People v. WoodsPeople v. Woods
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant, Damarian Woods, appeals the Will County circuit court‘s order denying him pretrial release under article 110 of the
¶ 2 Defendant petitioned this court for rehearing under
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On July 13, 2023, a grand jury indicted defendant on three counts of first degree murder (each on a different theory) (
¶ 4 On October 23, 2023, defendant filed a motion for pretrial release. He asserted that, while first degree murder is a detainable offense, he did not pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person, any persons, or the community. That same day, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant release under
¶ 5 The court heard the matters on October 30, 2023. The State provided the following factual basis. On June 15, 2022, Bloodson engaged in a text conversation with Saucedo and offered to sell Saucedo a firearm. At approximately 9:50 p.m., Bloodson and Saucedo arrived in the parking lot at Bott park, driving separate vehicles, and parked “two spots away from each other.” Saucedo drove a Jeep and was alone. Bloodson drove a red sedan with four passengers: defendant, seated in the front passenger seat, and Amarion, David Woods, and Antonio Funches, seated in the rear passenger seats. At that time, several games at the park had just ended.
¶ 6 About a minute later, Bloodson exited the sedan alone and approached the driver‘s window of Saucedo‘s Jeep. Saucedo remained in the driver‘s seat of his Jeep as he and Bloodson engaged in a brief conversation. Defendant, who was wearing a ski mask, and Amarion then exited the sedan and approached the Jeep. Bloodson returned to the sedan. Defendant and Amarion entered the Jeep and sat in the front passenger seat and the rear seat behind Saucedo, respectively. The surveillance footage showed an apparent struggle inside the Jeep, followed by defendant exiting the Jeep and firing a gunshot into the Jeep toward Saucedo.
¶ 7 At that point, David and Funches exited the sedan and approached the Jeep. Funches reached inside the half-open driver‘s window, and then he and David, who was in front of the Jeep, retreated to the sedan. Defendant and Amarion also retreated to the sedan, and Bloodson drove away.
¶ 8 When the police arrived, Saucedo was dead. An autopsy showed Saucedo had been shot seven times. One shot entered the back right side of his head and exited by his nose. Another shot entered the left side of his neck, severed his carotid artery and jugular vein, and exited the right side of his neck. He also had wounds on his right arm, left leg, neck (graze wound), chest (graze wound), and calf (graze wound). Evidence technicians recovered three 9-millimeter shell casings outside the front passenger side of the Jeep. They also recovered four .40-caliber shell casings where Amarion was seated. A magazine containing six rounds of live ammunition was found on Saucedo‘s lap. No firearms were recovered from the scene.
¶ 9 During their investigation, the police spoke with Bloodson and David. Bloodson confirmed defendant and Amarion entered Saucedo‘s Jeep but would not say why the men were in the park or what
¶ 10 David and Funches testified before the grand jury in exchange for immunity. David‘s testimony was consistent with his statement to police, except he did not testify he saw a revolver in Saucedo‘s hands. In addition, he testified he did not see a gun in defendant‘s or Amarion‘s possession immediately before or after the incident. Funches testified he, like David, believed they were going to the park to buy cannabis. He left the sedan because he observed a commotion. He saw Saucedo “pulling a revolver up from the front seat and trying to point it to the back of the Jeep.” He did not see defendant or Amarion with a gun either before or after the incident in the Jeep but confirmed defendant was wearing a ski mask at the time.
¶ 11 The police also executed a search warrant on defendant‘s phone and recovered “text chats with people about the incident.” In the texts, defendant claimed self-defense because Saucedo tried to rob them, claimed he could not be identified because he was wearing a ski mask, and deflected blame to Amarion.
¶ 12 The police also interviewed associates of Saucedo. The associates knew Saucedo to carry a black revolver in his glove box. The associates also believed Saucedo had robbed two individuals, one of a gun and the other of cannabis.
¶ 13 The State also proffered that defendant was charged in juvenile court with aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (a “Ruger 9mm“). This offense took place on January 13, 2023, that is, after Saucedo‘s shooting but before defendant was charged in this case. On January 24, 2023, defendant was adjudicated delinquent by admission in exchange for 18 months’ probation.
¶ 14 In argument, the State emphasized that defendant‘s release posed a risk to the community‘s safety, noting the offense jeopardized more than just the victim‘s safety because it was committed at a public park when patrons were present.
