People v. WrightPeople v. Wright
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Coccoma, J.), rendered September 26, 2011 in Schenectady County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of burglary in the second degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree.
Defendant was charged in a three-count indictment with burglary in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree and menacing in the second degree following an August 2010 incident wherein defendant entered the home of Kristi Kenyon (his former girlfriend)—through a window and in the middle of the night—and, among other things, attempted to stab Kenyon‘s new boyfriend with what was described as a serrated kitchen knife. When Kenyon tried to call 911, defendant grabbed her cell phone and fled the scene. After locating another cell phone in the residence, Kenyon called for help—reporting that she had been stabbed.1
Shortly thereafter, defendant was spotted by various members of the Schenectady Police Department less than one
We affirm. To the extent that defendant‘s pro se challenge to his initial detainment by the police has been preserved for our review, we find it to be lacking in merit. “Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been . . . committed by the person arrested. Accordingly, a police officer may effect a warrantless arrest when he or she observes a suspect in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime scene and the suspect‘s appearance matches a sufficiently detailed description of the perpetrator received by the officer” (People v August, 33 AD3d 1046, 1048 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 878 [2007] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Robinson, 101 AD3d 1245, 1245-1246 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1103 [2013]). Here, while en route to Kenyon‘s residence in response to her 911 call, officers spotted defendant—whose description and clothing matched that provided by Kenyon—less than one block from Kenyon‘s residence. Accordingly, we are satisfied that defendant‘s arrest was supported by probable cause.
Defendant next contends that this matter must be remitted for resolution of his suppression motion. We disagree. The record reflects that the underlying Huntley hearing was conducted by a judicial hearing officer pursuant to
As to the admissibility of the statements, defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in admitting into evidence certain statements that he made to members of the Schenectady Police Department (1) when he initially was approached by the police near the scene of the crime, (2) while he was being transported to the police station in a patrol vehicle, (3) after he was advised of his Miranda warnings at the police station and interviewed, and (4) after he invoked his right to counsel. Preliminarily, a review of the trial transcript reveals that defendant did not object to the admission of any of the now challenged statements and, therefore, we find this issue to be unpreserved for our review (see
As a final matter, defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial because the jury was permitted to view that portion of the interrogation video wherein defendant invoked his right to counsel. Although there is no question that “[a] defendant‘s invocation of his [or her] right . . . to counsel . . . cannot be used against him [or her] during the People‘s direct case” (People v Hunt, 18 AD3d 891, 892 [2005]), defendant—as noted previously—rendered no objection when the subject video was admitted into evidence, nor did he request that the video be redacted in any fashion and/or seek any sort of limiting instruction
Lahtinen, J.P., Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.