People v. Williams CA2/8
B339120
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 17, 2025|
Check TreatmentFiled 11/17/25 P. v. Williams CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B339120
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA386991-01)
v.
MALI WENDELL WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Terry A. Bork, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Ashwini Mate, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, we
review an order denying Mali Williams’s request for resentencing
under Penal Code1 section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). Because we
find the order is not appealable, we dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
A jury convicted appellant Mali Williams of two counts of
attempted kidnapping to commit robbery in violation of sections
664 and 209, subdivision (b)(1); two counts of attempted second-
degree robbery in violation of sections 664 and 211; and one count
of illegal possession of a firearm by a person adjudged a ward of
the juvenile court in violation of former section 12021,
subdivision (e). The jury also found true that Williams had
personally used a firearm within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivision (b). Williams waived jury trial and
admitted a prior strike conviction within the meaning of the
Three Strikes Law, sections 667 subdivision (b) through (i) and
1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d). On March 1, 2012, the trial
court sentenced Williams to 21 years and four months in prison.
Williams apparently filed a pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus, which is not in our record on appeal. At a May 8,
2024, status conference attended by appointed counsel for
Williams and the prosecutor, the trial court acknowledged that it
had appointed counsel to assist Williams upon receiving the
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the trial court
stated: “If memory serves me, this was one that I had felt having
[defense counsel’s] interpretation of the claim on habeas would
assist me.” Appointed counsel acknowledged the pending pro se
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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habeas petition and advised the court that he had, that morning,
filed an “invitation” to the court to exercise its discretion to recall
and resentence Williams under Assembly Bill No. 600 (Assembly
Bill). The invitation also included prison records demonstrating
Williams’s rehabilitation efforts. Counsel also advised the court
that he was reviewing the pending habeas corpus petition to “see
if it’s necessary for me to file a writ of habeas corpus.”
The trial court then postponed the status conference on the
pro se habeas petition and the Assembly Bill 600 “invitation” to
June 10, 2024 to give the court and counsel an opportunity to
review the pleadings. It asked defense counsel to send a copy of
the pending habeas petition to the prosecutor. The court also
reminded defense counsel that he was appointed on the “existing
petition, and if—but if there are additional ones, that’s a different
matter. He remains in propria persona as to any additional or
other habeas claims.” Defense counsel responded: “Yes, your
honor. So I think the thrust of this habeas claim was this AB
600. So my perspective was, just to go with the AB 600, and I
don’t know if it’s—I don’t know if a writ of habeas corpus would
be the appropriate vehicle for that.” The court responded: “Well,
fair enough. Let’s see where we stand on the issue on the 10th of
June.” The court continued: “[T]here’s a setting for both, AB 600
and the related habeas corpus petition. And I hope that by that
point, the People will have had a chance to review it and can tell
me if they want to submit anything or at least—even if you don’t
submit anything, if it’s something you want to be heard on, I’m
happy to hear your point of view on that. Again, this is—AB 600
doesn’t require even calendaring the issue. It’s something that
very often—in fact, most frequently is just handled in chambers
matter.”
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On June 10, 2024, the trial court held the continued status
conference. It acknowledged the Assembly Bill 600 petition was
“of some length and complexity. And I have not yet finished my
review of that document. I want to give it full consideration.”
The trial court suggested a further continuance. Williams
addressed the court personally and asked why it was taking so
long to decide his pending habeas petition. The court responded
that if Williams wanted an answer that day, “I’m going to deny it,
sir. You want to give me more time?” Williams consented to a
postponement of the status conference for both pleadings, which
the court moved to August 2, 2024. The trial court noted that it
might issue a written decision before August 2, 2024.
On June 25, 2024, the trial court refused to take any action
on Williams’s Assembly Bill 600 petition. The trial court’s order
stated: “On May 8, 2024, the Court received an ‘Invitation to
Consider Resentencing Pursuant to AB 600’ and petition for
recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1
from defendant’s counsel Richard Pagliari. The court appreciates
the work put into this petition, and the progress shown by
Petitioner Williams. The Court has reviewed the materials
provided and declines to resentence Petitioner or take further
action on the Petition. Future court dates previously set for
consideration of this matter are vacated. Clerk to give notice to
defendant.” “On Court’s motion, the hearing on 08/02/2024
Petition for Writ of Habas Corpus Status Conference is Vacated.”
This timely appeal followed.
We appointed counsel to represent Williams on appeal. On
July 11, 2025, counsel filed a no issue brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo. Counsel advised us they told Williams he could file
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his own supplemental brief within 30 days and sent him
transcripts of the record on appeal as well as a copy of the brief.
On July 11, 2025, this court sent Williams notice that a
brief raising no issues had been filed on his behalf. We advised
him he had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental brief
or letter stating any issues he believes we should consider. We
also advised him that if he did not file a supplemental brief, the
appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.
On August 15, 2025, Williams filed a supplemental brief in
which he contends that he had filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in 2023 asking the court to resentence him pursuant to
Assembly Bill 600, Senate Bill No. 620, and Senate Bill No. 1393.