¶ 15 Defendant offered a group exhibit containing “character letters and at least two photos.” The exhibit is not part of the record on appeal, but we accept counsel‘s representation at the hearing that the letters demonstrated defendant‘s “character,” family support, and community support. Defense counsel argued the State failed to show defendant was “a real threat to a person based on the specific articulable facts” of the case. She noted defendant was 17 years old at the time of the offense, was currently 18 years old, and had recently graduated from high school. If released, defendant would reside with his mother, who was present in court, along with his sister and two nephews. Further, defendant had been “a tremendous support to his family,” often watching his nephews while his sister worked and went to school. Ever since defendant was placed in custody, his family suffered hardship—defendant‘s sister struggled to find childcare.
¶ 16 Counsel also argued the State failed to establish that no conditions could mitigate the purported risk posed by defendant‘s release. She asserted both GPS monitoring and home confinement would mitigate any risk caused by defendant‘s release, again pointing to defendant‘s family support, stable home, and completion of high school. She also noted there was at least a question of self-defense, as David and Funches had both stated they saw Saucedo holding a revolver.
¶ 18 Defendant appealed under
¶ 19 On November 29, 2023, the State moved to dismiss defendant‘s appeal. Citing People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, the State argued the appeal should be dismissed because defendant‘s notice of appeal was deficient—he merely checked boxes and did not describe the grounds for relief or provide argument. Further, the State posited defendant should not be allowed to correct the deficiency via a memorandum. According to the State‘s motion, OSAD told the State it would file an objection. OSAD never did so. On December 8, 2023, we denied the State‘s motion. See People v. Duckworth, 2024 IL App (5th) 230911, ¶ 5 (timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step in perfecting a
¶ 20 On December 15, 2024, OSAD notified this court that it would not file a memorandum in support of defendant‘s appeal. The State filed a memorandum, opting to respond to the bare contentions of defendant‘s notice of appeal and defend the circuit court‘s detention order.
¶ 21 On January 18, 2024, we entered the following minute order, dismissing the appeal:
“Defendant, Damarian M. Woods, appeals from the order of the Will County circuit court denying pretrial release. Defendant has not filed a memorandum but has instead indicated his intention to stand on the notice of appeal. However, upon review of the notice of appeal, defendant has solely checked boxes on the form notice of appeal, without providing any further details or explanation. While defendant need not file a memorandum and may stand on the notice of appeal,
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023) specifically states, ‘The Notice of Appeal shall describe the relief requested and the grounds for the relief requested.’ The notice of appeal form provides space for defendant to describe such grounds, but defendant has failed to do so. As a reviewing court, we are entitled to have the issues and argument clearly defined, and it is not our obligation to act as an advocate for defendant. People v. Universal Public Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 073303-B, ¶ 50. Where defendant has failedto satisfy the requirements of Rule 604(h)(2) , we find that he has forfeited review. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.Appeal dismissed.”
¶ 22 On February 8, 2024, defendant petitioned for rehearing. He did not assert we overlooked or misapprehended something. Rather, he discussed three supervisory orders entered by our supreme court in unrelated cases: Grant v. Justices of the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, No. 130420 (Ill. Feb. 8, 2024) (supervisory order), Mateo v. Justices of the Appellate Court, Fifth District, No. 130409 (Ill. Feb. 7, 2024) (supervisory order), and Ali v. Justices of the Appellate Court, Fifth District, No. 130383 (Ill. Feb. 2, 2024) (supervisory order). In those cases, defendant noted, the appellate court dismissed the defendants’ appeals under similar circumstances, and the supreme court directed the appellate court to vacate the dismissals and consider the defendants’ appeals on their merits.
¶ 23 Defendant provided the following argument in his petition:
“As in Grant, Ali, and Mateo, [defendant] filed a timely notice of appeal [citation], and yet, his appeal was not considered on the merits. The Illinois Supreme Court orders in Grant, Ali, and Mateo indicate that [defendant‘s Rule] 604(h) appeal should be heard on the merits. As such, he asks this Court to reconsider the dismissal of his appeal in light of the Illinois Supreme Court‘s supervisory orders in Grant, Ali, and Mateo, and to grant rehearing, vacate its order dismissing his appeal and consider the appeal on its merits.”
¶ 24 The State answered defendant‘s petition, arguing dismissal was a proper disposition where defendant had failed to provide any argument in support of his appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 25 We first explain the basis for our finding that defendant forfeited his claims on appeal.
¶ 26 Under the new pretrial release provisions of article 110 of the Code, all criminal defendants are “eligible for pretrial release before conviction.”
