*1 Worrell PEOPLE v WORRELL (Calendar 11). 7, Argued Docket No. 68630. June No. Decided 21, November 1983. jury Jack Worrell convicted in the Monroe Circuit William,J. Court, Jr., J., Weipert, of assault involving commit criminal sexual conduct girl, pled 13-year-old guilty being on a and he an habitual J., Appeals, Brennan, Court of offender. The V. J. P. T. and M. Pannucci, (Docket JJ., 53944). Burns and affirmed No. The appeals, asserting that some force or violence convicted, essential element of offense of which he was and jury that the should have been so instructed. opinion by Kavanagh, Levin, joined by In an Justice Justices Brickley, Ryan, Cavanagh, Supreme Court held: A conviction assault with intent to commit criminal sexual involving penetration in a case in which the victim is ages years requires between the of 13 and 16 that an proved. the victim be While consent such a victim no charges attempt, defense to of criminal sexual conduct is a charge defense to a of assault. Assault and consent are mutu- ally concepts. proof exclusive can There be no assault without of force or a threat of force. Legislature protected years by has children of tender providing persons the consent of under the 16of legally ineffective, sexual intercourse is consent persons any equally under the to13 sexual contact is ineffective, persons equally protected but of all are the assault laws. activity Because the sexual case this is not claimed have been other than consensual and there was no evidence of assault, jury should not have been instructed on assault [1-4] [2, [4] [5] 75 Am Jur 3] 65 Am Jur 65 Am Jur 65 Am Jur 65 Am Jur 2d, 2d, Rape 2d, Rape References 2d, 2d, Trial § 876. Rape Rape § §§ 4. §§ § 108, 3. 15, for Points in Headnotes 21-23. 417 Mich involving pene- commit criminal sexual conduct
with intent to tration. Reversed. Williams, dissenting, joined Boyle, Justice Chief Justice *2 with intent to commit the crime of assault would hold penetration involving in a case conduct sexual criminal sexual ages years of 13 and 16 in victim is between the which the permit the fact to trier of made out evidence sufficient specific to commit that the defendant had the intent conclude touching the penetration. The nature of does sexual criminal ability depend not the victim’s to consent to some sexual intent, contact, showing and therefore a but on the defendant’s necessary not where the victim is under of coercion is force or age the of 16. protects persons under 1. sexual conduct statute The criminal penetra- years age from both contact and sexual of sexual age, years person tion. is at least 13 of but less than Where a contact, 16, given penetra- to sexual but not to consent can be criminal conduct tion. with sexual Assault specific involving penetration to achieve consists physical penetration in some manifestation sexual addition to 16, a victim is between the of 13 and of the intent. Where specific penetration acts a intent to achieve sexual from which permissible merely can are not because some touch- be inferred ing gratification for would otherwise be of the victim' sexual permissible given. consent The criminal nature of where was depend ability touching does not on the victim’s to consent contact, on the defendant’s intent. to some sexual but rather case, the trier of fact. In this The determination of intent is for beyond a trier of fact could have found a reasonable reasonable penetration sexual of the doubt that the defendant intended victim. necessary out a It is not show force or coercion to make permit that the case would the trier of fact to conclude which penetration during an intended to commit sexual victim is for sexual assault where the under the consent penetration. necessary of the If force or coercion were elements involved, underage underaged vic- where an victim is offense greater protection tims no from sexual assaults would have adults, Legisla- than the intent a result inconsistent with enacting proscribing con- ture criminal sexual statutes Rather, Legislature duct. a defendant intended make assaulting sexually strictly liable for his intent and conduct any person does not mean that under the of consent. This conclusively presumed intent to overt to include an act will be Worrell assault, i.e., act, penetrate An an overt and the the victim. proved penetration beyond must be intent to commit sexual support doubt to a conviction of assault with intent reasonable involving penetra- sexual to commit criminal sexual tion. case, charged third-degree 3. In this the defendant was conduct, i.e., penetration sexual of a criminal age.
