they contend that there was no evidence to the contrary, and therefore that the verdict was to this extent without support. A representative of the plaintiff testified, however, that at Council Grove in the summer of 1922 the defendant told him he would ship no cattle to Larned excepting those covered by the plaintiff’s mortgage, and repeated this at Larned about the middle of September; that he also told him after the cattle had arrived there that they were shipped pursuant -to the prior talk, and said of the cattle which were replevied that they had been shipped to be sold to pay the plaintiff’s mortgage. The plaintiff introduced a
The exhibit referred to concerning the list of cattle to be shipped is said to have been lost, but the appellants submit what is said to be a copy, which we treat as though it had been incorporated in the abstract.
A special contention is made with respect to eight head of the cattle which were too young to have been in existence or to have been conceived at the time the plaintiff’s mortgage was executed. The appellants make the point that for this reason they cannot be covered by it. The plaintiff replies that, as already stated, the defendant sold a number of head to different farmers, who paid for them with notes secured by chattel mortgages which were transferred to the plaintiff, and which it held as collateral to the principal note and mortgage. The making and transfer of a number of such chattel mortgages were proved. The evidence already referred to, that the defendant while in possession of the cattle told the plaintiff’s representative that they were covered by its lien, warranted a finding that they were brought within its operation in this way.
At the hearing of the motion for a new trial the interpleader asked for a judgment in his favor upon the pleadings on the ground that the allegations of his interplea, which set up the execution of
The appellants seek to make a point based on the fact that the plaintiff’s mortgage, although filed at once in Ness county, was not made of record in Morris county until June 26, 1922. The matter is unimportant, since the defendant necessarily knew of it, and the interpleader’s claim accrued after the record was complete.
The judgment is affirmed.