THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER ERIC WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
A160530
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO
Filed 4/30/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 18SF001211A)
We conclude the trial court erred in finding Williams posed an unreasonable risk to public safety and thus abused its discretion in denying his request for mental health diversion. Accordingly, the judgment will be reversed.
BACKGROUND
One day in 2015, Williams went to a local autobody shop for an estimate and became upset
The record contains abundant evidence of the extremely disturbing content of Williams‘s communications, and the parties have summarized it accurately in their briefing. He sent the family thousands of vile and threatening
Williams was arrested on December 20, 2017, and released on bond the same day.
Subsequently, on February 1, 2018, Williams was charged with one felony count of stalking the family for a period of about four months the prior year (between August 1 and December 13, 2017) (
Then on June 27, 2018, less than three weeks after Williams‘s plea, the Legislature passed an omnibus budget bill that took immediate effect (Assem. Bill No. 1810). Among other measures, the bill enacted
Diversion under
If diversion is granted and the defendant completes the process satisfactorily, the defendant‘s criminal charges shall be dismissed and the defendant‘s arrest “shall be deemed never to have occurred.” (
To be eligible for diversion, the defendant must meet six statutory criteria. (See
Shortly after the new statute took effect, Williams asked (in a “Statement in Mitigation” prepared for the upcoming sentencing hearing) that criminal proceedings be suspended so that he could be considered for pretrial mental health diversion, asserting that the harassment he had engaged in was attributable to “a sustained period of impaired judgment due to a major mood disorder.” In support, his filing referenced written evaluations from two doctors (Drs. McGlynn and Patterson).8
The following day (August 8, 2018), the probation department filed its report in which it acknowledged Williams‘s mental health issues and recommended he be placed on supervised probation so he could receive continued mental health treatment.9 According to the probation report, Williams “presented as cooperative, honest and very emotional. He admitted to his crimes and stated several times that he had no intention of following through with his threats, but that he wanted to embarrass or upset the recipients. . . . He wept openly and expressed what appeared to be genuine remorse and said, ‘They did nothing to deserve this treatment. I felt horrible when I found out I scared a family.‘” The report noted that Williams‘s neighbor “stated that she never really thought the defendant was a threat to her, but contacted police because she wanted his actions documented.” The neighbor told the probation officer that “while she believes the defendant has possible mental health issues and needs to suffer some consequences for his behavior, ‘I don‘t believe he‘s a threat, I never have.‘”
A few weeks later, on August 24, 2018, citing principally the existing psychological evaluations conducted by Drs. McGlynn and Patterson, Williams filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea or, alternatively, to suspend sentencing proceedings and formally requested pretrial mental health diversion.10 He subsequently supplemented the motion with declarations by both doctors.
Dr. Patterson, who had reviewed abundant materials from the criminal case (including the probation report, and some of the emails and other materials recovered from Williams‘s home during the warrant search) and met with Williams three times, opined in his declaration that during the period of his criminal behavior, Williams was suffering from depression, chronic anxiety and trauma-related symptoms, as well as “sensitivity (or hypersensitivity) and, at times, paranoid ideation in relation to real and/or misperceived racism,” and that all of these symptoms had impaired Williams‘s judgment and his ability to manage anger and frustration. Dr. Patterson stated that Williams “does not deny or greatly minimize his threatening behavior . . . nor does he deny or greatly minimize the consequences of his behavior to others,” was remorseful and “[t]here are no indications that [he] has been beset by violent ideation or intent prior to or since the incidents.” Dr. Patterson “found no evidence that Mr. Williams poses an imminent risk of danger to himself or others,” because using three different risk assessment methodologies, Williams‘s “long-term risk of violence falls within the lowest category.” Dr. Patterson concluded Williams “may benefit from psychiatric intervention and psychotherapy, and the available information suggests he
Dr. McGlynn, a licensed professor of clinical psychology at Stanford University who had been treating Williams regularly since shortly after his arrest (beginning in January 2018), opined in his declaration that Williams had been living with a previously undiagnosed major mood disorder that resulted in a sustained period of severely impaired judgment and paranoid ideation. Williams was responding favorably to treatment and medication, and McGlynn predicted that Williams would continue to improve. He also concurred in Dr. Patterson‘s assessment that Williams‘s likelihood of reoffending was very low.
Williams‘s diversion request proceeded to hearings before two different judges who came to opposite conclusions.
First, on November 21, 2018, the trial court (Hon. Joseph C. Scott) conducted an evidentiary hearing. Both wife and husband testified about their experiences, and a victim impact statement from Williams‘s neighbor also was read into the record (she opposed Williams‘s request for diversion, and asked the court to impose the maximum penalty). The declarations of Drs. McGlynn and Patterson were admitted into evidence, and both doctors were cross-examined at some length. Judge Scott noted he did not intend to issue a definitive ruling on that date, including because the county did not yet have a mental health diversion program in place (the probation department was in the process of implementing one), and at the conclusion of the hearing he ordered supplemental briefing concerning the new statute.