between 13 and 16
Because force and violence are
necessary
not
elements of assault with intent to commit crimi-
involving
nal sexual conduct
age,
jury
properly
who is under 16
could
be
necessarily
instructed that
the assault was a
lesser included
third-degree
offense of
criminal sexual conduct. For the same
reasons,
give
the information did not fail to
adequate
against
he
notice that
would be
to defend
charge.
the assault
defendant,
sentencing
4. Before
the trial court reviewed
record,
previous
noting
frequency
his
both the
and the
many
nature of his crimes. The court also noted that
of the
consumption
crimes involved excessive
of alcohol and that
there was some indication that the defendant’s excessive con-
problem
sumption
not under
control. The record shows
*3
sentence,
recognized
imposing
that the court
its discretion in
a
greatest possible
appro-
but determined that the
sentence
priate as the maximum sentence.
(1981)
App
Ill Mich
Dissenting Opinion by Boyle, Rape — 2. With to Commit Sexual Assault Intent Criminal — — — Conduct Infants Force. Elements third-degree
The crime of assault with intent to commit sexual conduct in is between the a case in which the victim 417 ages of 13 and 16 is made out evidence sufficient to permit the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant had the specific penetration; showing intent to commit sexual of force necessary or coercion is not where the victim is under the (MCL 750.520g[l]; 28.788[7][1]). of 16 MSA Rape — 3. Assault With Intent to Commit Sexual Criminal — — Consent. Conduct Infants person years may
A between the of 13 and 16 consent to contact, however, penetration; sexual but not to sexual where a assaults such with the intent to commit penetration, any touching may to which the victim otherwise consent and from which an intent to commit sexual penetration may permissible be inferred is not and is the crime third-degree of assault with intent criminal sexual (MCL 750.520g[l]; 28.788[7][1]). MSA Rape — 4. Assault With Intent to Commit Criminal Sexual — — Conduct Infants Force. necessary
ft is not to show force or coercion to make out a case penetration the defendant intended to commit sexual during an assault where the victim is under the of consent penetration; prosecutor only beyond for sexual need show reasonable doubt an overt act and an intent to commit sexual (MCL penetration 750.520g[l]; 28.788[7][1]). MSA Rape Third-Degree — — (cid:127) Criminal Sexual Conduct Assault — With Intent to Commit Criminal In- Sexual Conduct Jury — structions Lesser Included Offenses. necessary Because force and violence are not elements of the crime of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving with a under 16 age, jury prosecution third-degree in a for criminal sexual properly conduct could be instructed that the assault offense charged was a lesser included offense of the crime and the charging provided information sufficient notice to against the defendant that he would be to defend (MCL 750.520d[l][a], 750.520g[l]; offense 28.788[4][1][a],28.788[7][1]). *4 Kelley, Attorney General, Frank J. Louis J. Caruso, General, LaBeau, Solicitor Michael W. Prosecuting Attorney, Prosecuting Attorney, Bond, William D. Assistant people.
for the People Worrell v Opinion op the Court Appellate (by State Defender Kim Robert Faw- cett) for the defendant. case, J. The dissent in this as the Kavanagh, Appeals, of Court charge decision premise of is based on the statutory that a of or crimi- by nal sexual conduct is made out evidence of penetration statutory of female regard without puted. to her consent. This is not dis- traditionally The law has held consent of a of such tender to such recognized accordingly acts will not be and a charge. is consent no defense to such charge Likewise, is to consent no defense attempt penetration. such effect proof attempt
However, or penetrate support will conviction of the crime of only assault with intent to effect such connection if the assault be made out. Appeals
The cases cited
the Court of
and the
large,
posit
dissent,
assault1 and
do
hence
question presented
People
not address the
here.