The trial court then appointed counsel to assist him. Instead of
pursuing the habeas petition, however, counsel filed a section
1172.1 request for resentencing and did not pursue the issues
Williams raised on habeas. Williams asks us to consider the
issues he raised on habeas in addition to his invitation to the trial
court to resentence him pursuant to Assembly Bill 600.
DISCUSSION
I. Assembly Bill 600
A. Section 1172.1—the Recall and Resentencing Statute
Assembly Bill 600 amended section 1172.1, endowing a
trial court with authority to recall the sentences of incarcerated
defendants and resentence them under certain circumstances.
Like its predecessor provisions, section 1172.1 is a statutory
exception to the general rule that “ ‘once a judgment is rendered
and execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not
have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.’ ” (People v.
King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 637–638.)
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Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and
resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county
in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if
the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Until recently, the statute also provided
that a trial court may recall and resentence “on its own motion”
within 120 days of the date of commitment. Effective January 1,
2024, the 120-day provision was expanded. Now a trial court
may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own
motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time
of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law.” (Ibid.; Assem. Bill 600 (2023–2024 Reg.
Sess.).) Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it may
either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the
conviction and impose judgment on “any necessarily included
lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that
offense was charged in the original pleadings.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(3).)
Notably, section 1172.1, by its terms, denies a defendant
the right to petition the court for recall and resentencing.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (c) [“[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief from the court under this section,” and “[i]f a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the
court is not required to respond.”].) As to a right to appeal, the
statute provides: “After ruling on a referral authorized by this
section, the court shall advise the defendant of their right to
appeal.” (Id., subd. (d).)
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B. The Right to Appeal Generally
The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute. (Teal v. Superior Court
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598.) Criminal defendants are entitled to
appeal from “any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
C. The Definition of “Substantial Rights”
Our Supreme Court has not provided “a comprehensive
interpretation of the term ‘substantial rights’ as used in section
1237, subdivision (b).” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155,
1161, fn. 3 (Loper).) But Loper did discuss how to approach
formulating a definition. There, the court addressed the question
whether a defendant has the right to appeal a trial court’s denial
of a request for compassionate release properly made by the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
under section 1170, former subdivision (e). That statute is
similar to section 1172.1 in that both statutes do not give
defendants the right to make a request for relief themselves. For
relief under section 1170, only the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation or the Board of Parole Hearings
may make such a request. (§ 1170, former subd. (e).)
In deciding that the denial of a request for compassionate
release affects substantial rights, our Supreme Court in Loper
noted: “Although the defendant has no independent right to
initiate compassionate release proceedings in the trial court, the
Secretary [of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation]
evaluated defendant’s medical condition and made a
recommendation for compassionate release on his behalf. By
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providing a mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from
custody, section 1170[, former subdivision] (e) implicates a
prisoner’s substantial interest in personal liberty. Moreover,
although section 1170[, former subdivision] (e) authorizes the
trial court to exercise discretion whether to release a prisoner for
compassionate reasons, the statute also establishes clear
eligibility criteria (§ 1170[, former subd.] (e)(2)), suggesting that
discretion is not unfettered when evidence is presented satisfying
the statutory criteria. These factors lead us to conclude the trial
court’s ruling clearly affected defendant’s substantial rights for
purposes of section 1237, subdivision (b).” (Loper, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1161, fn. 3.)
We glean from this footnote that the combination of three
factors dictates whether a defendant’s substantial rights in
personal liberty are implicated: 1) the Legislature sets up a
mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from custody; 2) that
mechanism is used to get the issue of release from custody before
the trial court; and 3) that mechanism includes a list of eligibility
statutory criteria that must then be followed by the trial court in
making its ruling, suggesting that the trial court’s discretion is
not unfettered. We also glean from the extended discussion in
Loper on standing that whether or not defendants themselves
have the express right to initiate the request for sentencing relief
is immaterial to determining whether substantial rights are
affected. (See Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1161–1165
[defendant may appeal an adverse decision on a postjudgment
motion or petition if it affects substantial rights, even if someone
else brought the original motion].) Indeed, we find that it is use
of the mechanism set up by the Legislature, coupled with
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legislatively mandated factors to consider, that are determinative
of whether substantial rights are affected by the statute.
Keeping these three factors in mind, we hold that section
1172.1 does not implicate a defendant’s substantial rights where,
as here, a defendant has filed a petition not authorized by
statute. It is true that the Legislature created a mechanism for
release, satisfying the first of the three criteria set out above.
However, that mechanism, authorized for use by only designated
entities or persons, was not followed in this case. Section 1172.1,
subdivision (c) expressly provides: “A defendant is not entitled to
file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If
a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section,
the court is not required to respond.” The statute also expressly
provides that where an authorized request for relief is denied, a
defendant must be advised of their appellate rights, inferring a
right to appeal a properly authorized request. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (d).)
Here, Williams filed an unauthorized request for relief to
which the trial court was not obligated to respond. Thus, the
second criterion—that the authorized mechanism be used to
obtain the requested relief—has not been satisfied. This, we
emphasize, stands apart from a standing analysis per se. We
conclude that orders denying requests for relief that do not
properly invoke the mechanisms set out by the statute do not
implicate substantial rights and are not appealable.