About four months later, on March 27, 2019, while the matter was still undecided, a customer of the family‘s body shop observed a sign posted in the window of the car belonging to Williams‘s partner, stating “Do not patronize” their shop. At a status hearing on April 19, 2019, the People informed Judge Scott about this.11
On November 22, 2019, after receiving additional briefing, Judge Scott found Williams satisfied all of the statutory criteria for diversion under
Pursuant to local court procedure, the case was then referred for a “suitability” hearing concerning mental health diversion before another judge of the same court, and additional briefing was filed by the parties.
When Judge Novak then entertained argument, she expressed serious concerns in her questions to defense counsel about the sign stating “Do not patronize” the family‘s business that had been posted in the car belonging to Williams‘s partner back in March 2019, eight months before Judge Scott had deemed Williams eligible for diversion (in November 2019):
“THE COURT: . . . Mr. Getz, what was really disconcerting, setting aside the underlying facts for which your client now stands convicted by entry of a plea—and I don‘t think I need to revisit the graphic nature of the threats and the ongoing harassment that he engaged in. Having been under the care of mental health providers now for a substantial period of time, how do you reconcile that and convince the court that he doesn‘t present an unreasonable risk of safety to these people when just in December of 201912 he—and I think it‘s reasonable to infer that the publication of a sign in his partner‘s back window of his car is something that I can certainly reasonably infer he bears some responsibility for, which is still critical of this same victim and is advising or admonishing the public not to patronize this victim because this victim‘s business is dishonest or crooked. That is the exact same kind of behavior that is part and parcel of the underlying stalking conviction.
[¶] I just cannot reconcile that with the proposition that because of treatment, he is so responsive to that treatment that he doesn‘t still pose an unreasonable risk to these people. Granted that publication didn‘t contain a threat, but it‘s the exact same behavior. Yet, a year and a half after the incident for which he now stands convicted, he is still fixated on that. [¶] I have a really difficult time feeling comfortable that mental health diversion is appropriate for someone whose underlying crime is as serious as his and whose treatment after a year and half has not abated the fixation or the hatred for these people.”
Defense counsel urged Judge Novak to consider the “overall arc” of Williams‘s treatment and progress, argued the sign was different than the threats underlying his offense, and told Judge Novak that after the sign was discovered, Judge Scott “ordered him to do a more formal OR release, and he has been in total compliance with that.”
At the subsequent sentencing hearing (before the Hon. Stephanie G. Garratt), the court denied Williams‘s motion to withdraw his no contest plea, and placed him on probation for three years with the condition he serve eight months in county jail.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Mental Health Diversion.
Williams argues the court abused its discretion in finding him unsuitable for mental health diversion because, contrary to Judge Novak‘s finding, he does not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. The People urge affirmance on the ground Judge Novak reasonably found that Williams does pose such a risk.
The parties agree that we review the trial court‘s ruling for an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449 (Moine).) As this court explained at some length in People v. Jacobs (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 728, various definitions of the abuse of discretion standard have been announced in numerous cases, but the standard cannot be boiled down to simply calling for reversal only if a ruling appears to be arbitrary, capricious or utterly irrational. (See id. at pp. 736-738.) “Very little of general significance can be said about discretion. ’ “The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is subject
The parties also agree about the legal standard for assessing an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as used in
As recently explained in People v. Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 440, “The violent felonies encompassed in this definition ‘are known as “super strikes“.... [¶]
Applying this standard, Moine held that a trial court had abused its discretion in finding that mental health diversion of a defendant would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety in circumstances that were similar in pertinent respects to these. In Moine, the defendant was charged with three counts of assault in connection with a fistfight that broke out in the waiting room of a medical facility (prompted by defendant‘s request to turn off the television) and two counts of making criminal threats in connection with an incident that took place about a year later in the waiting room of another medical clinic (prompted by his frustration with the way in which a prescription refill had been handled). (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.) The
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion for mental health diversion supported by a medical report from a court-appointed psychiatrist. The trial court denied the motion. The court assumed that the facts of the two incidents were true, concluded defendant‘s actions on those occasions meant he posed a danger to public safety and denied the motion on that basis. (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 447.)