v
(1861),
only
McDonald,
Assault and consent are proof or of force There can be no assault without threat Accordingly, not while consent will thereof. charge of criminal amount to a defense to the attempt it, it is a sexual conduct charge every defense to of assault. require proof suggestion force or v Worrell every charge of force in of assault
offer somehow protection years reduces the of children of tender legislation this is intended of all chimerical. Persons protected equally are under our assault persons laws. The consent of under 16 legally sexual intercourse ineffective. The con- persons any under 13 sent equally legally. contact ineffective *6 protection Legislature This is the ordained. areWe not free to enforce our own values provide per- of name construction even to some greater protection. ceived activity Because the sexual here not claimed consensual, be than other there is no evidence support assault, a to error to instruct verdict of and it hence was it. aside,
This conviction set and the defendant discharged jury because the refusal of the to find guilty of criminal sexual conduct or attempted precludes criminal sexual conduct his charges. retrial on those JJ.,
Levin, Ryan, Brickley, Cavanagh, and J. Kavanagh, concurred (dissenting).
I. Facts The issue before the Court is whether actual force and is an violence essential element of the offense of assault with intent to commit sexual ages with a between the of 13 and
Defendant-appellant charged Jack Worrell was third-degree conduct, criminal sexual MCL 750.520d(l)(a); 28.788(4)(l)(a), pen- i.e., MSA sexual etration with a at least 13 of Opinion Dissenting Boyle, J. jury age. He was convicted to commit criminal with intent penetration, involving MCL conduct 750.520g(l); 28.788(7X1). Defendant subse being pled guilty quently offender, habitual 769.10; He sentenced MSA 28.1082. Appeals years. The Court 2-1/2 to 15 term of App 27; his conviction. affirmed NW2d Fairly characterized, a situa- complainant may the record reveals 13-year-old in which the tion aspirations "girlfriend” of the had to be have although Consequently, 34-year-old defendant. young sexual conduct act characterizes criminal people "victims” and 16 as between the testimony penetration, complainant’s re- of sexual being own at so identified. flects her ambivalence neighbor she had seen A next-door testified that complainant on the couch the defendant and the up” apartment "loving days few before at her prosecution. giving to this On the the incident rise complainant night offense, of the again visiting apartment were *7 neighbor. next-door Fifteen minutes after the the defendant complainant upstairs arrived, the went up pick stayed to use the bathroom and she to dirty Approximately some clothes the bedroom. complainant upstairs, ten minutes after the went upstairs the the defendant went use bathroom. upstairs complainant The defendant and the were together quite for not half hour. When the complainant time, did down the not come after neighbor complainant called she the twice. When up- neighbor downstairs, the went did not come opened neigh- The stairs the bathroom door. the and the bor testified that she saw defendant complainant lying floor. Each was on the bathroom v Worrell Dissenting Opinion by Boyle, down, from the waist and the naked defendant’s complainant’s was the body legs. between The testified on direct complainant examination clothing that the defendant had removed her cross-examination, penetrated her. On had she "possible” that testified that was the defendant her. penetrated never Later the same evening, complainant forcibly raped a different per- son, and the encounter with the defendant came to during police investigation the course of the light the rape. forcible charged the information engage with another "[d]id * * * said at person, person being least but age, years; contrary Section 750.520d(l)(a), 1970; Michigan Compiled Law Stat 28.788(4)(l)(a)” utes (third-degree Annotated crimi conduct). In nal sexual to instructing addition court, jury principal charge, over de objection, gave fense instructions on attempted criminal sexual conduct and assault with intent involving commit criminal sexual conduct penetra tion. Defense counsel indicated that the defendant preferred go ahead with guilty or not guilty verdict principal charge. on the After the jury returned a verdict of of assault guilty with intent conduct,1 moved judgment for a notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that in failing trial court erred to instruct that an jury some force or violence. The motion was denied.
In affirming conviction, of Appeals the Court relied on long line of holding cases force was not a necessary element of assault with intent when female is statutory age under the of consent. 28.788(7X1). 750.520g(l); *8 617 417 Mich
626
Opinion
Dissenting
Criminal
Commit
to
Intent
With
II. Assault
Involving
Penetration
Conduct
Sexual
Instruction
now-repealed
that under
It
is well settled
intent
to com
for assault
provision
statutory
28.280),
750.85; MSA
(formerly
mit
consent,
necessary
not a
force,
or lack
was under
the victim
where
element
Mich
233 NW
Eddy,
v
People
consent.
