*1 Wyngaard PEOPLE WYNGAARD May 1997, Marquette. No. Docket 182760. Submitted Decided 12, 1997, appeal sought. December at 9:05 a.m. Leave to Raymond Wyngaard, Facility, an inmate at Kinross Correctional by jury Chippewa Court, in was convicted a Circuit Nicholas J. Lambros, J., prisoner being possession of a in of sub- controlled being of stance and a third-offense habitual offender. The defend- appealed. ant Appeals
The Court held: The defendant’s convictions must be and affirmed the matter must be for trial remanded court conduct an camera hear- ing in order to determine whether the confidential informant who prison guards possession told the that the defendant was in marijuana provide testimony helpful can to the If the defendant. testimony court finds that the informant offer no could favorable to defense, then the defendant’s conviction must be affirmed. A contrary finding requires reversal and a new trial. 1. There is no merit the defendant’s claim that the double jeopardy prohibition was violated when he for was tried the instant prisoner $874.84 pursuant offense taken his after was from account to a civil forfeiture action based on the same offense. erroneously 2. The court determined that the defendant was actual, possible, an to demonstrate rather than a need for the confidential informant’s an before in camera to determine if the offer informant could be would helpful appropriate. would to the defendant be deemed The matter hearing. must be remanded for the court to conduct an in camera 3. The defendant received effective assistance of counsel. Specific 4. was There sufficient evidence of intent. is not intent an of the element offense. Affirmed and remanded. by majority panel holding regard A of the was not reached with concerning
to an raised use in trial issue the defendant his during prison of admissions the defendant had evidence made disciplinary proceedings regarding administrative the same offense. App 681 appellate preserved J., issue was not stated that the Sawyer, important review, present issue that is constitutional does not outcome, not be reviewed. and should decisive dissenting part, part X, concurring stated that Markman, *2 pro- prison disciplinary The current issue should be addressed. the disciplinary compel ceeding in not inmates structures do against privilege and, therefore, proceedings Fifth Amendment implicated such compelled the use of is not self-incrimination proceeding. testimony subsequent Because in a prison Carr, inmates were found that disciplinary proceedings, speak prison was compelled Carr regarding wrongly should not be followed. It this issue and decided disciplinary was advised at the whether the defendant is not clear testimony hearing admissible him at a would not be that his required by underlying offense, subsequent as criminal trial on the whether the be remanded to determine The matter should Carr. advised, and his advised. If he was so defendant was so pro- elementary against him, notions of due later used was in fact reversed, indepen- require his should be would that conviction cess advised, any If he was not so Fifth Amendment concerns. dent of anal- not be because the of the conviction should reversal wrong. ysis Amendment issue in Carr was of the Fifth important P.X, dissenting, an stated that the issue is O’Connell, be of the outcome and should issue that decisive constitutional any holding derived from testi- in Carr that evidence reviewed. The hearing mony is inadmissible at crimi- charge, impeach- proceedings regarding underlying save for nal rebuttal, The convic- determinative of the case. ment or is outcome reversed. tion should be — — Informants. Law Evidence Confidential 1. Criminal prosecution request considering be a defendant’s that the A court identify make the inform- a confidential informant and ordered to in camera at trial should conduct an ant available for examination pres- hearing the defendant’s and interview the informant outside anonymity, thereby ence, protecting in order to the informant’s would be if informant could offer determine possi- helpful demonstrates a to the defendant where the defendant testimony. informant's ble need for the — — 2. Criminal Law Substances Prisoners in Possession of Controlled Specific Intent. prisoner being Specific in the offense of a intent is not element of 800.281[4]; (MCL possession MSA a substance controlled 28.1621[4]). J. Opinion by Sawyer, Kelley, Attorney General, Frank J. L. Thomas Casey, General, Solicitor Patrick M. Prose- Shannon, Attorney, C. cuting Pierce, and Jonathan Assistant Attorney General, people. for John W. Groves, appeal. for defendant Sawyer P.J., Before: and and O’Connell, Markman, JJ. was a jury Defendant convicted after
Sawyer, being prisoner possession trial of of a controlled substance, MCL 800.281(4); 28.1621(4), MSA offender, 769.11; third-offense habitual MCL MSA 28.1083. This case arose after defendant was found possession marijuana while an inmate Kin- Facility ross Correctional in Kincheloe, Michigan. appeals affirm right. Defendant as We and remand the trial court to conduct an in camera *3 order to determine whether the confidential inform- told prison guards ant who the that was in defendant possession marijuana provide of testimony could helpful to defendant.
