54 S.C. 413 | S.C. | 1899
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This was an action for foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the defendant, John D. Garlington, upon his interest in a certain tract of land known as “Spring Grove.” So far as this appeal is concerned, the only controversy is between the plaintiff and the defendant, John G. Williams, who, by his answer, “for a second defense, alleges that neither the plaintiff nor his alleged mortgagor has any title to or interest in Spring Grove,” having alleged, in his first defense, “that he is the owner, and entitled to retain the possession of Spring Grove.” A jury trial having been waived, the case was heard by his Honor, Judge Benet, upon the testimony taken and reported by a referee, who rendered a decree which is set out in the “Case,” which should be incorporated in the report of this case. In will be sufficient, therefore, to state
From this judgment the defendant, John G. Williams, alone, appeals upon the several exceptions set out in the record, which should be likewise incorporated in the report of this case. We do not propose to consider these exceptions seriatim, inasmuch as, according to our view, they raise but. two general questions, viz: ist. Whether the action was prematurely brought as against the appellant. 2d. Whether the interest of John D. Garlington, as a contingent remainderman, in the Spring Grove tract of land, was barred or destroyed by the .deed of feoffment, with livery of seizin, executed by the life tenant of said land. For a proper understanding of these questions it may be well to state here that, under the established facts in this case, the Spring Grove tract of land, formerly belonging to one John D. Williams, who died on the --- day of June, 1870, leaving a will, by the third clause of which he devised Spring Grove to his executors for the use and benefit of his son, the said John G. Williams, during his natural life, “to remain in his possession and enjoyment, unless efforts be made to subject the same to the payment of his debts and liabilities, and in this event to be taken charge of by my executors to prevent and protect the same from such liabilities, and at his death to' be equally divided between such child or children as he may leave surviving at his death; or should all his children die before attaining the age of twenty-one years, then to revert to my estate for division, as the residue of my estate is here
We proceed, then, to consider the second reason why ap
■ The judgment of this Court is that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.