The appellate court held the record did not support the court‘s implied finding defendant was likely to commit a super-strike offense if he received mental health treatment in the community pursuant to diversion, given the opinion of mental health experts about this risk of danger, his criminal record and the circumstances of the pending charges. (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 450-451.) Although the defendant had four prior misdemeanor convictions, and also was facing several pending misdemeanor charges (one for resisting an officer in connection with a report of possible drug overdose, and one for petty theft for stealing medical supplies), “[n]one of [defendant‘s] convictions involved a violent felony, let alone a super-strike felony.” (Id. at p. 450.) The pending charges themselves were not super-strike offenses either, even though they involved allegations of violence and threats of violence. (Ibid.) The appellate court also noted the prosecution did not present any evidence to suggest the defendant was likely to commit a super-strike offense in the future, and “the circumstances of the pending charges did not support such an inference.” (Id. at pp. 450-451.) In addition, two psychiatrists had determined he posed a low risk for future assault. (Id. at p. 451.)
Contrasting cases where courts of appeal have affirmed dangerousness findings under
Moine compels reversal. Here, there is ample evidence Williams terrorized a family. The family was extremely afraid for its safety (as the victims in Moine no doubt were). And as in Moine, Williams‘s threats were violent, hateful and specific. But just as in that case, Williams‘s charges are not super-strike offenses, he poses a low risk to public safety in the uncontroverted opinion of two mental health professionals, there is no evidence he owned, possessed or had access to any weapons (see Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 445, fn. 2) and he, too, was released on bond for more than two years without incident. Like the appellate court in Moine, we cannot sustain Judge Novak‘s implied finding that Williams was reasonably likely to commit a super-strike offense if granted diversion and treated in the community.
Indeed, the record of Williams‘s potential dangerousness is even weaker than it was in Moine. Unlike the defendant in that case, Williams has no prior criminal record, he faces no other pending charges in unrelated cases and, for all of his horrific threats, he never actually assaulted anyone or engaged in any violence.14 We recognize that, unlike in Moine, here there is evidence that, after little more than a year of voluntary treatment, Williams continued to harbor resentment against his victims (the family), evidenced by the sign he posted in his partner‘s car urging a boycott of their body shop. But, as Judge Novak recognized, his conduct on that one isolated occasion was not violent or threatening; nor did it indicate any intention to engage in violent acts much less a super-strike offense. Indeed, Judge Scott deemed Williams eligible for diversion and specifically found he posed no threat to public safety, eight months after having been apprised of this incident.
In reaching a contrary finding, Judge Novak erroneously believed the sign had been posted much more recently (in December 2019, which was nine months later than the actual incident and just two months before the hearing over which she presided). In fact, by the time of the hearing before Judge Novak
Although the court‘s error regarding the danger element of the diversion statute compels reversal here, for the benefit of the trial courts we make the following observations. In enacting a mental health diversion program, the Legislature sought to expand the use of community-based mental health treatment in order to prevent defendants with treatable mental illness from cycling in and out of our criminal justice system. As this court recently explained, the Legislature enacted this measure in response to the large and growing number of mentally ill persons who are incarcerated in California, including in our overcrowded prisons, and we have criticized its under-utilization. (See People v. O‘Hearn (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 280, 300-301.) The Legislature‘s expressly stated purposes are to ” ‘promote . . . [¶] [i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety,’ ‘[a]llowing local discretion and flexibility for counties in the development and implementation of diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a continuum of care settings,’ and ‘[p]roviding diversion that meets the unique mental health treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.’ (
In People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th 619, which held the statute applies retroactively, our Supreme Court quoted and agreed with the Court of Appeal that “the statute‘s express purpose of promoting ‘[i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety’ indicated ‘the Legislature intended the . . . program to apply as broadly as possible.’ ” (Id. at p. 630.) Judge Novak‘s finding that Williams was not suitable for diversion because he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety cannot be reconciled with these legislative objectives.15 Once again, we
The only question, then, is the appropriate remedy. Moine reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new eligibility hearing under
II.
Remaining Issues.
For guidance on remand, we address one of two remaining issues Williams has raised. As noted, the trial court sentenced Williams to three years of supervised probation. Pursuant to legislation that took effect on January 1, 2021, however, the maximum term for felony probation (with exceptions not relevant here) is two years. (See
Because we are reversing the judgment, and with it the order of probation, Williams‘s final argument that the probation order should be modified to strike the imposition of a monthly $100 probation fee is moot.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed with directions the defendant be referred to a pretrial mental health diversion program. When and if defendant successfully completes diversion, the court shall dismiss the charges. In the event defendant does not successfully complete diversion, the trial court shall conduct a new sentencing hearing in accordance with this opinion.
We concur.
STEWART, J.
KLINE, P.J.
RICHMAN, J.
People v. Williams (A160530)
Trial Court: San Mateo County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Lisa A. Novak and Hon. Stephanie G. Garratt
Counsel:
Jeffrey S. Kross for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Amit Kurlekar and Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.