Defendant first argues that his criminal conviction must be reversed because it violated his to be right free jeopardy, from double that he been given had already punished $874.84 this incident when was prisoner pursuant taken from his a civil account forfeiture action. We disagree. recently This Court in People Acoff, addressed this issue App v 220 Mich NW2d (1996). pro- Defendant has not vided transcript the of the civil forfeiture proceeding any proof or that was punitive the forfeiture so in purpose or equivalent effect that it was to a criminal Therefore, proceeding. jeopardy defendant’s double claim without Id. merit. App 226 Mich
Opinion by Sawyer, pro- rights argues to due that his next Defendant trial court denied where the trial were and a fair cess prosecution request be the that defendant’s refused identify examina- make available for and ordered to told the informant who confidential at trial the tion possession prison guards in of defendant was Captain marijuana. advised informant A confidential pos- would be in that defendant Zimmerman Michael day marijuana he was detained on the session of marijuana. possession Defendant claimed found given con- that the box he was did not know that he up marijuana. had been set He believed he tained the informant be asked that other inmates. Defendant hopes eliciting produced that would theory. defense this corroborate requests production a con- When a defendant conduct an in informant, the court should fidential hearing the informant outside and interview camera thereby protecting presence, defendant’s anonymity, if to determine order informant’s helpful that would be offer informant could People Underwood, 447 Mich the defendant. (1994); Stander, 706; 526 NW2d903 The trial 617, 622-623; 251 NW2d erroneously was determined that defendant court required possi- actual, rather than
to demonstrate an testimony before the in for the informant’s ble, need appropriate. Conse- be deemed camera would quently, conduct this in we for the court to remand hearing. finds that If the trial court camera testimony favorable to the could offer no informant shall be then defendant’s conviction defense, *4 require contrary finding reversal and A shall affirmed. Stander, a new trial. at 623. v Opinion by Sawyer, argues
Defendant next that evidence of his admis- regarding sion the instant offense, made at an admin- istrative erroneously was proceeding, admitted at trial because he was not given Miranda1 warnings before the at which he made this However, statement. preserve defendant has failed to this issue objected because he neither at trial nor raised the issue in his motion for a new trial. Further- more, I am persuaded not presents impor- this an tant constitutional issue that is decisive of the out- come. Newcomb, App 424, Mich 431; 476 NW2d 749 (1991). Accordingly, would decline to review the issue.
Defendant
argues
next
that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel where his trial counsel
elicited character evidence suggesting that defendant
was a known drug dealer. We disagree. Defendant has
not overcome
presumption
that his trial counsel’s
actions were consistent with a trial strategy. Also,
where there was overwhelming evidence of defend-
guilt,
ant’s
it cannot be said that there is a reasonable
probability
jury
that the
would have concluded differ-
ently. Thus, there was no ineffective assistance. Peo-
ple v Stanaway, 446
Mich
687-688;
Finally, defendant argues that the crime of being a
prisoner
possession
of a controlled substance
requires a showing
specific
intent and that
prosecution
provide
failed to
sufficient evidence to
support
jury
finding
this element. We disagree.
Specific intent is
not
element of this offense. Peo
ple Norman,
895 posses- knowing in he was defendant admitted that marijuana. sufficient evi- Therefore, there was sion of of intent. dence proceedings remanded for further
Affirmed and opinion. retain We do not with this consistent jurisdiction. dissenting part (concurring in in and
Markman, J., opin- part). of the lead with the conclusions I concur remanding affirming convictions but defendant’s ion— to determine whether confiden- disa- been admitted—but tial informant should have gree claim view that defendant’s Miranda1 with the addressed. need not be argues appeal, the trial court defendant
On erroneously into evidence admissions made admitted given disciplinary hearing because he was not making warnings In the admissions. Miranda before NW2d 653, 656; Carr, v warnings do held that ‘Miranda this Court disciplinary hearing.” apply not at an administrative agree conclusion for the reasons set forth with this “[qjuite that, also held However, the Carr Court Carr. is entitled to other Miranda, aside from defendant protections.” at 657. The Fifth Fifth Amendment Id. per- provides, pertinent part, that “No Amendment any compelled Criminal Case to be son .. . shall be against V. Const, himself . . . .” US Am The a witness compelled Carr found that inmates were Court speak prison disciplinary proceedings: at 1602; Arizona, L Ed 2d 694 384 US 86 S Ct Miranda Opinion by Markman, practice,
Under current inmates must make “Catch 22” They prison disciplinary choice. can either at the hearing forego right incriminate themselves or exculpatory mitigating offer or statements and face the potential penalties prison misconduct based on evidence they explain. which cannot refute or . . . But if inmate’s disciplinary hearing against statements can used be likely trial, him in a it is that such will statements be from withheld the administrative being fear examiner for used the inmate a later forego time. ... The inmate is forced to a valuable defense. *6 impermissible penalty This constitutes the exercise privilege against Depart- self-incrimination. Even Hearing that, ment of Corrections Handbook states while warnings required, Miranda are not no statement made prisoner a prehearing interrogative stage at the or at formal hearings subsequent is admissible at a proceeding. criminal [Carr, supra at 658-659. Citation omitted.] The Carr Court at concluded 659: present case, discipli- In the defendant’s admission
nary hearing actually
severity
served
reduce the
of
discipline.
