3 Park. Cr. 681 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1858
The principal ground on which the application for the writ of error in this case rests is, that upon the trial evidence was allowed against the prisoner, tending to prove that both previous and subsequent to the time of the alleged murder, for which he was then on trial, he had been guilty of other and separate acts of a felonious character, for which indictments were then pending against him.. Such evidence was allowed on the trial of the indictment upon which the prisoner was convicted, but it was not offered or allowed upon the principal issue, nor for the purpose of raising any direct inference in regard to the existence of the main fact in controversy. It was offered and allowed distinctly and solely for the purpose of establishing the quo anima, the motive existing in the mind of the prisoner, which the prosecution assumed incited and moved him to commit the offence charged against him, and for no other purpose.
The indictment was for the murder of Mrs. Rhoda Wood, the wife or widow of David J. Wood, in whose family the prisoner resided. The theory of the prosecution was, that the prisoner’s motive in committing the alleged murder was to obtain the property and estate of D. J. Wood, or some considerable portion of it. The prisoner was the brother of D. J. Wood, and, as the prosecution assumed, he supposed and believed that D. J. Wood was possessed of a large estate, which he coveted; and that a portion of this estate would come to him as one of the heirs, if D. J. Wood and his wife and children could be put out of the way ; that to accomplish this object, and to enable himself to appropriate
It was assumed and claimed by the prosecution, that these several felonious acts were but parts of a single transaction, influenced by a single motive, and designed to accomplish a single object. That they were all connected by unity of plot and design, and, if proved, would tend to show the motive which actuated the prisoner in taking the life of Mrs. Wood. Accordingly, evidence was allowed tending to show the commission of all these alleged felonious acts by the prisoner, for the purpose of establishing the assumed motive. The case being one of circumstantial evidence .wholly, proof of the existence of a criminal motive in the mind of the prisoner to commit the act was essential to making out a case against him which would justify a verdict of guilty. -That the evidence tended directly to uphold the theory, and to establish the imputed motive, cannot, I think, be denied or doubted, and the only question is, whether evidence of that character is admissible for the purpose for which it was allowed to be given in this case. There can
The atrocity of the act cannot be used as a shield under such circumstances, or as a bar to its legitimate use by the prosecution. If it could, many criminals might escape just and merited punishment solely by means of their hardened and depraved natures. The rule appears to me to be well settled, both by elementary writers and by adjudged cases, that separate and distinct felonies may be proved upon a trial for the purpose of establishing the existence of a motive to commit the crime in question, even though an indictment is then pending against the prisoner for such other felonies. I might cite many elementary books and numerous cases where the rule is thus laid down, but it is unnecessary. Indeed, there is no authority to the contrary., It is quite true that the prosecution cannot prove the cotiamission of another and distinct felony by the prisoner for the purpose of establishing the fact directly that he committed the one for which he is then on trial, or for the purpose of raising any direct infer
The application is therefore denied.