Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, possession of a short-barreled shotgun, MCL 750.224b; MSA 28.421(2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty-five to fifty years for the assault with intent to commit murder conviction and three to five years for the possession of a short-barreled shotgun conviction, to be *720 served consecutively to a two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences as of right. We affirm.
On January 9, 1994, at about 11:10 P.M., the victim drove into the parking lot of a White Castle restaurant on Woodward Avenue in Ferndale. As he parked, the victim saw three men, who were standing in the parking lot near the drive-through lane, approach his car. One man stood next to the driver’s side of the victim’s car, one stood on the passenger side, and one stood in front of the restaurant door facing the car. The man standing next to the passenger’s side of the car, later identified as defendant, was wearing a red bandana on his head, a long red-and-black plaid hunter’s jacket, and a shorter black leather jacket over that. The man standing next to the driver’s side of the car tapped on the window. The victim rolled down the window about an inch, and the man asked him for the time. The victim told the man the time and rolled the window up again.
At that point, the victim noticed movement near the passenger’s side of the car. The victim saw defendant pull a shotgun from under his jacket and fire. The victim was struck in the right arm. Some of the shotgun pellets also struck the victim in the chest and chin. The victim managed to pull out of the parking lot and drive away. He eventually stopped the car, got out, and collapsed at the doorway of a Subway sandwich shop about a quarter mile from the scene of the shooting. The victim was bleeding severely and asked repeatedly whether his right arm was still attached. When the police arrived, the victim told them he had been shot. He gave the police a description of his assailants, stating that one man was wearing a New *721 York Giants baseball cap and that another one had a Chicago Bulls baseball cap. The victim specifically described the shooter as a white male wearing a bandana and a red-and-black plaid jacket.
Officer Michael Lennon testified that he proceeded to the White Castle restaurant, where he spotted three men matching the descriptions given by the victim standing at a telephone booth. Two of the men, Chuck Vigil and defendant, ran upon seeing the officer. The third, David Boswell, told Officer Lennon that the other two men had just robbed him and taken his coat. However, when Officer Lennon and Boswell drove to where defendant and Vigil had been apprehended by other officers, Boswell denied that they were the men who robbed him. All three men were taken into custody and driven to the Subway restaurant. Defendant was wearing a red bandana and a red-and-black plaid jacket. As the victim was being placed in the ambulance, he stated that the three suspects were the ones who shot him. The victim specifically identified defendant as the shooter. The police eventually found a shotgun, which recently had been fired, buried in a mound of snow approximately thirty feet from the telephone booth in the White Castle parking lot.
i
Defendant first argues that the victim’s on-the-scene identification was improper because it was taken in violation of defendant’s “constitutional” right to counsel. We disagree.
We note initially that this issue does not involve defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. US Const, Am VI. In
Moore v Illinois,
Rather, the issue in this case is whether defendant’s right to counsel established by our Supreme Court in
People v Anderson,
Again before
Moore,
in
People v Jackson,
The . . . Anderson rales . . . represent the conclusion of this Court, independent of any Federal constitutional mandate, that, both before and after commencement of the judicial phase of a prosecution, a suspect is entitled to be represented by counsel at a corporeal identification ....
Nevertheless, the Jackson Court, again on an unspecified basis, reaffirmed the Anderson rules in the exercise of its “constitutional power to establish rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings in Michigan courts,” in order to “preserve best evidence eyewitness testimony from unnecessary alteration by unfair identification procedures . ...” Id. at 338-339; see also id. at 354-355 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
Of course, the Michigan and federal constitutions may have different meaning.
People v Pickens,
The confusion among panels of this Court resulting from
Anderson
was succinctly explained by Judge Wahls in his opinion in
People v Marks,
Since Anderson, the question of on-the-scene identification has been raised in the context of the “constitutional right to counsel,” see, e.g., People v Wilki,132 Mich App 140 , 142;347 NW2d 735 (1984), and specifically the “Sixth Amendment right to counsel,” see, e.g., People v Fields,125 Mich App 377 , 380;336 NW2d 478 (1983); People v Turner,120 Mich App 23 , 33-34;328 NW2d 5 (1982) . . . ; People v Coward,111 Mich App 55 , 62;315 NW2d 144 (1981)....
While Anderson and the above cases from this Court at first glance appear to be Sixth Amendment cases, further inquiry reveals otherwise. In People v Jackson,391 Mich 323 , 338;217 NW2d 22 (1974), the Supreme Court observed that the Anderson rules “represent the conclusion of this Court, independent of any Federal constitutional mandate, that, both before and after commencement of the judicial phase of a prosecution, a suspect is entitled to be represented by counsel at a corporeal identification.” Furthermore, were Anderson a statement of Sixth Amendment law, it would no longer be controlling, because the United States Supreme Court has since approved of the distinction drawn by the Kirby plurality but rejected in Anderson. [Marks, supra at 209-210.] 2
*725
If we were writing on a clean slate, we would adopt the federal rule, as announced in
Kirby
and adopted in
Moore,
that the right to counsel provided in
Wade
attaches only to corporeal identifications conducted at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings.
