23 P.2d 524 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1933
The defendants having been arraigned upon the information, the defendant June Young entered a demurrer to the second count of the information. Her demurrer was sustained by the trial court and judgment entered dismissing her. The appeal here presented is by the People from that judgment. The crime involved is defined in the law as follows (Stats. 1911, p. 10): "Any male person who, knowing a female person to be a prostitute, shall live or derive support or maintenance, in whole or in part, . . . shall be guilty of a felony, to-wit: pimping, . . ."
[1] The question presented by the appeal is whether a female can be charged with this offense because the opening *771
statement of the law is "Any male person." Penal Code, section
By these sections it is manifest that one who, not being the principal actor but who assists in the commission of a crime, although absent from the scene, is regarded as a principal and may be charged as such in the presentment without using any terms indicating the fact that such person was an accomplice. Penal Code, section
Under this section, it is held in People v. Anderson,
Penal Code, section
The defendant cites the case of People v. Simpson,
Penal Code, section
It is evident that the question as here presented was not before that court. The trial court in this case may well have felt bound by that decision and relied upon it properly in sustaining the demurrer, but when the question is again presented to a court of review and there is no other expression upon this subject by other courts of review in this state, so that no rule has become settled, it seems appropriate that in this case further consideration should be given to the question.
The sections cited which make principals and accomplices subject to be prosecuted as principals and under the same wording or charge, so far as the form of the presentment is concerned, and the holdings that in case of an executive officer, one not an executive officer can be convicted, and in the case of rape a woman who assists can be convicted of that offense, seem to require a holding that a woman charged with the offense here involved, in connection with the charge against a male person of the offense, is properly charged and could be lawfully convicted on evidence that she assisted the principal.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed.
Barnard, P.J., and Marks, J., concurred. *773