307; 180 NW
Kongeal,
212 Mich
v
People
(1930);
Chamblin,
653; 113
149 Mich
(1920); People v
Goulette,
36; 45
v
People
(1907);
NW
McDonald,
have sexual
intercourse,
upon
and laid hands
looking
such
towards
to use
although he did not mean
purpose,
her for
any
child
force,
complete
if
caused
his
attempt
soon as it
his
as
pain,
and desisted from
hurt,
assault with
yet
guilty
would be
of an
he
Force,
charged in the information.
commit
against
the crime
female,
necessary ele-
not
of the
is
will
intercourse
charged here. Sexual
ment of the crime
sufficient,
made,
design
with the
and if an assault
statutory age,
sexual intercourse with a child under
carnally know
with intent
the crime of
Courier,
and abuse the child is committed.”
366, 368; 44
NW
States.
in the United
prevailing
This is the
view
*9
People Worrell
627
v
Dissenting Opinion
Boyle, J.
(2d
Perkins,
ed),
See
Criminal
pp
Law
170-171. See
also Anno: Assault with intent
to ravish
rape
consent,
age
female
consenting
under
81
ALR
599, 601. The
is that
minority
view
who
have
attempts
to
intercourse with a child under
the
consent
age of
not be found
may
guilty of
intent
rape
with
to
where the child con
sented to
was
The
what
done.
rationale
of the
minority view
that consent
the
eliminates
ele
ment of force and resistance
to
necessary
consti
Deveau,
v
State
tute an
See
assault.
Thus
scheme,
under
the former
statutory
any
touching
girl
of a
age for
statutory
sexual purpose
unlawful,
was
regardless
of con-
Formerly MCL
750.336;
MSA 28.568.
sent. Bennett, 45 Mich Sheffield, People v supra; (1938); lv den (1973), 389 Mich 127; 205 NW2d App People Doyle, cf. (1973); App 16 Mich (1969) den (1969), lv 167 NW2d (defendant’s not a of victim’s ignorance prosecution). in indecent liberties defense valid rule with majority policy underlying The rape consenting to assault respect statutory laws. policy follows that al expresses judgment a societal policy physical have though may adolescents attained intercourse, neverthe engage they capacity *10 to fully apprehend are not mature sufficiently less emotional, social, physical and psychological, Thus, Legislature consequences sexuality. of them as victims of sex appropriately regard may seduction, irrespective subjective ual of their state created a conclusive Legislature of mind.3 The has age under a certain are presumption persons of to sexual intercourse. This incapable consenting offense, a effectively liability type creates a strict commonly protect of offense most created (C. Wharton, "public welfare”. See Criminal Law ed), 23, Cf. Reasonable p Myers, Torcia § Age: Mistake of A to Statutory Needed Defense Rape, 64 Mich L 105, 113-115 Like Rev reasoning pertains to an assault with have sexual intercourse.
In 1975 relat- many provisions of the statutory re- ing repealed sexual crimes were and were act, placed by the criminal 28.788(1) seq.; seq. 750.520a et et Among other provisions repealed provisions were the con- Abuse, Rape, Involuntary Sodomy, Re- Comment on Sexual and Offenses, Working Papers lated form Wharton, on Re- of the National Commission Laws, 2, (1970), p quoted in 3 of Federal Criminal Vol (C. ed), 46, 291, p Criminal Law Torcia fn 8. § People v Worrell cerning knowledge carnal of a force, female knowledge 16,4 of carnal a female under indecent 16,5 liberties with a child under and assault with rape, sodomy, gross indec ency.6 proscribes act two kinds of sexual penetration conduct, sexual contact, and sexual arranged degrees which are into four of criminal sexual conduct.
