People v. WoodsPeople v. Woods
Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorney, James E. Atkins and Brooke E. Tafreshi, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
Defendant Marsha Mary Woods was on probation for two prior offenses when she was arrested and charged with five theft- and drug-related offenses. Under a plea agreement, she agreed to plead guilty to one count of attempted burglary and admit one strike prior, and to serve concurrent sentences of 16 months on the current offense and
The People appeal, contending the sentence imposed by the trial court is not within the bounds of the parties’ plea agreement. Defendant maintains the People forfeited this challenge by failing to assert it below. Alternatively, she argues she has earned enough custody credits to satisfy the seven-year sentences and, thus, either the People have suffered no prejudice, or their request for relief is moot. We agree that the sentence imposed by the trial court is not within the bounds of the parties’ plea agreement. We reject defendant‘s contentions as to forfeiture, prejudice, and mootness. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings as directed below.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Probation Cases
In 2012, defendant pleaded guilty in case SCE314699 (Case 699) to vandalism over $400, and she admitted having one рrison prior and one strike prior. She was granted five years’ formal probation.
Current Offenses
In 2015, while still on probation in the Probation Cases, defendant was arrested for allegedly stealing approximately $1,850 worth of tools from a residential yard. When police searched defendant, they found in her purse a glass smoking pipe and a plastic baggie containing methamphetamine.
The People charged defendant with five offenses: burglary, grand theft of personal proрerty, receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics. The People also alleged numerous prison and strike priors.
Plea Bargain
Defendant and the prosecution reached a plea bargain. Defendant agreed to (1) plead guilty to one count оf attempted burglary; (2) admit one strike prior; (3) admit violating probation in the Probation Cases; and (4) serve concurrent sentences of 16 months on the current offense (the lower term doubled) and seven years for each of her probation violations in the Probation Cases. In exchange, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and аllegations.
Sentencing
The probation department submitted two presentence reports: an initial report and a supplemental report. The reports were consistent on the calculation of the actual days defendant served in custody in connection with the Probation Cases and the current offense. They differed, however, оn the number of additional custody credits to which defendant was entitled. The initial report proposed 15 percent custody credits under
The probation department‘s supplemental report recalculated defendant‘s custody credits granting full credit under
| Current Offense | |
| June 30, 2015 to July 1, 2015 | 2 days |
| July 24, 2015 to March 22, 2016 | 243 days |
| Actual days: | 245 days |
| Credits: | 244 days |
| Total credits: | 489 days |
| Case 699 | |
| September 20, 2011 to March 28, 2012 | 191 days |
| August 15, 2012 to October 22, 2013 | 434 days |
| July 24, 2015 to March 22, 2016 | 243 days |
| Actual days: | 868 days |
| Credits: | 868 days |
| Total credits: | 1,736 days |
| Case 042 | |
| August 10, 2012 to October 22, 2013 | 439 days |
| July 24, 2015 to March 22, 2016 | 243 days |
| Actual days: | 682 days |
| Credits: | 682 days |
| Total credits: | 1,364 days |
At the continued sentencing hearing, defendant and the prosecution continued to disagree about whether defendant was entitled to full credit under
“The calculations have been a disaster in that every time they‘ve been—we‘ve recalculated it three times now, and every time it‘s a different answer, okay? [¶] . . . [¶] But why don‘t I just sentence her on the new case and terminate probation on everything else? That‘s seven years that exists there that‘s just about eaten up by credits, and I have a problem with the way we‘ve been calculating credits on it, that it has been hit or miss. And so it creates a situation where the defense lawyer in a case like this can‘t adequately advise his client of what the credits are because it becomes a moving target . . . .”
Defendant and the prosecution submitted. The court then sentenced defendant: “So what I‘m going to do on [the Probation Cases], [is] credit for time served. Probation is terminated. [¶] On [the current case], it‘s a stip[ulated] 16 [months]. That‘s the low term of eight months. It‘s doubled [due to a strike prior].” The court determined defendant had served 245 days in actual custody on the current offense, with 244 days of credit under
The abstract of judgment reflects the court‘s calculation of defendant‘s custody credits for the current offense, but not the Probation Cases.
