Fоllowing a bench trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and retaining a financial transaction device without consent, MCL 750.157n(l). He was sentenced as а third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 12 to 25 years for the armed robbery and carjacking convictions and one to four years for the financial transaction device conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
At approximately 9:30 p.m. on December 17, 2004, a man wearing a tan hooded Carhartt jacket and jeans approached Patti Harris in a parking lot outside a drug store in Detroit. The man had a silver object that Harris believed was a gun. The man forced Harris into her Jeep, but she escаped and fled, and the man drove away with her purse, credit cards, cellular telephone, identification, and other items. Harris reported the crime to the police аpproximately 10 or 15 minutes later. At 1:00 a.m., Detroit Police Officer Kari Kammerzall found the Jeep outside a gas station and observed defendant wearing a hooded Carhartt jaсket and jeans. Kam-merzall observed defendant drop something into a garbage can, from which Harris’s keys were later recovered. Defendant was arrested and discoverеd to be in possession of several of Harris’s other items, including
her identification and Social Security card, as well as a silver butter knife. Defendant was interviewed by two police investigators; he told one of them that he was trying to broker a sale of the Jeep at the gasoline station, and he told the other that he came into possession of items belоnging to the victim from a group “hanging
Defendant first argues that the trial court deprived him of due process by coercing him into accepting a bench trial instead of a jury trial. We disagree.
The record shows that оn July 18, 2005, the trial court refused to accept a plea agreement because of defendant’s assertions of innocence. Defendant objected to the length of timе he would need to wait for a trial. The trial court expressed sympathy for defendant’s desire to go home, and noted that trial was scheduled for August 25, 2005, because the trial court had received the case from another courtroom and needed to schedule trial according to the court’s docket. However, the trial court explained that it would be possible “to handle this matter a lot sooner” if defendant was willing to accept a bench trial. The trial court agreed to a recess when defense counsel requestеd an opportunity to speak with defendant, but defendant interjected, “No, no, I want — I want to go home,” and indicated that he wished to accept the bench trial arrangement. Thе trial court personally questioned defendant to ascertain that he had been afforded an opportunity to speak with defense counsel regarding his waiver and that he was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to a jury trial.
It is clear from the record that defendant was not in any way coerced into accepting a bench trial. Furthermore, the trial court, pursuant tо MCR 6.402(B), clearly ascertained, “by addressing the defendant personally, that the defendant understands the right [to a trial by jury] and that the defendant voluntarily chooses to give up that right and to be tried by the court.” We find no clear error in the trial court’s determination that defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial.
People v Leonard,
Defendant next arguеs that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not move to suppress evidence of defendant’s statement to the secоnd police interviewer, Investigator Derek Duff. Defendant contends that his second interview violated his Miranda 1 rights and played a significant role in the trial court’s finding that defendant’s testimony was not credible. Specifically, defendant contends that his refusal to give a written statement to the first interviewer, Investigator Philip Wassenaar, precluded Investigator Duff from apрroaching him to conduct a second interview. We disagree.
In
Michigan v Mosley,
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that a merе refusal to reduce an oral statement to a written statement does not amount to the invocation of the right to remain silent. See
Crosby v State,
366 Md 518, 529-530;
Here, defendant actually gave an initial statement to Investigator Wassenaar and refused only to reduce that statement to writing. Therefore, the prevailing rule would appear to be that defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent. Neverthеless, Wassenaar treated defendant’s refusal to provide a written statement as an invocation of his right to remain silent and scrupulously honored that perceived invocation.
Mosley, supra
at 104;
Adams, supra
at 231. Defendant was not approached again until ten hours later, when Investigator Duff again advised defendant of his
Miranda
rights before commencing a second interview.
Slocum, supra
at 703. We note, by way of contrast, that if defendant had invoked his right tо an attorney, the second interview would have been precluded unless defendant himself initiated it.
People v Crusoe,
Defendant alternatively requests a remand for an evidentiary hearing. This Court denied defendant’s earlier motion to remand. Because defendant has not set forth any additional facts that would require development of a record to determine if defense counsel was ineffective, we again deny defendant’s rеquest for a remand. MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a); see also
People v Hernandez,
Affirmed.
Notes
Miranda v Arizona,
The Hawaii court discussed two cases. In one, the defendant had previously given a statement but refused to give another one with a tape recorder running; the second refusal constituted an invocation of the right to remain silent, precluding the prosecution from commenting at trial on that refusal.
State v Woods,
249 Neb 138;