Sexual is either first-7 or third-8 degree depending conduct, criminal sexual on the presence aggravating or absence of circumstances. aggravating One such circumstance is that years age.9 penetra victim is under 13 of Sexual person years tion with a at least 13 years age, third-degree however, under 16 criminal sexual conduct.10 The consent of victims age group in either is irrelevant.
Sexual contact is either second-11 or fourth-12 degree conduct, criminal sexual and the distinction depends presence aggravating also on the cir cumstances. Sexual contact with a under 13 age, second-degree consensual, even if criminal sexual It conduct.13 is relevant to note parallel prohibition there is no of consensual sexual contact with a per Thus,
older. consensual sexual contact with age group son in this is not criminal sexual con *11 respect permissive duct. In this the act is. more [7] 8 9 4 6 5 [12] 11 13 10 MCL MCL MCL MCL MCL MCL MCL MCL MCL MCL 750.520b(l)(a); 750.336; 750.520; 750.520b; 750.85; 750.520d; 750.520c; 750.520c(l)(a); 750.520e; 750.520d(l)(a); MSA 28.280. MSA 28.788. MSA 28.568. MSA MSA MSA MSA MSA MSA MSA 28.788(2). 28.788(4). 28.788(3). 28.788(5). 28.788(2)(l)(a). 28.788(3)(l)(a). 28.788(4)(l)(a). 417 Mich Opinion Dissenting prohibiting provision indecent the former than liberties. concerning provisions assault contains
The act conduct, sexual criminal to commit intent with 28.788(7), involving penetra- 750.520g; MSA MCL 28.788(7)(1), 750.520g(l); and as- MSA tion, MCL con- sexual commit criminal intent sault with 750.520g(2); degree, in the second duct 28.788(7)(2). argues some consensual that because
Defendant 13 and between contact sexual cannot be act, assault an not violate 16 does physical presumed manifestation from a penetrate 16. It intent to commit intent assault with that an is asserted third-degree requires sexual conduct criminal Plaintiff, the other on coercion. force or some hand, distinguishes from assault contact intent to commit ground involving penetration that sexual consummation to the desire and is limited contact must be touch, whereas an the desire to of combined pene- specific to achieve intent with the tration. law, intent assault with
Under former knowledge. offense of carnal was a lesser-included specific gist the offense was the rape. People Phillips, 30; 187 Mich commit v (1971); People Oberstaedt, v NW2d (1964); People Guillett, 521; 127 NW2d Indecent liberties 1; 69 NW2d rape were distin- assault with required, guished by of the intent the nature requiring express negation the intent former requiring rape, intent to and the latter commit rape. supra, p Oberstaedt, See penetra- intended sexual Whether *12 631 v Worrell Dissenting Opinion by Boyle, merely tion or took indecent liberties not intend- ing question jury. was a for the People Richardson, See v 66; Mich 194 NW (1923). general apply statutory We rule of Legislature presumed construction that is legislate harmony existing know of and People Harrison, 363, laws. NW 623 prohibits The criminal sexual conduct act con- persons sensual sexual under 16 age. argues, however, Defendant that even though penetration, he intended sexual his con- merely permissible duct was consensual sexual argument, contact. theOn basis of defendant’s no activity person consensual sexual with a between prohibited the penetration of 13 and 16 would be until completed. disagree. is We People Langworthy, In 630, 644; 331 (1982), recognized NW2d 171 this Court that one of purposes of the criminal sexual conduct act strengthen against was to the laws sexual violence by removing evidentiary certain obstacles to the prosecution of sexual case, assaults. In that this purpose Court unlikely reasoned that this made it proof14 that a new element of would be added specific without mention.