DISCUSSION
I. Forfeiture
Defendant contends the People have forfeited their right to argue that the trial court departed from the plea bargain because the prosecutor did not object on that basis below. We are not persuaded. After the trial court terminated probation in the Probation Cases, the prosecutor stated: “I do believe she should be getting the seven years.” This was obviously a reference to the provision of thе plea bargain that required seven-year sentences on the Probation Cases. This was sufficient to preserve the People‘s challenge for appeal.
II. Prejudice/Mootness
Defendant next contends that either the People have suffered no prejudice, or their claim for relief is moot, because defendant has already served the stipulatеd seven-year
The plea bargain requires defendant to serve 2,555 days (seven years x 365 days) in Case 699. The probation department‘s supplemental report credits her with 868 actual days and 868 days of
Similarly, the plea bargain requires defendant to serve 2,555 days in Case 042. The probation department‘s supplemental report credits her with 682 actual days and 682
This examination of defendant‘s actual and earned custody credits on a sentence-by-sentence basis shows she has not served seven years in either of the Probation Cases.
Defendant‘s calculation of custody credits exceeds seven years only because she improperly adds her custody credits from each probation case to the other. This double-counting error is compounded by the substantial overlap of the actual days defendant served in custody in the Probation Cases. That is, all but five of the 682 days that defendant actually served in custody in Case 042 are subsumed within the 868 days she actually served in custody in Case 699.7 Defendant‘s creative accounting would improperly give her two days of actual custody credit for every one overlapping day she actually served. Defendant‘s calculation further compounds this error by then basing her
Because defendant‘s prejudice and mootness arguments are premised on a fundamentally flawed calculation, the arguments fail.
III. Plea Bargain
Turning to the merits of the People‘s appeаl, we conclude the trial court erred by sentencing defendant outside the bounds of the parties’ plea bargain.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
Plea bargains are “an accepted and ‘integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts.’ ” (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929 (Segura).) “A plea bargain is a contract between the accusеd and the prosecutor.” (In re Ricardo C. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 688, 698; People v. Vargas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 533.) “Both these parties are bound to the terms of the agreement; when the court approves the bargain, it also agrees to be bound by its terms.” (In re Ricardo C., at p. 698; People v. Armendariz (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 906, 911.) “Both the accused and the People are entitled to the benefit of the plea bargain.” (In re Ricardo C., at p. 698; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.) ” ‘When either the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of benefits for which it hаs bargained, corresponding relief will lie from concessions made.’ ” (In re Ricardo C., at p. 698; People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214.) Available relief includes a remand to allow withdrawal of the plea agreement; specific performance of the agreement as made; or “substantial specific performance.” (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1362.)
“Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing discretion, ‘a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain.’ ” (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 931.) Yet, courts have broad
In reviewing a challenge involving a plea bargain, we apply the standards of review applicable to contracts, generally. (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 930.) ” ‘[T]he “interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review where the interpretation does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence.” ’ ” (In re Ricardo C., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 696.)
B. Analysis
The sentence imposed by the trial court exceeded the bounds of the parties’ plea bargain. The parties stipulated that defendant would receive concurrent sentences of 16 months on the current offense and seven yeаrs on each of the Probation Cases. The trial court imposed the 16-month sentence, but “terminated” probation in the Probation Cases instead of imposing the stipulated seven-year concurrent sentences. This was a clear departure from the plea bargain.
To be sure, the trial court retained its discretionary authority to sentence defendant differently than the parties had agreed. (In re Ricardo C., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 699.) But once it chose to do so, the court was required to withdraw its approval of the plea bargain in its entirеty; it was not free to enforce some portions of it but not others. (Ibid.) By doing the latter, the trial court improperly allowed defendant to receive her benefit of the plea bargain—and deprived the People of theirs.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to either (1) sentence defendant in accordance with the pаrties’ plea bargain, which will require the
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
AARON, J.
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed May 16, 2017, was not certified for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standаrds for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
ORDERED that the words “Not to Be Published in the Official Reports” appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
Copies to: All parties