THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSHUA K. WOODS, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. 4-24-0190
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT
April 25, 2024
2024 IL App (4th) 240190
FILED April 25, 2024 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate Court, IL;
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Doherty and Lannerd concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant, Joshua K. Woods, appeals the trial court‘s order denying him pretrial release under section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2 ¶ 3 On July 14, 2023, the State charged defendant with the Class X offense of unlawful possession of controlled substance with the intent to deliver (
¶ 4 On January 2, 2024, defendant filed a motion “to elect conditions of pretrial release.” In his motion, defendant asserted he had been in custody since September 18, 2023, pursuant to charges in this case (case No. 2023-CF-113) and in Morgan County case No. 23-CF-133. Defendant summarized, in this case, the bond was set at $250,000, 10% to apply. Defendant argued, under the Pretrial Fairness Act, he was entitled to a hearing on the issue of his continued detention.
¶ 5 On January 8, 2024, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release under section 110-6.1(a)(1) of the Code (
“On July 12, 2023, Illinois State Police agents executed a search warrant at defendant‘s residence ***. The search warrant issued based upon evidence constituting probable cause including controlled buys from the defendant occurring at the location for the issued search warrant. Upon execution of the search warrant, in a bedroom
believed to be utilized by defendant, agents located a metal lockbox. Inside the lock box[,] agents found approximately fifty-eight grams of suspected cocaine. Based on the agents’ training and experience they believed the cocaine was packaged in a manner indicative of the cocaine being prepackaged for resale. In the same room agents located several items indicated of the illegal distribution of controlled substance including[] plastic baggies, a vacuum sealer[,] and a digital scale with suspected cocaine residue. Additionally, in close proximity to the illegal items, agents located several documents belonging to defendant, including two IDs issued to defendant, a passport and a credit card, all bearing defendant‘s name. At the time of the alleged [offense] in this case, defendant was admitted to bail in two other felony cases, [Morgan County case Nos. 22-CF-79 and 22-CF-109], which are currently pending. In addition, defendant is current[ly] charged in [Morgan County case No. 23-CF-133] with Unlawful Delivery of [a] Controlled Substance, [a] Class 2 felony[;] however, the commission of that offense is alleged to have occurred on June 27, 2023, prior to the commission of the offense which is the subject of this petition. Based on defendant‘s pretrial bond report[,] he also appears to have [a] currently pending [charge] for possession of a controlled substance in Sangamon County.
The pretrial bond report rates defendant as high risk. The pretrial bond reports lists two prior drug[-]related convictions including[ ] 2011 Manufacture or Delivery of a Controlled Substance (cocaine) for which defendant was sentenced to six years in [the Department of Corrections (DOC)] (boot camp); and 2016 Manufacture or Delivery of Controlled Substance (heroin) for which defendant was sentence[d] to ten years [in the] DOC.”
¶ 6 The trial court held a detention hearing on January 16, 2024. The State‘s proffer largely mirrored the facts set forth in its verified petition. Defense counsel argued the search warrant was executed on defendant‘s parents’ house. At the time the warrant was executed, defendant‘s parents and his two brothers were also present; defendant was not. Defense counsel argued “[o]ur main position” is the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence there is no condition or combination of conditions that would mitigate any real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the community. Defense counsel further argued the alternative to pretrial detention is home detention with or without electronic monitoring.
¶ 7 In denying defendant pretrial release, the trial court specifically found the “factors 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8” of section “110-6.1” apply, noting it considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of defendant, the statements made or attributable to defendant, defendant‘s age and physical condition, and the fact defendant was on parole when he was charged with the offense. The court found the proof evident and presumption great defendant committed a qualifying offense. The court further found, due to the fact defendant was on parole and the acts were alleged to have occurred in his residence, there was no factor that could mitigate the threat of defendant dealing drugs out of his house.
¶ 8 Using a preprinted form, the trial court entered a written order finding the State proved the dangerousness standard by clear and convincing evidence. Under a sentence giving the court the option to
¶ 9 This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 ¶ 11 On January 26, 2024, defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging the order denying him pretrial release under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). Defendant‘s notice of appeal is a completed form from the Article VI Forms Appendix to the Illinois Supreme Court rules (see
¶ 12 The first ground for relief checked by defendant in his notice of appeal is the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the proof is evident or the presumption great he committed the offense charged. In support, defendant argued the following on the preprinted lines, in part: “The charge arises from the execution of a search warrant on the home of Defendant‘s parents on July 12, 2023. The defendant was not present in the home at the time the warrant was executed. Present in the home were the defendant‘s parents and two of his brothers. Any number of people had access to the bedroom in which the suspected cocaine was located.” In his memorandum, defendant did not make additional argument regarding this ground.
¶ 13 Under the Code, all criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release.
¶ 14 In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proof evident and the presumption great defendant committed the charged offense. The State need not prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The record supports the court‘s conclusion. Not only does the proffer show the police believed the bedroom in which the cocaine was found belonged to defendant, the proffer shows documents personal to defendant were found “in close proximity” to the lockbox in which the cocaine was found. These items include defendant‘s passport and credit card.
