People v. WilliamsPeople v. Williams
Justice LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 The defendant, Derrick D. Williams, was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 35 years for attempted first degree murder (
¶ 2 Following the defendant‘s convictions, he was ordered to pay a $200 DNA analysis fee. The defendant was in custody from July 22, 2006, until he was sentenced on November 9, 2006. After sentencing, the defendant filed a direct appeal. While the defendant‘s direct appeal was pending, he filed a postconviction petition. The trial court dismissed the defendant‘s postconviction petition. Thereafter, we issued our order on the defendant‘s dirеct appeal. People v. Williams, No. 3-06-0838 (2008) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 3 On November 2, 2009, the defendant filed a successive postconviction petition without leave of the court. The court denied the petition, and the defendant appealed.
¶ 4 On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court should have applied his $5-pеr-day credit toward his $200 DNA assessment.
¶ 5 The State argues that we should not grant the defendant‘s request because he failed to seek leave of the court to file a sucсessive postconviction petition and he does not meet the cause and prejudice requirements. Further, the State urges us to adopt the reasoning in People v. Tolliver, 363 Ill.App.3d 94, 299 Ill.Dec. 821, 842 N.E.2d 1173 (2006), which held thаt the $200 DNA analysis fee is not a fine and therefore is not compensable by the presentencing credit.
¶ 6 A defendant is allowed $5 for each day he is incarcerated but does not supply bail before sentencing.
¶ 7 Next, we look to whether the DNA assessment was a fee or a fine, as the credit may be levied against a fine but not a fee.
¶ 8 The judgment of the circuit court оf Warren County is affirmed.
¶ 9 Affirmed.
Justice HOLDRIDGE specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice WRIGHT dissented, with opinion.
¶ 10 Justice HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring:
¶ 11 I agree with the majority‘s judgment and analysis. I write separately to further clarify why I believe the $200 DNA analysis assessment required by section 5-4-3(j) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) is a fee rather than a fine.
¶ 12 Here, nothing about the DNA analysis assessment suggests that it is a fine. As the majority notes, a fine is punitive, whereas a fee is compensatory. See supra ¶ 7; see also Graves, 235 Ill.2d at 250, 335 Ill.Dec. 881, 919 N.E.2d 906. Thus, a
¶ 13 In People v. Long, 398 Ill.App.3d 1028, 338 Ill.Dec. 305, 924 N.E.2d 511 (2010), our appellate court held that the DNA analysis assessment is a fine. However, in my view, Long is not persuasive. Long ruled that the DNA assessment is not a fee because section 5-4-3(k)(3) provides that money from the DNA analysis assessment may be used “to form, maintain, and improve a DNA database of Illinois criminals” and because that section “contains no language indicating the DNA-analysis assessment is to be used to pay for the anаlysis of the specimen of the particular defendant required to submit a specimen.” Long, 398 Ill.App.3d at 1034, 338 Ill.Dec. 305, 924 N.E.2d 511. However, the fact that the legislature allows the funds collected through the impоsition of the DNA analysis fee to be used to finance the entire DNA database (rather than merely to fund the cost of analyzing the defendant‘s DNA) does not change the cоmpensatory nature of the fee. As noted above, the fee “reimburses the State for the expense of operating a system under which this defendant‘s DNA profile was required to be processed and analyzed as a result * * * of this prosecution and conviction.” Anthony, 408 Ill.App.3d at 809, 351 Ill.Dec. 423, 951 N.E.2d 507. Those expenses were incurred as the result of the defendant‘s conviction and the convictions of all others who were convicted of qualifying offenses. Moreover, even if the State is overcharging convicted felons for the сost of analyzing their DNA, that fact would not change the nature of the fee.
¶ 14 In any event, as the majority notes, the supreme court‘s recent decision in People v. Marshall, 242 Ill.2d 285, 296, 351 Ill.Dec. 172, 950 N.E.2d 668 (2011), has resolved this issue. In Marshall, the suprеme court stated that the DNA analysis assessment is intended to cover the costs of analyzing a defendant‘s DNA and held that a trial court may order a defendant to submit a DNA samрle and pay the $200 assessment “only where [the] defendant is not currently registered in the DNA database.” Id. at 296, 303, 351 Ill.Dec. 172, 950 N.E.2d 668. Although Marshall did not explicitly decide whether the DNA assessment is a fine or a fee, the supreme court‘s reasoning in Marshall compels the conclusion that it is a compensatory fee rather than a punitive sanction. Thus, in my view, Long is no longer good law. See People v. Stuckey, 2011 IL App (1st) 092535, ¶ 36, 355 Ill.Dec. 326, 959 N.E.2d 740 (declining to follow Long in light of Marshall).
¶ 15 Justice WRIGHT, dissenting:
¶ 16 In this case, defеndant did not request leave of the court to file his successive
¶ 17 This issue was not included in defendant‘s successive postconviction petition and was not addressed by the trial court when dismissing that petition. Therefore, this court should not consider whether defendant is entitled to receive monetary credit toward his DNA analysis fee as the issue has been waived. See People v. Jones, 213 Ill.2d 498, 508, 290 Ill.Dec. 519, 821 N.E.2d 1093 (2004). I would affirm the trial court‘s decision.
¶ 18 For these reasons, I respectfull