171 So. 36 | La. | 1936
The Peoples Homestead Savings Association, a Louisiana corporation, instituted foreclosure proceedings via ordinaria against defendant, a borrowing member of the association, claiming a vendor's lien mortgage against certain real estate, alleging that he had defaulted in his payments; that the whole debt became due and payable; that a writ of sequestration should be issued and the property seized; and that a receiver should be appointed to take charge of collecting the rents due therefrom.
The district judge ordered the issuance of a writ of sequestration upon the plaintiff executing bond in the sum of $1,000, and appointed A.J. Lester, receiver, to collect the rents due on the seized property, upon his executing a bond in the sum of *802 $2,000. The property was seized, and the receiver, after duly qualifying, proceeded to take charge thereof.
The defendant then filed a motion to dissolve the sequestration on the ground that section 47 of Act No. 140 of 1932, which established the procedure under which the defendant's property was taken, was unconstitutional, because section 47 contained provisions not covered by the title of the statute.
The trial judge sustained the order appointing the receiver and issuing the writ of sequestration, and dismissed the defendant's rule. Defendant then applied to this court for writs of certiorari and prohibition, which were granted, and the case is now here for review.
Act No. 140 of 1932 is a general and comprehensive statute governing homestead and building and loan associations in this state. The title of the act has twenty-two separate clauses, the first two reading as follows:
"An Act codifying the statutes of this State in respect to all homestead and building and loan associations; prescribing the rights, obligations and duties of said corporations and of all the members thereof."
The title contains numerous clauses dealing with the organization, regulation, etc., of building and loan associations, and in clause 10 we find the following:
"Providing for the repayment of all loans and for the remedies to enforce collection and payment thereof."
Fourteen statutes are repealed by the act and four are specifically exempt from the repealing clause. *803
It appears that section 12 of Act No. 120 of 1902 was formerly the law governing the foreclosure of homestead mortgages, but section 47 of Act No. 140 of 1932 added the new features regarding the writ of sequestration and the appointment of a receiver to collect the rents.
Defendant's counsel argue that since the initial statement of the title was that it is "An act codifying the statutes of the State, etc.," that one would only look for a repetition of the provisions of section 12 of Act No. 120 of 1902 with reference to the remedies for the enforcement, collection, and payment of delinquent and matured homestead loans, and that there is nothing in the title of the statute which would reasonably place any one on guard to expect the amendment by which these new features were added. They, therefore, say that section 47 of the statute is unconstitutional, being in violation of the provisions of section 16, article 3 of the Constitution of 1921, which reads:
"Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of such object."
In reviewing the decisions of this court, construing similar if not identical provisions of the Constitution of 1898, in the case of Southern Hide Co., Inc. v. Best et al.,
"It is not the purpose of this article [article 31 of the Constitution of 1913] to require that the title be an index to the contents of the act, or that every end and means convenient or necessary for the accomplishment of the general object of the *804
act be set out at length in the title, but it is deemed sufficient, under the article, that the act contain but one object and that the object be fairly stated, although it be expressed in general terms, in the title of the act. All things proper or necessary to carry out the general object, so stated in the title, are deemed to be within the scope of the title. Thornhill v. Wear,
In the case of Ellerbe et al. v. Grace et. al.,
"Nor do we think that said Act No. 124 of 1862 is broader than its title. All lakes must necessarily become shallow lakes before ultimately drying up altogether, so that the title, `Relative to shallow lakes,' gave a clear insight into the character of legislation intended; which was all that was necessary. In State v. Fobbs,
"`If, in applying it, we should follow the rules of a nice and fastidious verbal criticism, we should often frustrate the action of the Legislature, without fulfilling the intention of the framers of the Constitution' — quoting from Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La.Ann. 329."
In Grinage et ux. v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co.,
"Regulating the collection of costs is a term broad and comprehensive enough to cover the requirement of security for costs, and as defendant may incur obligation for costs and pay out money for costs in the preparation of its defense, it is not without the pale of the title of the act when the body thereof authorizes the exaction from plaintiffs of a bond for the costs it may expend."
In the case of State v. Hincy,
In State v. LaHiff,
A case which is similar to the one before us is McIntyre v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W.,
"A reading of the title leaves no doubt in our minds that the Legislature intended to make the title all comprehensive, and this conclusion is fortified by the fact that Act No. 287 of 1914 was passed at the first session of the General Assembly held after the decision was rendered in the case of *807
Lavedan v. Thompson,
A creditor asserting a lien and privilege on property has the right to sequester it under subdivision 7, of art. 275, Code Prac. Gest Atkinson v. New Orleans St. L. C.R. Co., 30 La.Ann. 28. A seizing creditor has a right to have the sheriff collect the rents from the property seized. Rev.Civ. Code, art.
In the instant case, we are of the opinion that the title of the act was sufficient to cover the remedies provided in the body of the statute.
We further conclude that the act only contained one object and the question of procedure was merely auxiliary and incidental to the main object.
For the reasons assigned, the writs are recalled and vacated, the rule nisi dismissed, and the judgment of the district court affirmed, at relator's costs. *808