penalty
defendant’s
The
defendant thereafter suf-
speaking
subsequent
fered for
out was conviction at a
crim-
proceeding
underlying
opinion
inal
on the
our
offense. In
remedy
proper
adoption
procedure
of
announced
[People
App 497, 512;
in
Rocha Mich
As a
matter,
testimony
I note that
that an
inmate would consider
providing
disciplinary
exculpatory
as
hearing
of misconduct
charge is
likely
exculpatory
any
also to be
regarding
related
226 Mich
Opinion by Markman, principal
charges.
in which an
The
context
criminal
conceivably
disciplinary hearing
inmate’s
subsequent
incriminating
trial
in a
criminal
could be
inmate decides to admit to a lesser mis-
is when the
hopes
charge
proving
in
that he did not
conduct
charge.
commit a more serious misconduct
proceed-
in a
use,
Whether the
disciplinary
ing,
given
in a
vio-
privilege against
lates the Fifth Amendment
com-
pelled self-incrimination turns on whether inmates
“compelled”
proceedings.2
are
Supreme
The
States
Court has observed:
United
“
speaks
compulsion.
[Fifth]
‘The
Amendment
It
preclude
testifying
from
does not
witness
volunta-
”
rily
may
him.’
in matters which
incriminate
Minne-
Murphy,
420, 427;
1136;
465 US
104 S Ct
79 L
sota v
quoting
(1984),
Monia,
Ed 2d 409
United States v
L
424, 427;
409;
US
63 S Ct
87 Ed
The
following language from
Carr Court cited the
Baxter
Palmigiano,
1551;
425 US
96 S Ct
47 L
Ed
“
support
2d 810
of its conclusion:
‘if
compelled
proceedings
inmates are
those
to furnish
might
testimonial evidence
incriminate them in
they
proceedings,
later criminal
must be offered
*7
immunity
required
supplant
privi-
“whatever
is
to
may
lege”
required
not be
to “waive such immu-
that, here,
plea
guilty
I note
defendant claims that he entered a
possible
disciplinary hearing “to avoid
harm and inmate retribution.” How
might
making
ever much these considerations
have contributed to
defend
one,
ant’s decision a difficult
the Fifth
not
Amendment
does
address
“compulsion”
government.
derived from sources other than the
prohibits
involuntary
Fifth Amendment
. . .
or
confes
coerced
“[T]he
‘compel’
suspect
against
.. .
to
sions.
become a witness
himself can
[T]o
only
suspect
against
mean to ‘coerce’ a
to become a witness
himself.”
Truth,
University
Grano, Confessions,
(Ann
and the Law
Arbor: The
of
Michigan Press, 1993), p 135.
Opinion
Markman,
’ ”
nity.” Carr, supra
(Emphasis added.)4
at 658.
The
Garrity
Jersey,
v New
385 US
Carr Court then cited
616;
The United States
has
however,
compelled
also
addressed
issue
self-
party merely
incrimination in situations in which a
faced with a difficult
deciding
tactical choice in
whether to assert
this privilege
opposed
as
to direct
compulsion to waive it or a
penalty
direct
on assert-
4 Baxter,
In
the inmate was advised that he was not
prison disciplinary hearing
at a
but that his silence could be used
him;
allowing
the Court concluded that
an adverse inference to be drawn
Baxter,
disciplinary proceeding
from an inmate’s silence at a
was valid.
Opinion
J.
