THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v LAWRENCE A. WOODARD, Appellant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
March 8, 2012
93 AD3d 944 | 939 NYS2d 648
Kavanagh, J.
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lawrence A. Woodard, Appellant. [939 NYS2d 648]—
Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Warren County (Hall Jr., J.), rendered May 27, 2009, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, coercion in the first degree and menacing in the second degree.
On the afternoon of April 21, 2008, the victim and defendant were talking outside his apartment when he invited her in for a visit. Shortly after they entered the apartment, defendant threatened the victim with a kitchen knife and, while he held her about the neck, forced her to walk down the hallway into his bedroom. There, he ordered the victim to disrobe, grabbed her by the hair, pulling some of it from her head and, after he undressed, sexually assaulted her. Later, the victim told defendant
On April 28, 2008, defendant was charged by indictment with, among other things, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, menacing in the second degree and coercion in the first degree. After a jury trial, he was convicted of these crimes and, on his conviction for sexual assault in the first degree, he received the maximum sentence of 25 years in prison and 25 years of postrelease supervision. Lesser sentences, all of which were directed to run concurrently, were imposed for his other convictions. Defendant now appeals.
Initially, defendant claims that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated (see
Defendant claims that the delay in providing County Court with the grand jury minutes was chargeable to the People and, because more than six months had passed since the indictment was filed, his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. When determining whether the People have satisfied their statutory obligation to be ready for trial within six months of the indictment being filed, certain time delays are excludable, including those that occur because proceedings had to be conducted to determine if a defendant is competent to stand trial (see
Defendant also challenges County Court’s decision to permit the People to cross-examine him at trial regarding his conviction for a felony assault that occurred in 1981. In that regard, County Court noted that defendant had a lengthy criminal record and, in its Sandoval ruling, precluded the People from cross-examining defendant regarding numerous other convictions that appeared on his record. Also, defendant was incarcerated as a result of this conviction, and remained in custody until three years before this incident is alleged to have occurred. Therefore, this conviction was not, as defendant contends, so remote as to have no value on the issue of his credibility as a witness at trial (see People v Wilson, 78 AD3d 1213, 1215-1216 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 747 [2011]; People v Rosa, 47 AD3d 1009, 1010 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 816 [2008]). Also, the court instructed the jury that evidence of this conviction was not proof of defendant’s guilt and restricted cross-examination so that the jury was not informed that this conviction was for a sexual assault (see People v Smith, 63 AD3d 1301, 1304 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 862 [2009]). As a result, the court’s Sandoval
Defendant also claims that County Court improperly denied his motion to suppress the clothing that had been taken from him while at the county jail. As previously noted, prior to defendant’s arrest, the police obtained a search warrant for his apartment authorizing the seizure of, among other things, “personal items of [the defendant], including but not limited to articles used for grooming, and clothing items, including black dress pants, blue short sleeve button up shirt and white brief style underwear.” Defendant was not arrested until after the police had completed their search of the premises and had left the apartment. Later that evening, they took defendant into custody and noted that, at that time, he was wearing black pants and a khaki button up shirt. These clothes were taken from defendant by jail personnel and stored with his other belongings at the county jail. The day after he was taken into custody, the police, without a warrant, seized this clothing in connection with their investigation, and a hair sample found on it was subjected to DNA analysis.2 Defendant argues that since this clothing was not described in the search warrant for his apartment, the police should have obtained a search warrant authorizing its seizure from the county jail, and the clothing should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. However, since defendant was wearing this clothing when he was taken into custody by the police and placed under arrest, he can hardly claim that he had any legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated when the police seized these items from the county jail. As such, a search warrant authorizing the seizure of this clothing was not required (see People v Natal, 75 NY2d 379, 383-384 [1990]). Moreover, this clothing had limited evidentiary value when introduced into evidence at trial and there is simply “no reasonable possibility” that it played any role in the jury’s decision to convict defendant (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]). As such, any error that may have been committed by its admission into evidence was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (id.; see People v Marshall, 57 AD3d 1163, 1165 [2008]).
Defendant next argues that County Court should not have allowed the People to introduce evidence seized from his apartment that was not listed on the return form prepared by the police and filed with the court in connection with the execution of
Finally, contrary to defendant’s claim, the merger doctrine does not apply to the crime of coercion (see generally People v Cassidy, 40 NY2d 763, 765 [1976]; see People v Scott, 47 AD3d 849, 850 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 870 [2008]; People v Richard, 30 AD3d 750, 755 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 869 [2006]). Instead, it “is intended to preclude a conviction for kidnapping based on acts which are ‘so much the part of another substantive crime that the substantive crime could not have been committed without such acts and that independent criminal responsibility may not fairly be attributed to them’” (People v Mao-Sheng Lin, 50 AD3d 1251, 1252 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 961 [2008], quoting People v Gonzalez, 80 NY2d 146, 153 [1992]; see People v Cassidy, 40 NY2d at 767). Moreover, holding the victim at knife point and forcing her to walk down a hallway to the bedroom were discreet acts and constituted competent proof
Defendant’s remaining claim has been reviewed and found to be lacking in merit.
Peters, J.P., Lahtinen, Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.