We also adopt the analysis of our colleagues in Division 2
who concluded that orders denying requests for relief from
defendants personally, as opposed to those from authorized third
parties, are not appealable. (See generally People v. Hodge (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 985.) As Presiding Justice Lui wrote, “[T]he
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second sentence of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) does undermine
any claim that defendants have a substantial right at stake when
they file an unauthorized request for resentencing. That
sentence excuses the trial court from any responsibility to rule on
such a request, or even to respond. It follows that a defendant
who chooses to file an unauthorized request for resentencing has
no right to a ruling. The defendant may have a liberty interest at
stake in any decision as to whether they should remain
incarcerated. But a defendant has no right to demand that the
trial court actually make such a decision. If the defendant has no
right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to make one does
not deprive the defendant any right, much less a substantial
one.” (Id. at p. 996.) Under Hodge, where a statute expressly
relieves the court of any obligation to adjudicate a request for
relief filed by defendants personally, it follows that defendants do
not have a substantial right in this particular pathway toward
resentencing. (Ibid; see also People v. Faustinos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 687, 697 [order declining to act on defendant’s unauthorized section 1172.1 petition not an appealable order]; People v. Brinson (2025)112 Cal.App.5th 1040
, 1047 [same].)
It is the Legislature’s mechanism and the use of that
mechanism that is paramount in deciding whether substantial
rights are affected, not the format of the trial court’s order.
Because we find that the order declining to take any action on the
section 1172.1 petition is not an appealable order, we do not
address the merits of the request.
II. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
There is no petition for writ of habeas corpus in the record
we have on appeal. As set out ante, up until June 25, 2024, when
the trial court declined to rule on the Assembly Bill 600 petition,
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the court acknowledged the existence of a pending petition for
writ of habeas corpus filed by Williams pro se.
The minute order dated June 25, 2024 addresses only the
petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1
and takes off calendar the status conference on the pending
habeas petition.
Williams’s notice of appeal refers only to his request for
resentencing under Assembly Bill 600. His supplemental brief
asks us to review the exhibits attached to his Assembly Bill 600
resentencing request. Those exhibits consist of numerous
laudatory certificates, letters, commendations, and memoranda
about his successful rehabilitation efforts while in custody.
Williams’s supplemental brief asks us to consider requests for
relief under Senate Bill No. 1393 and Senate Bill No. 620 as well
as Assembly Bill 600. He represents that these additional
statutory requests for relief are included in his petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
Notwithstanding Williams’s representations that his
habeas petition requested relief under Assembly Bill 600, Senate
Bill No. 620, and Senate Bill No. 1393, we adhere to our
conclusion that the appeal must be dismissed. First, as we have
discussed above, denial of an unauthorized petition for relief
under Assembly Bill 600 and section 1172.1 is not an appealable
order.
Second, we do not have a copy of the petition Williams filed,
rendering us unable to address it. However, were we to act on
Williams’s representations, we note Senate Bill No. 620 (Senate
Bill 620) (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1, 2),
effective January 1, 2018, grants trial courts discretion to strike
firearm enhancements imposed under section 12022.53 “ ‘in
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furtherance of justice’ ” under section 1385, subdivision (a).
(People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 396.) However, Senate Bill 620 does not apply retroactively to cases that became final before its effective date. (People v. Johnson (2019)32 Cal.App.5th 938
, 941–942; People v. Hernandez (2019)34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326
.)
The record in this matter reflects that Williams’s
judgment became final years before Senate Bill 620 was enacted.
We take judicial notice that the direct appeal affirming his
judgment of conviction as modified was filed July 24, 2013, and
our Supreme Court denied his petition for review on October 23,
2013. (People v. Williams (July 24, 2013, B240665) [nonpub.
opn.], review den. Oct. 23, 2013, S213128.) We have found no
petition for certiorari filed in the United States Supreme Court.
“A judgment becomes final when the availability of an appeal and
the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court have expired.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th
857, 876, fn. 5.) A petition for certiorari must be filed within 90
days of entry of an order denying discretionary review by a state
court of last resort. (U.S. Supreme Ct. Rules, rule 13(1), (3).)
This places finality well before Senate Bill 620’s effective date of
January 1, 2018.
Finally, Senate Bill No. 1393 (Senate Bill 1393) (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1, 2), effective January 1,
2019, grants trial courts discretion to strike five-year serious
felony enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (a) “ ‘in
furtherance of justice.’ ” (People v. Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th
at p. 397.) Likewise, this statute also applies only to cases not
final as of its effective date. (People v. Alexander (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 341, 344.) Williams’s judgment was final well
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before the law’s effective date of January 1, 2019. On the merits,
Williams has not shown that the trial court’s decision declining to
take further action on his habeas petition was prejudicial error.
The denial of Williams’s section 1172.1 petition is not an
appealable order. And because the court lacked jurisdiction to
grant resentencing under Senate Bill 1393 and Senate Bill 620,
the appeal of the order declining to rule on the petition for writ of
habeas corpus must be dismissed. (People v. Alexander, supra,
45 Cal.App.5th at p. 345.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J.
RUBIN, J.*
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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