Moore, supra
at 226-227. The
Wade
decision was rightly focused on the routine “police station” lineup and show-up procedures employed by the police to obtain evidence for use at trial as a “critical stage” wherein the right to counsel is implicated.
3
The concerns associated with such a stationhouse lineup are simply absent where the police promptly apprehend a suspect and return him to the scene of the crime for identification by the victim. Moreover, we note that defendants still have an independent
constitutional
basis for challenging lineup procedures conducted before the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings that are so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that they amount to a denial of due process.
Stovall v Denno,
When a person has not been formally charged with a criminal offense, Stovall strikes the appropriate constitutional balance between the right of a suspect to be protected from prejudicial procedures and the interest of society in the prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved crime. [Kirby, supra at 691.]
Regardless of the shortcomings in the
Anderson
decision, it remains the law in Michigan, and we must
*726
therefore accord it appropriate deference.
Boyd v W G Wade Shows,
In
People v Turner,
Rather than simplifying this area, Turner’s “very strong evidence” rule appears to be as inherently vague as the “more than a mere suspicion” rule in Dixon. 5 We agree with Judge WAHLS that the police cannot reasonably be expected to make a practical decision whether they have “strong evidence” or “very strong evidence” in any given case. Marks, supra at 217. In People v Wilki, supra at 144, yet another panel of this Court, concerned that “the Turner standard will not always be an easy one to apply,” interpreted “very strong evidence” to mean “evidence such that the police, acting in good faith, have no reasonable necessity for confirming that the suspect they have apprehended is in fact the perpetrator.” Id. at 144. 6
We believe that
Dixon
and
Turner
fail to provide a simple, practical standard consistent with
Anderson
for use by police officers in the field. Therefore, we hold that it is proper and does not offend the
Anderson
requirements for the police to promptly conduct an on-the-scene identification.
People v Purofoy,
116
*728
Mich App 471, 480;
Applying the on-the-scene exception to the instant case leads us to conclude that the identification procedure employed here did not violate defendant’s Anderson-based “right to counsel.” Following the shooting, the victim was able to drive to the Subway restaurant about a quarter-mile away. Bleeding severely and awaiting an ambulance, the victim told the police that he had been shot, and he gave the police general descriptions of his assailants. The police found defendant and his accomplices in the immediate vicinity of the shooting and quickly took them to the Subway restaurant where the victim positively identified defendant as the shooter. This on-the-scene corporeal identification, within minutes after *729 the shooting occurred, was not only reasonable, but necessary police practice. We find no error.
n
Defendant next argues that the on-the-scene identification by the victim was unduly suggestive and that the in-court identification should therefore have been suppressed as having no independent basis. Defendant’s challenge below was directed to the absence of counsel at the on-the-scene identification, not to its suggestiveness. Consequently, there is no record on which we can review whether the on-the-scene identification was unduly suggestive. The issue is therefore not preserved for appellate review, and we decline to address it. See
People v Lee,
m
Next, defendant maintains that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence presented at trial. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal by moving timely for a new trial below, we decline to address it. MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e);
People v Dukes,
IV
Defendant next argues that he must be resentenced because the trial court misinterpreted the instructions regarding the application of prior record variable 5 (prv 5) (prior misdemeanor convictions) and prior record variable 7 (prv 7) (subsequent/concurrent felony convictions). Defendant’s challenge does not state a cognizable claim for relief.
People v Mitchell,
*730
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his sentencing information report stated that the guidelines’ range was “180 to 300 [months] or life” when the actual range, according to the trial court’s own discretionary scoring of the guidelines, should have been 120 to 300 months. Defendant did not object to this inaccuracy at sentencing and so has not preserved this issue for appeal. MCR 6.429(C). Accordingly, we will not review it.
Affirmed.
Notes
Anderson
relied in part on this Court’s decision in
People v Hutton,
The other two judges on the Marks panel concurred only in the result of Judge Wahls’ analysis concerning the propriety of the counselless on-the-scene identification in that case.
The Wade Court, supra at 228-233, was concerned with, among other things, the “vagaries of eyewitness identification” and the potential for “improper influence” at such lineups.
Dixon
relied on
People v Patskan,
Turner further confused matters by retaining the Dixon “more than a mere suspicion” standard where the police have already validly arrested the suspect for an unrelated offense. Turner, supra at 37.
The Wilki Court’s concern about the Turner rule is, to say the least, an understatement.
Again, we believe that due process provides sufficient protection against unreliable pretrial identifications obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures. Moore, supra at 227; see also Stovall, supra; Marks, supra at 217.