The criminal sexual conduct act continues the policy prohibiting predecessor statutory provisions of the activity persons who are conclusively presumed, because of or other incapable appreciating circumstances,15 to be activity. nature and ramifications of the While a protected under 13 from penetration, sexual contact as well as sexual 14 Langworthy In first-degree this Court held that criminal sexual general-intent crime, predecessor, is a rape. like the 15 E.g., defective, mentally the victim mentally incapacitated, physically helpless. 28.788(4)(l)(c). 750.520d(l)(c); .Mich Boyle, J. 16 can consent to 13 and under least at penetration. contact, not to but *13 statutory that, we find while scheme From this give persons Legislature between intended to the freedom, it intended to 16 some sexual 13 and pene- prohibition of sexual the absolute continue prior law. Defendant’s tration which existed Legislature’s recognition argument, the that changing the decriminalization of mores and social persons 13 to 16 sexual contact consensual legislative permit years intent to old indicate penetrate, activity there is an intent to such where accepted. that the are not convinced cannot be policy We protecting statutory rape laws of the behind exploitation possible and children from sexual engaging by physical psychological harm It is clear that the is outmoded. sexual intercourse sexual not decriminalize consensual statute does penetration age group. It is within the in this Legislature’s prerogative determi- to further that making which those activities nation criminal penetration, under- but which are fall short of prohibited Thus, intent. with the taken Legislature intend to the did not we hold change prior concerning in- assault with the law consenting underage person. rape tent to recognizes qualitative be- The act difference penetration. The tween sexual contact and sexual type activity is differ- intent ent, for each just as indecent liber- the intent elements for prior mutually ties and were exclusive under supra. Oberstaedt, the crimi- law. Under specific act, to nal sexual conduct intent prohibited penetration, achieve combined sexual physical intent, with some manifestation of to constitutes the crime of with intent assault involving commit criminal sexual People v Worrell Opinion by Dissenting Boyle, J. specific penetration. from Acts which a penetration can be achieve permissible merely inferred are not touching
because some gratification permissible. victim for sexual touching depend criminal nature of does not ability the victim’s consent some sexual contact, but rather on the defendant’s intent. This question is a for the factfinder. On the of this facts case we believe a reasonable factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt intended plainant. have sexual with the com- Thus, we hold that of a case victim under over 13 elements of degree to commit third- may
criminal sexual conduct be made out permit evidence sufficient factfinder to *14 specific conclude that the defendant had the penetration, showing to commit sexual and that a of force or coercion not in case the of underage an If victim. force or coercion were necessary of elements the offense the case of an underage young victim, then the victim would greater protection have no from sexual assaults than adult an victim. We believe this result to be inconsistent with the criminal sexual conduct act’s provisions provide greater protection which from persons age. years sexual conduct for under argues presump- Defendant the conclusive 16-year-old group tion anof assault for the 13- to process violates due because there is no rational penetrate connection between presumed, incapacity the fact to be i.e., to consent touching pene- whenever the defendant intends criminality tration. The defendant’s con- depends duct, however, on the defendant’s intent thought conduct, not on what victim he 417 Mich complained presumption The conclusive intended. cannot of, i.e., under that a intercourse, an element of is not consent to sexual Legislature intended to create a the offense. consisting liability the defendant’s crime strict completed when conduct. The offense is intent and in- act with the commits an overt penetration with a achieve sexual tent holding not create a old. does Our respect presumption to either of conclusive prosecutor Thus, must still these elements. prove assault, i.e., act, an overt and the intent penetration beyond a reasonable to commit sexual doubt. necessary to the offense
The overt act
establish
to commit criminal sexual
of assault with intent
involving penetration must be a criminal
attempt
assault, i.e., "either an
to commit a bat-
places
tery
or an unlawful act which
another
receiving
apprehension
an immedi-
reasonable
battery”. People
Joeseype Johnson, 407 Mich
ate
v
(1979). Moreover,
196, 210; 284
NW2d
present ability
carry
out
defendant must have
Sanford,
the intended act.