Markman,
Florida,
In Williams v
399 US
ing
privilege.
this
83;
1893;
(1970),
90 S Ct
The defendant in a criminal trial is
forced to
in an effort to
himself and to call other witnesses
presents
risk of
he
his wit-
reduce the
conviction. When
identity
nesses, he must reveal their
and submit them to
may prove incriminating
cross-examination which in itself
may
incriminating
or which
furnish the State with leads to
rebuttal evidence. That the defendant faces such a dilemma
demanding
complete
present-
a choice between
silence and
ing
thought
a defense has never been
an invasion of the
privilege against compelled
pres-
self-incrimination. The
may
generated
sures
the State’s evidence
be severe but
they
present
do not vitiate the defendant’s choice to
an alibi
prove it,
though
defense and witnesses
even
attempted
catastrophe
defense ends in
for the defendant.
“incriminating”
However “testimonial” or
the alibi defense
proves
be,
“compelled”
it
cannot be considered
within
meaning
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Rylander,
752;
United States v
460 US
103 S Ct
contempt pro-
against compulsory self-incrimination be a valid upon Rylander ground which witness such as declines to
Opinion by Markman, questions, thought answer it has never been to be in itself a meeting substitute for evidence that would assist in a bur- *9 production. den of We think the view of the Court of Appeals privilege against would convert the from the shield compulsory seF-incrimination which it was intended to be whereby asserting privilege into a sword a claimant the adducing proof support would be freed from aof burden which would otherwise have been his. None of our cases support this view. squarely rejected notion, apparently
We have sub- by Appeals, possible scribed to the Court of that a failure of proof on an issue where the defendant had the burden of proof “compulsion” requires is a form of which that the bur- den be shifted from the defendant’s shoulders to that of the government.
In United States v One Plymouth Colt Vista, F Supp Ill, 1546 (ND 1986), court followed Rylander in the context of a forfeiture proceeding. There, the claimant contended that he could meet his burden of proof regarding evidence of non-drug- related sources of funds for only the car at issue by incriminating himself. The Plymouth Colt Vista court concluded that the claimant’s “dilemma” really by every no different from that faced criminal complete defendant forced to choose between silence and
presenting By choosing a defense. silence the defendant government, incurs the risk the if it satisfies its burden of proof, prevail. will thought Yet that has never been to vio- against privilege late the self-incrimination. at [Id. 1552.] The court further stated that Rylander stood for the proposition that the fact that a party must decide whether to remain silent in a in which proof proof beyond burden of is less than a reasona- ble doubt as in a criminal trial does not con- compulsion stitute under the Fifth Amendment. Id. 226 Mich Opinion Markman, J. Rylander Plymouth indicate that even Colt Vista proof party issue, when a has the burden party’s when the decision whether difficult be him in a could used “compulsion” proceeding does not constitute party’s simi- fortiori, Amendment. A under the Fifth setting in a where he does not bear lar decision prison disciplinary hearing, proof (e.g., as burden compulsion here) not constitute is at issue would the Fifth Amendment. under inmates Carr, here,
In as there is no indication that prison compelled furnish disci- were plinary hearings. hearings, In there is no penalty placed assertion of the direct on an inmate’s compelled privilege against The self-incrimination. prepon- hearing officer’s decision must be based on a *10 791.252(k); MSA derance of the evidence. MCL 28.2320(52)(k). an inmate’s choice to Therefore, automatically will result in a deter- remain silent not engaged in with mination that he has the misconduct charged; prison must affirma- which he is tively satisfy authorities statutory proof. burden of See Bax- supra an inmate ter, at 317.6The tactical decision that discipli- regarding whether to must make nary might potentially hearing, be when his proceeding, against him in a used perhaps quite difficult, while does not constitute supra Murphy, at 438: See also probation might Murphy that his be If did harbor a belief exercising privilege, the Fifth Amendment that belief revoked for Our decisions have made clear would not have been reasonable. constitutionally carry that the State could not out a threat probation legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amend- revoke privilege. ment Wyngaakd Opinion by Markman, “compulsion” under the Williams, Fifth Amendment. supra at 83-84; Rylander, supra at 758.
That an inmate is faced with this tactical decision
is distinguishable
penalty
from
a direct
placing
assertion of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination,
in Garrity
as
and
See
Lefkowitz.
Lefko
witz, supra
Carr,
here,
at
n 5. In
as
the state did
not
potent
threaten “to inflict
sanctions unless the
constitutional privilege
surrendered.”
[was]
Lefkowitz
at 805. Nor was assertion of the privilege “penalized
so as to ‘foreclose a free
silent,
choice to remain
and
”
. . .
. . .