“(1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed [a qualifying] offense ***, and
(2) *** the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case ***, and
(3) no condition or combination of conditions [contained in section 110-10(b) of the Code] can mitigate *** the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case ***.”
Id. § 110-6.1(e) .
¶ 27 A defendant has the right to appeal an order denying his pretrial release.
¶ 28 To streamline the process, the supreme court approved a fillable form notice of appeal. Consistent with the
¶ 29 Since the Act became effective, this court has repeatedly faced appeals in which the defendant has checked boxes on the form notice of appeal without providing a reasoned argument either in the notice of appeal or in a
¶ 30 All appeals begin with the presumption that the circuit court‘s order was correct, and the party claiming error carries the burden to establish error and that the error warrants relief. Molner v. Cartenos, 415 Ill. 172, 176 (1953). The appealing party cannot meet this burden by offering bare contentions against the order; the party must explain any contentions and present an argument based on matters of record and pertinent authorities. Littell v. City of Peoria, 374 Ill. 344, 350-51 (1940); Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 369-70 (2010). We have repeatedly admonished litigants that this court is not a depository into which the parties may dump the burden of argument and research. In re Estate of Kunz, 7 Ill. App. 3d 760, 763 (1972); Vilardo v. Barrington Community School District 220, 406 Ill. App. 3d 713, 720 (2010); accord People ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56. Accordingly, we routinely hold that the failure to develop an argument in support of a bare contention forfeits that contention, and we do not consider it further. E.g., People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 77; People v. Meyer, 402 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1093 (2010). Sometimes, we dismiss an appeal when the appellant fails to present argument beyond bare contentions. McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶¶ 19-20.
¶ 31 We recognize
¶ 32 The text of
¶ 33 Our holding is consistent with our obligation to remain a neutral arbiter of the matters properly placed before us and not act as an advocate. See Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993). As our supreme court has noted, our adversary system functions on the principle of party presentation, meaning we rely on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and advance the facts and arguments entitling them to relief. People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 323-24 (2010). And while we have the power to raise and decide unargued and unbriefed issues (
¶ 34 Here, defendant‘s notice of appeal failed to comply with
¶ 35 Of course, these defects are not jurisdictional (People v. Acosta, 2024 IL App (2d) 230475, ¶ 13 (failure to describe relief requested is a nonjurisdictional defect); Duckworth, 2024 IL App (5th) 230911, ¶ 5 (failure to describe the grounds for relief is a nonjurisdictional defect)), and
defendant was entitled to reserve a description of the grounds until he filed a memorandum. But defendant did not file a memorandum and, thus, never provided the missing description of the grounds for relief, much less a reasoned argument. Accordingly, defendant forfeited his bare contentions that the State failed to meet its burden of proof under
¶ 36 We now address defendant‘s petition for rehearing, which asks us to vacate our dismissal and consider the appeal on the merits.
“The petition shall state briefly the points claimed to have been overlooked or misapprehended by the court, with proper reference to the particular portion of the record and brief relied upon, and with authorities and argument, concisely stated in support of the points. Reargument of the case shall not be made in the petition.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 367(b) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) .
¶ 37 Defendant does not assert that we overlooked or misapprehended an argument or some part of the record when we originally decided the case. And he does not suggest our conclusion—that defendant forfeited his contentions by failing to present argument—was wrong. Indeed, he points to nothing in the text of
¶ 38 We acted within our discretion when we dismissed the appeal based on defendant‘s failure to present any argument to this court. McCann, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶¶ 19-20. Nevertheless, we choose in this case to overlook defendant‘s inappropriate citation of supervisory orders and grant his petition for rehearing to address whether dismissal was the appropriate disposition here. See Anundson v. City of Chicago, 97 Ill. App. 2d 212, 221 (1968) (choosing to address certain points in a petition for rehearing even though the petition was improper).
¶ 40 We have reviewed the record, and the evidence supported the circuit court‘s findings that (1) defendant‘s release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community and (2) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. See
¶ 41 In closing, we emphasize that OSAD has all but abdicated its role in these proceedings and its duty to advocate zealously on defendant‘s behalf. See
¶ 42 We will not speculate as to why OSAD declined to present argument on the merits at any time in this case. That was OSAD and defendant‘s choice to make.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
People v. Woods, 2024 IL App (3d) 230592
| Decision Under Review: | Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 23-CF-1123; the Hon. Amy Bertani-Tomczak, Judge, presiding. |
| Attorneys for Appellant: | James E. Chadd and Carolyn R. Klarquist, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. |
| Attorneys for Appellee: | Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of Springfield, for the People. |