Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of possession of less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7403X2) (a)(iv), and possession of a firearm during the commissiоn of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to the mandatory two-year consecutive term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction and to two to four years’ imprisonment for the possession of cocaine *56 conviction. Defendant now appeals as of right, and we affirm.
i
Defendant’s convictions arose out of events that occurred on August 26, 1987, in the City of Detroit. Two officers from the Detroit Police Department were on routine patrol when thеy noticed two men on the porch of an abandoned house.
The officers entered the house and went up a flight of stairs, shouting that they were police officers. Upon entering the upstairs living room, the officers encountered defendant and another man. Defendant was spraying lighter fluid into a small can on thе floor. The other man, Xavier Fielder, was sitting on a milk crate, holding matches. When Fielder stood up, a plastic bag containing suspected cocainе dropped onto the floor from his lap. The officers confiscated this bag, as well as thirty-four similar packets from the can on the floor. One of these packets was later tested and found to contain cocaine.
When defendant was searched, the officer found a revolver in the rear pоcket of defendant’s pants and a plastic bag containing powder in another pocket. The officers also confiscated $263 from a small tablе located about two feet from defendant and Fielder.
ii
Defendant first contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonablе doubt that he had possessed the cocaine. We disagree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at a criminal bench trial, this Court must
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viеw that evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Petrella,
Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that the pаckets in the can contained cocaine because the officer combined those packets with the one that had fallen from Fielder’s lap. However, the laboratory analysis stipulated to by defendant states that the evidence envelope contained thirty-five packets, each containing a lumpy, off-white material. There is no indication that the one packet from Fielder’s lap was anything but a part of this larger lot. Here, a samplе of thirty-five indistinguishable packets was tested and found to contain cocaine. An inference that the entire lot contained cocaine was aрpropriate, regardless of whether the tested packet came from Fielder’s lap or the can on the floor. See
People v Kirchoff,
Defendant also argues that his presence in the room with the cocaine is not enough to prove possession. Something more than mere association must be shown to estаblish joint possession. The prosecution must show an additional independent factor linking the defendant with the drugs.
People v Davenport,
Defendant also suggests that the prosecution did not prove that he was not merely trying to dеstroy the contraband drugs. Defendant did not present this argument to the trial court, and it is therefore waived for appellate review. In any event, the issue is without mеrit. The possession of contraband for the mere purpose of destroying it is not unlawful.
People v Germaine,
in
Defendant next contends that thе prosecutor’s failure to provide defendant or his counsel with a witness list thirty days before trial, as required by MCL 767.40a(3); MSA 28.980(1X3), requires dismissal of the charges against him. We disagree.
MCL 767.40a(3); MSA 28.980(1X3) provides:
Not less than 30 days before the trial, the prosecuting attorney shall send to the defendant or his or her attorney a list of the witnesses the prosecuting attorney intends to produce at trial.
Defendant cites no authority for his argument that noncompliance with § 40a(3) requires automatic dismissal, and we can find none.
A trial сourt must exercise discretion in fashioning a remedy for noncompliance with a discover^
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statute, rule, order, or agreement.
People v Clark,
On Octobеr 24, 1988, the day of trial, defense counsel moved to have the case against defendant dismissed because she claimed that neither she nor defendant was served with a copy of the list of witnesses the prosecution intended to call at trial. It is noteworthy that counsel did not request an adjournment or any other reliеf short of dismissal to cure any perceived prejudice resulting from the failure to have the witness list in a timely fashion.
The prosecutor responded that he hаd given a witness list to counsel and the court on September 9, 1988, and that he had not been informed earlier that defense counsel had not received a copy of that list. In denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the case, the trial judge noted that all of the witnesses were police officers and that because defendant was not denied discovery she did not see how defendant could have been prejudiced. We also note that a copy of the prosecutor’s witness list, dated September 9, 1988, is contained in the lower court file.
Although she maintained that she had not received a witness list, defense counsel admitted that she had received discovery materials from the prosecutor. Moreover, all of the prosecutor’s witnesses were police officers who had participated in the arrest. Defendant clearly had access to the police report filed in this case, because it was used to cross-exаmine one of the police officers. Under these circumstances, even if there was noncompliance with the statute, we fail to see how defеndant *60 could have suffered prejudice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss.
iv
Defendant also contends that he is entitled to resеntencing because the trial court erred in scoring offense variable sixteen. Defendant claims that there is no indication of drug trafficking in the record which would have supported a score of fifteen for offense variable sixteen. We disagree.
A sentencing judge has discretion in determining the number of points to bе scored for any offense variables in the sentencing guidelines provided that there is evidence in the record which adequately supports a partiсular score.
People v
Day,
The evidence in the record is sufficient to uphold the court’s finding that circumstances indicated drug trafficking. When defendant was arrested, he was in joint possession of thirty-five packages of cocaine, a cutting agent, and a large amount of cash. The trial court did not err in scoring offense variable sixteen.
Affirmed.