THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ISRAEL GUTIERREZ ZAMORA, Defendant and Appellant.
G059259
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 1/14/22
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. 16CF1903)
Avatar Legal and Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Following his conviction on several charges, including attempted murder, kidnapping, and assault with a semiautomatic weapon, Israel Gutierrez Zamora filed a petition for disclosure of juror identifying information pursuant to
Zamora now appeals from that second order which denied his disclosure petition, arguing that the court was statutorily required to release the identifying information for jurors who did not object to disclosure. We disagree.
Zamora also challenges additional aspects of his sentence that were imposed when the court resentenced him following our remand. He argues he is entitled to the benefit of recent changes in the law that rendered certain sentence enhancements imposed under
FACTS
This is the second appeal arising from the trial court‘s denial of Zamora‘s motion for disclosure of juror identifying information and alleged sentencing errors. Because neither issue relates to the convictions themselves, we incorporate the brief summary of facts underlying Zamora‘s convictions from our prior opinion.
“Zamora‘s charges were based on three separate incidents involving the same victim, J. Hernandez. In the first incident, Zamora and Hernandez were drinking together and got into a fist fight. During the fight, Zamora threatened Hernandez with a gun and unsuccessfully attempted to force Hernandez into his car; Hernandez escaped.
“The second incident occurred a few months later, when Hernandez was driving and Zamora walked into the street and began shooting at him, with several bullets hitting Hernandez‘s car. Hernandez crashed and took off
“The third incident occurred a few weeks later when Zamora went to Hernandez‘s house and threatened to hurt Hernandez or his family if Hernandez talked to the police.” (Zamora 1, supra, G055827.)
Zamora was charged with nine counts. The jury found him guilty on counts 1 and 2 (attempted kidnapping and assault with a semiautomatic firearm); not guilty on count 3 (assault with a deadly weapon-pliers or screwdriver); guilty on counts 4 and 5 (attempted murder and kidnapping); guilty on counts 6 and 7 (assault with a firearm and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle); and guilty on counts 8 and 9 (criminal threats and dissuading a witness or victim by force or fear).
“On January 3, 2018 [two days before the continued sentencing hearing], Zamora filed a motion to disclose juror identifying information arguing that there was good cause to disclose the information based on a declaration by Zamora‘s sister. According to her declaration, ‘during one morning break near the beginning of the trial, I overheard a female juror walking back into the courtroom state to another female juror, “let‘s just find him guilty so we can get this over with.” The juror was laughing as she said it. The second female juror also laughed about it.‘” (Zamora 1, supra, G055827.)
The trial court determined Zamora‘s motion for disclosure of juror identifying information was untimely and denied the motion on that basis without considering its merits; the court then proceeded with Zamora‘s sentencing. Zamora appealed from the court‘s conclusion his motion was untimely, and also argued the court made several errors relating to his sentence and the abstract of judgment.
In Zamora 1, we concluded the request for a disclosure order was not untimely and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to consider the request on the merits. (Zamora 1, supra, G055827.) We also instructed the trial court to modify the sentence and abstract of judgment and directed the court “to prepare amended minutes and an amended abstract of judgment consistent with all ordered changes. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.” (Zamora 1, supra, G055827.)
Following remand, the court informed counsel it intended to direct the jury commissioner‘s office to give notice to the trial jurors of the potential release of their personal information; the court then “ordered the Jury Commissioner‘s Office to send notice to the named jurors on the present case notifying
The jury commissioner‘s letter informed jurors the court had made a tentative decision to release their juror identification information to counsel for both parties; the letter also told the jurors they had the right to object to the release, either personally or in writing, pursuant to
The July 17 hearing was continued to July 28; on July 27, Zamora filed a supplemental brief arguing that despite the objections of some jurors, he had made a prima facie showing of good cause for disclosure of juror identification information. He pointed out that aside from the specific content of the juror‘s statement, the fact that jurors were discussing the case at all was misconduct a direct violation of the court‘s repeated admonition directing them not to do so.
The court read and considered Zamora‘s supplemental brief; it then denied the petition. As the court explained at the hearing, “[f]or the court to release juror information, among the things that the court has to find is that the alleged misconduct must be of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. The court does not so find.” The court then explained that it is not uncommon for jurors to joke with each other, and it is apparent from “their body language or what they say or how they act, whether smiling or laughing,” which is contrasted with what they look like “as they‘re receiving evidence, whether they‘re bored or taking the evidence seriously.” The court viewed the comment described by Zamora‘s sister as “a casual comment by one juror to another [that was] a joke about probably the amount of time that I told them this case was going to take.”
The court also pointed out that the jury had “asked for two separate readbacks of the testimony, which indicates to me that they took their obligation seriously and examined the evidence and the instructions of the court seriously.” The court also stated it believed the evidence in the case “was overwhelmingly towards guilt.” Based on those factors, “the court does not find that the defense has shown good cause and refuses then to release the juror information.”
1. Governing Law
For all cases in which the jury‘s verdict was returned on or after January 1, 1996, the right to obtain the jurors’ personal identifying information is governed by
If the trial court finds that the moving party made a prima facie showing of good cause, and if it finds no compelling interest against disclosure, it shall set the matter for hearing. (
If none of the jurors object to the petition for disclosure, the trial court must grant disclosure following the hearing. However, if one or more jurors does object, the court must sustain the protest(s) “if, in the discretion of the court, the petitioner fails to show good cause, the record establishes the presence of a compelling interest against disclosure as defined in subdivision (b), or the juror is unwilling to be contacted by the petitioner.” (
Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion to release juror contact information. (People v. Russell (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1050.) The trial court‘s decision to deny such a request is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1059.)
2. The Court‘s Ruling on the Disclosure Motion
Zamora argues the court abused its discretion by refusing to order disclosure of the juror identifying information for the six jurors who did not object to disclosure. According to Zamora,
The issue of whether good cause exists is ultimately resolved at the scheduled hearing.
Following the hearing, the court must make the records available as requested in the petition “unless a former juror‘s protest to the granting of the petition is sustained.” (
Here, in response to the protests of six jurors, the court made a determination at the hearing that, when considered in the wider context of the trial, the evidence offered by Zamora did not show good cause for disclosure of the juror identifying information. That is precisely what the statute requires; we find no error.
Zamora relies on Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1097, as well as this court‘s decision in DeHoyos v. Superior Court (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 71, 82, for the proposition that the court cannot “unilaterally prohibit all contact” with jurors. Those cases are inapposite, as both involved cases in which the jury verdicts were returned long before the effective date of
3. Retroactively Unlawful Sentence
Zamora also challenges several sentence enhancements. Specifically, Zamora explains that “[b]efore appellant‘s original sentence, the trial court found appellant had suffered one prior felony conviction resulting in prison sentence pursuant to
Zamora acknowledges the one-year enhancement imposed (but stayed) under
Because Zamora‘s prior prison term was not for a qualifying sexually violent offense as required under the amended version of
DISPOSITION
The order denying Zamora‘s petition for disclosure of juror identifying information is affirmed. We reverse the judgment in part and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to strike the sentence enhancements that were imposed (but stayed) pursuant to
GOETHALS, J.
WE CONCUR:
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
ZELON, J.*
*Retired Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.