v
402 Mich
(1978); People
Carlson,
160 Mich
265 NW2d
(1910); People Lilley,
426; 125
NW 361
521;
is an commit third- degree plus greater criminal conduct degree proximity. Perkins, See Criminal Law (2d ed), p 578. The differences in the sentences imposed presumably represents for these offenses16 legislative proxim concern with conduct closer ity prohibited to the act. argument reject
Because we the defendant’s necessary force and are violence elements of the offense of penetration to commit sexual consenting person under 16 years old, we hold that on facts these this is a necessarily third-degree lesser included offense Accordingly, sexual conduct. the trial giving People court did not err this instruction. (1975); Chamblis, 408; NW2d People supra, Phillips, pp 36-37. Nor did the give adequate information fail the defendant notice that be would against charge. defend the assault v Ora Jones, 379, 236 NW2d 16The maximum sentence for assault with intent commit crimi- involving penetration years, nal is 10 MCL 28.788(7X1), 750.520g(l); MSA whereas the maximum sentence for attempted third-degree years, criminal sexual conduct would be five 750.520d(2); 28.788(4)(2); 750.92; MSA MSA 28.287. *16 417 by Boyle, J. Opinion Dissenting at Exercise of Discretion Court’s
III. Trial Sentencing erred that trial court Defendant also claims the failing recognize in and exercise its discretion in sentencing Specifically, defendant the defendant. statute, MCL the habitual offender claims that sentencing 28.1082, allows the 769.10; MSA which the maximum sentence to not increase court more longest prescribed times the term than 1-1/2 requires conviction, that the trial for the first setting judge the maxi- exercise discretion his 15-year mum maximum habitual offender The defendant concedes that term. permissi- sentence is statutory provision for assault the with ble under commit criminal sexual conduct involv- intent ing 28.788(7)(1). 750.520g(l); penetration, complains Nevertheless, recognize sentencing did not its that the court pointing maximum, to the discretion to control the court’s statement: a minimum at two and one-half "The court sets maximum is set the statute here under
years; charge years. That named supplemental the as the maximum.” of fifteen responds sentencing transcript Plaintiff that the judge that the trial exercised his demonstrates discretion Court of imposing the maximum sentence. Appeals agreed plaintiff: excerpt sentencing tran- "While the cited from the script interpretation, that subject the fact specified against public mor- court the offense was against that young lends credence to the als and position child recognized the trial court its discretion by setting the maximum term as exercised App Ill Mich maximum allowed under the statute.” People v Worrell Having sentencing examined entire tran script excerpt and considered above-cited in its context,17 agree we proper plaintiff Appeals the Court the trial court recog sentencing defendant, nized its discretion in but found that the greatest possible sentence was *17 appropriate. defendant’s conviction
Accordingly, and sentence are affirmed.
Williams, C.J., Boyle, concurred part, judge sentencing: In relevant the trial commented at your lawyer "The Court: I have considered now what advances. Of course, is, judge’s duty try good that is what balance and certainly the bad. I have to do this tried this in case and all. offense, concerning "We have said sufficient I You a believe. are thirty-four? man of Yes, "The Defendant: sir. record, prior felony "The Court: are You divorced. You do have a having only indicates, years; your parole expired served a term of two five That, a certainly, few months before this offense was committed. afraid, you facing-up I am had not made a full to the keep away things. been, certainly, from need of were Mostly involving such have There a lot prior lawyer briefly. Your offenses. has referred to them There Assaultive, them, eleven so or convictions. some of behavior. consumption excessive of intoxicants. "Now, claim, you Worrell, believe, you you I say know Mr. gotten you the with come problem reports have under we control. have from agencies, though, you fully cooperated do not indicate that have you control, hope gotten them. things I have but those back, you know? "The Defendant: Yes sir. work, imagine "The Court: That takes constant I from what all the studies show. "Now, against public here we have an offense morals and also child, against young girl thirteen, does, finds, which the court prison require a sentence. The court sets a minimum at two and one- years; half the maximum is set the statute here under the supplemental charge years. of fifteen That is named as maximum. already computed You are credited with all eighteen days. time served to be your counseling. The court does recommend behalf Further, treatment, counseling necessary, alcoholic if and voca- training. hope you released, you tional sooner than I when are as will be much you longer, know—maximum been much could have set minimum, rather, you the problems than this —that will have corrected the your prior experience good yourself.” and made life for