¶ 15 The next checked box on defendant‘s notice of appeal is the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence defendant poses a real and present threat to the community. In support, defendant added the following to the preprinted form, in relevant part: “Defendant argues that his criminal history lacks any indication of violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior.” Defendant added argument in his memorandum. Defendant maintains the State presented no clear and convincing proof defendant posed a “real and present” threat to the community and the trial court
¶ 16 To deny defendant pretrial release under the dangerousness standard, as the State sought here, the State must also prove by clear and convincing evidence “the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.”
¶ 17 Defendant‘s cases, Norris and Drew, conclude the question of whether a real and present threat to the community exists may not be satisfied with reference to a “generalized risk of societal harm from drug crimes.” Norris, 2024 IL App (2d) 230338-U, ¶ 37; see Drew, 2024 IL App (2d) 230606-U, ¶¶ 18-19. In Norris, the Second District considered the propriety of an order denying pretrial release to a defendant charged with drug offenses, including a Class X felony for the sale of cocaine. Norris, 2024 IL App (2d) 230338-U, ¶¶ 2, 4. The record, without specifying the offenses in the defendant‘s “extensive” criminal history, reveals the defendant‘s criminal history began in 1998 and the defendant had “periods of imprisonment,” “positive drug tests,” and two instances where probation was revoked due to the defendant‘s failure to comply with drug-court probation. Id. ¶ 9. On appeal, the Second District found the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the defendant was a real and present threat to the community. See id. ¶ 35. In so doing, the Second District rejected the State‘s contention the defendant‘s dealing of cocaine may lead to overdose and pose a threat “to all the persons in the families of individuals who suffer from addiction” and causes “havoc *** in the community.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 35. The court reasoned “the State does not articulate how the present charges reflect a specific threat to the community, such that less-restrictive conditions could not mitigate that harm” and “if the generalized risk of societal harm from drug crimes, alone, was sufficient to establish that any defendant charged with them automatically presents a danger to the community, then the legislature would have made those crimes ineligible for release.” Id. ¶ 37. The Second District concluded the bare elements of the offense could not be a basis for finding defendant poses a real and present threat and the fact “the State‘s broad arguments that [the] defendant had engaged in drug crimes, which could result in an overdose and which, generally, wreak havoc on families, was akin to suggesting that no person charged with such a crime could ever be eligible for pretrial release.” Id. ¶ 39.
¶ 19 We are not convinced we should follow Drew and Norris. Neither decision gives any weight to their defendants’ respective criminal histories in finding the trial courts erred in concluding the defendants posed a real and present threat to the community. Drew, 2024 IL App (2d) 230606-U, ¶¶ 5, 17; Norris, 2024 IL App (2d) 230338-U, ¶¶ 15, 35, 41 (“[N]othing beyond the charges themselves *** suggest a threat to the community.“). Taken to its logical end, so long as a defendant does not have a violent or abusive history, although both defendants had domestic-battery convictions (see Drew, 2024 IL App (2d) 230606-U, ¶ 5; Norris, 2024 IL App (2d) 230338-U, ¶ 35), or are linked to a specific overdose (see generally Drew, 2024 IL App (2d) 230606-U; Norris, 2024 IL App (2d) 230338-U), one can sell Class X amounts of cocaine into the community over and over and not be deemed a threat to the community.
¶ 20 In addition, the Drew and Norris decisions, because they gave no weight to the defendants’ criminal history, appear to hold a real and present threat to the community cannot be established through both “the generalized risk of societal harm from drug crimes” and a defendant‘s history of drug-dealing. To that apparent conclusion, we disagree. The societal harm from drug crimes is well-established in Illinois law, meaning the baseline question of whether the sale of drugs is a threat to the community has been answered. For example, in section 100 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (
¶ 21 Whether that generalized risk is alone enough to prove a defendant presents a real and present threat to the safety of the community is not, however, a question we must answer. Unlike in the Drew and Norris decisions, we do give weight to the “nature and circumstances of the offense” (
¶ 22 We note, the trial court, in checking a box on a preprinted order, found defendant‘s history and characteristics included violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior. As defendant argues, the record contradicts that conclusion. However, we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally People v. Langston, 2023 IL App (4th) 230162-U, ¶¶ 1, 27, 36 (applying harmless-error analysis to a trial court‘s consideration of evidence not admitted at trial). At the hearing, the State did not argue defendant‘s record contained violent behavior, and the court did not find as much. The State presented sufficient evidence to meet the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard without that alleged fact.
¶ 23 The third ground defendant checked in his notice of appeal is the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the community‘s safety. Defendant wrote the following, in part, under the preprinted text: “There was no evidence presented by the State that the defendant was a real or present threat to the safety of any persons, persons or the community.” Defendant did not develop the argument further in his memorandum.
¶ 24 As we have already rejected the argument the State failed to prove defendant a real or present threat, the basis for defendant‘s claim and, therefore, this argument likewise fails.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 ¶ 26 We affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
¶ 27 Affirmed.
People v. Woods, 2024 IL App (4th) 240190
| Decision Under Review: | Appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan County, No. 23-CF-113; the Hon. Christopher E. Reif, Judge, presiding. |
| Attorneys for Appellant: | James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Bryon M. Reina, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. |
| Attorneys for Appellee: | Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of Springfield, for the People. |