[compel]
testimony.’
incriminating
Murphy,
supra at 434. (Citation
I am
omitted.)
aware of the
federal and state cases from
jurisdictions
other
cited
in the dissent
prison
conclude that
disciplinary
proceedings compel waiver of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination
require
or that
Miranda
prison
warnings
How
proceedings.7
I am
ever,
persuaded by
not
these cases
they
because
fail to distinguish between a direct penalty on asser
tion
privilege
compelled
self-
incrimination (e.g., that at issue in Garrity) and what
merely
a difficult
tactical decision that does not
rise
compelled
to the level of
self-incrimination.8 I
carefully
I
respectfully approach
believe that this Court should
regarding
majority
issues
which our conclusions differ from those in a
jurisdictions
However,
other
that have considered the same issues.
our
interpret
language
ultimate task here is not to “count noses” but to
clearly
above,
agree
the constitution. As
with Carr’s conclusion
stated
warnings
that Miranda
are not
in the noncriminal context of
*11
prison disciplinary hearings.
8 By respecting
compulsion
the distinction between direct
to waive the
privilege against compelled
pressure
self-incrimination and mere indirect
testify
choice,
seeking
to
that creates a difficult tactical
I am
to accord
meaning
language
By
reasonable
to the
of the Fifth Amendment.
effec
tively
“compulsion”
equating
among
with a decision undertaken from
choices,
slippery slope
unattractive
in
cases cited
the dissent create a
Opinion by Markman, J.
language
Amend-
of the Fifth
instead focus on
Supreme
analogous
Court
and on
United States
ment
privilege
parameters
fleshing
out the
cases
Accordingly,
compelled
I
self-incrimination.
pro-
prison disciplinary
that the current
am convinced
testify
compel
ceeding
in
do not
inmates to
structures
disciplinary proceedings
therefore, that the Fifth
and,
compelled
privilege against
self-
Amendment
implicated
such testi-
incrimination is not
mony
use of
proceeding.9 For these
in a
criminal
wrongly
Carr was
decided
reasons, I believe that
regarding this issue and should not be followed.10
admissibility
What is at issue here is the
of relevant
proceeding. In
absence of a
evidence in a criminal
requirement, I
violation of a constitutional
do not
ought
that relevant evidence
to be denied to
believe
proceeding.
the factfinder in such a
To do so here is
meaning
language and
to distort the
thereby
of constitutional
ability
justice
of our
to diminish
criminal
system carry
responsibility
people
out its
to the
to
determining
criminal
the truth about
activities.11
any
pressure
vague psychological
in
under which
or emotional
to
proceeding
“compulsion”
could be deemed to constitute
noncriminal
therefore a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The result
each such
deprive
proceeding
instance is to
the factfinder in a criminal
of relevant
relating to criminal conduct.
evidence
Department
Hearing
Carr states that
of Corrections
Handbook
indicates that no statement made at a
is admissible at
subse
quent
Department
proceeding.
is free
artic
The
of Corrections
policy
handbook,
it chooses in its
but I do not believe that
ulate whatever
policy
required by
federal
such
the state or
constitutions.
Rocha,
based, specifically
I also
on which Carr is
stated
note
“upon public policy
grounds.”
rather than constitutional
that it was based
Rocha, supra at 512.
Boyle’s
summary
instructive Justice
dissent from the
order
also find
appeal
Pacholka,
denying
lead
conclusion that this case does not
important
ent “an
constitutional issue that is decisive
of the outcome” of this case. Ante at 685. In
App
Carr, 149 Mich
653, 659;
Opinion prison conviction, defend- for an unrelated While in possession amount of a small to be ant was found tip, acting marijuana. officers, Corrections immediately was after he searched defendant being The box was handed a small box. observed marijuana. grams Defendant 4.8 found to contain known what was in the that he had not later asserted him. when it was handed to box *13 concerning the surround- Evidence circumstances supported ing have the the search of defendant could caught had red- that defendant been conclusion by work corrections handed as a result of deft suggested that However, other evidence officers. officers con- defendant had been framed —corrections sistently identity the refused disclose apprehended had was before he informant, defendant opportunity to discover what the box he had had the contained, and another inmate testified been handed box and that that he had handed defendant way what was defendant would have had no to know apparently never Further, in it. this other inmate was any way. disciplined prosecuted or disciplinary hearing was held An administrative Department hearing Michigan before a officer of the hearing, At the defendant admitted of Corrections. marijuana knowingly possessed that he had punished Department in accordance with he was guidelines. that he Corrections He later stated by pleaded being guilty a “snitch” to avoid considered parties Significantly, all concede that other inmates. point at no told that his defendant was However, we reach a workable resolution to Fifth Amendment. until can case, presented substantial the dilemma in this I am reluctant to advocate system. changes to the current Opinion O’Connell, P.J. against him in later be used a criminal could proceeding. proceedings after, criminal were initiated
Soon testified at trial that he defendant. Defendant that the box that he was handed con- had not known marijuana. considering After the evidence set tained jury was unable to reach a unani- above, forth Another trial was held. At the second mous verdict.2 produced, officer trial, a new witness was who had overseen the administrative hearing. He testified that defendant had admitted at disciplinary hearing knowingly had he been marijuana. possession This was not impeachment purposes introduced for but as substan- light tive evidence. In of the fact that defendant was prisoner standing having then accused of been a possession 800.281(4); contraband, MCL MSA 28.1621(4), jury, unsurprisingly, this second found appeal guilty. defendant This followed. argues
Defendant
that the evidence of his earlier
disciplinary hearing
confession at the
was not admis-
sible in the
trial because he was not read
*14
warnings.
appeal,
his Miranda3
In his brief on
defend-
ant concedes that this issue was not raised
his
attorney
attorney lodged
objection
trial
no
—the
testimony,
the admission of the
officer’s
nor
attorney
postjudgment
did the
raise the
at
issue
2
transcript
testimony presented
The record contains
trial,
transcript
jury’s
or, rather,
first
but the
does not reflect the
verdict
jury
indication that the
was unable to reach a verdict.
infer that the
representation
trial
first
resulted
a mistrial from defense counsel’s
at
sentencing hearing (after
trial)
the second
trial
the first
resulted
jury.
representation
corroborated, obviously, by
hung
in a
This
is
the fact
that a second trial was conducted.
3
Arizona,
1602;
(1966).
Miranda v
384 US
86 S Ct
motion for a new trial.
we will not review
appeal. People
an issue raised for the first time on
v
App
(1983);
Davis,
597, 609;
To reiterate defendant’s
he contends that
prior
the admission into evidence of his
confession of
guilt
rights.4
violated his Fifth Amendment
This
precise
supra
Court reached this
issue in Carr,
relying
659,
Rocha,
86
497, 512;
Mich
my
every
knowledge,
issue,
i.e.,
To
court
that has addressed the
rights
whether Miranda
prison disciplinary hearing,
must be read at a
has
prison disciplinary hearing
concluded that
the statements
of an
rights may
inmate who has not been advised of his Miranda
not be used
Clifford,
496,
him at a
trial. Avant v
67 NJ
McGinnis,
538-540;
(1975);
Carter v
Supp 787,
[A]ny testimony evidence derived from at a hearing subsequent proceedings is inadmissible at criminal underlying charge, impeachment on the rebuttal, save for or . and the testifying accused must be advised before disciplinary hearing testimony that his will not be admissi- subsequent ble him at a criminal trial on the under- lying offense.
It is not
present
contended in the
case that the hear
***5
ing
testimony
officer’s
impeachment*
was offered for
or rebuttal,
prosecution
and the
concedes
that
introduction into evidence of
testimony
this
violates
Carr.6 While the
prosecution
submits that this error
may be considered to have been harmless,
for the
reasons set forth
I
above,
cannot so conclude. There
fore, because
prior
defendant’s
statements were
improperly introduced into evidence in this criminal
trial, and because the introduction of these state
certainly
ments almost
resulted in the verdict of
5 Though
hearing
prior
officer’s account of defendant’s
confession
impeach
credibility,
could have been used to
defendant’s
it was not so
present
part
prose
used in the
case. The
officer testified as
chief,
is,
testified,
cution’s case in
before defendant
and the officer’s
guilt.
was utilized as substantive evidence of defendant’s
Carr, agree
warnings
For the reasons stated in
that Miranda
are not
prison disciplinary hearings. However,
at
if the state intends to
subsequent
proceeding,
use the accused’s
criminal
a differ
presented.
writing
slate,
point
ent issue is
If I were
on a clean
the focal
prison disciplinary hearings
this issue would be whether
involve custodial
interrogation.
interrogation
prison disciplinary
If there is no custodial
hearings,
warnings
required. However,
then the Miranda
are not
if custo
interrogation
occur,
state,
dial
does/did
if
then the
it intends to use the
proceeding,
give
accused’s statements in a
must
rights. People Hill,
accused his Miranda
429 Mich
I would reverse.