THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DERMON LOUISE WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
[Crim. No. 21783]
Supreme Court of California
Dec. 31, 1981.
30 Cal.3d 470
Howard Goodman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Norman H. Sokolow and Howard J. Schwab, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Stanley M. Roden, District Attorney (Santa Barbara), and Gerald McC. Franklin, Deputy District Attorney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
BIRD, C. J.—May a trial court dismiss, pursuant to
I.
Appellant was charged with one count of violating
Two incidents are involved in this case. The first took place on December 11, 1978, when the home of Maggie Loney in Long Beach was burgled. According to Mrs. Loney,2 she answered a knock at her door about 10 p.m. A female responded and indicated she had been hit in the stomach and would like to use the phone. When Mrs. Loney opened the door, two males rushed in. The woman went over to the telephone and one of the men disappeared into a back room. Mrs. Loney went to investigate and was grabbed from behind by the other man. She was thrown to the floor and tied up with pieces of cloth torn from two of her dresses and a pillowslip. She yelled at the man not to hurt her; he responded that she had better shut her mouth or he would kill her.
Mrs. Loney lay on the floor until after the people left. She then worked herself free and discovered that many items had been taken
The second incident occurred on December 17, 1978. According to David Dickey, who lived with his 85-year-old mother in Long Beach, he heard a knock at the door about 10 p.m. A woman outside stated that she wanted to use the telephone for an emergency. When he opened the door, the woman and three other people entered the house. Mr. Dickey was knocked over the head with an iron and lost consciousness. When he came to, his legs and hands were tied and he had been beaten about the shoulders. He managed to reach the home of his neighbor, Mrs. Robinson, who untied him. He then returned home and found that various items, including television sets and dresses, had been taken. He identified appellant as the woman at the door.
After calling the police, Mrs. Robinson went next door and found the Dickey house in a shambles. She also discovered Mrs. Dickey in the back bedroom on the floor. There were spots of blood on Mrs. Dickey‘s chest and she complained that the front of her neck hurt. There were bindings around her arms, but Mrs. Robinson did not remember seeing any other bindings. She did recall Mrs. Dickey saying, “They tried to break my neck. Why did they do it?”
Mrs. Dickey died soon after the robbery. A deputy medical examiner for the coroner‘s office testified that there were two causes of death—a stab wound penetrating the chest and a blunt force injury causing a fracture of the odontoid process of the second cervical vertebra. The victim had been stabbed below the right armpit, the weapon penetrating four inches into the chest. The other injury had resulted in compression of the spinal cord. The medical examiner testified at first that “[c]onsiderable” force was necessary to break the odontoid process, a projection from the second vertebra upon which the skull rotates. Later, however, he stated that “[n]ot a great deal of force” was required to cause the injury. This was in recognition of Mrs. Dickey‘s age and the brittleness of her bones. Each injury in itself was sufficient to cause death.
There was severe bruising around the neck and a ligature-type imprint on the back of the neck, according to the medical examiner‘s testimony. He defined ligature as “[a]ny rope-like, flexible instrument.”
William Collette, a Long Beach police officer, testified that appellant made a statement to him on January 12, 1979, in which she admitted participating in both crimes.3 According to this statement, she had met a man known as “Fast Eddie”4 shortly before these events. Soon after they met, Eddie moved in with her and her two children. One evening, he told her that he had “pulled a job” with someone else. This occurred before the Loney burglary.
On December 11, 1978, she was walking near the Loney residence with Eddie, her daughter Nini, and Nini‘s teenage boyfriend David. They decided they needed money and would obtain it by taking items from the Loney home. They quickly devised the plan which resulted in Mrs. Loney opening her front door. Appellant was the woman who knocked on the door. She did not intend to take anything when she entered the home, but subsequently searched the living room for valuables. She did not find or take anything. However, Nini found about $200. Appellant did receive some money from the sale of a television set taken from the home.
Officer Collette further testified that appellant told him about the second incident. That time, the robbery was planned in advance. Nini suggested the Dickeys because she thought they had money. The group decided to bring pieces of cloth to tie up the victims. They tore up a bedsheet and braided it into ropes. Besides the four people who had participated in the earlier episode, a man known as “Smooth” was the driver of the getaway vehicle in the second robbery. Appellant obtained entry in a manner similar to that utilized at the Loney residence.
According to appellant‘s statement, Eddie came in with her and asked for a glass of water. When Mr. Dickey handed Eddie a glass, Eddie and David jumped him and hit him with an iron. She said that she did not see this occur, but Eddie had informed her of it later. Appellant proceeded to a back bedroom where she found a woman. She placed
Appellant went on to inform Officer Collette that she started staying at her sister‘s home in Los Angeles rather than her own home in Long Beach shortly after the incident. On December 19, 1978, she learned that Mrs. Dickey had died. On December 30, 1978, she came to Long Beach where she met Eddie, who told her that Nini had been arrested. She called the police station to confirm this, giving her true name but a false address. She and Eddie then decided to go to San Antonio, Texas.
They went to the bus station and bought tickets, but Eddie fell asleep waiting for the bus. Appellant cashed in the tickets, bought one ticket for Memphis, where her mother lived, and left Eddie behind. She spent one week in Memphis with her mother and told her what had happened. Her mother told appellant to return to Los Angeles and turn herself in. Appellant did so, arriving in Los Angeles at 5 a.m. on January 12th. She walked to the police station and waited until Officer Collette arrived at approximately 8 a.m.
Appellant‘s testimony at trial was in substantial conformity with her statement to Officer Collette. However, she stated that she had participated in the criminal ventures because she was afraid of Eddie. She admitted that Eddie had never hit or quarrelled with her, but claimed that he had once threatened to kill Nini and told her he would do so if Nini did not go along with the second robbery. She further claimed that Eddie gave her drugs, including heroin, which she had taken on the night of the Dickey robbery.
Appellant testified that she had found Mrs. Dickey in the back bedroom, getting out of bed and hollering. When Eddie yelled at her to quiet the old woman, she put her hand over Mrs. Dickey‘s mouth and held her down in an attempt to do so. She stated that she did this so that Eddie would not kill Mrs. Dickey. She then put one braid in Mrs. Dickey‘s mouth and secured it with a second strip of cloth. She did not
On the murder charge, the jury was instructed solely on first degree felony murder. (CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and 8.27 (aider and abettor).) They were instructed to find specific intent only as to the underlying robbery and burglary. (CALJIC No. 3.31.) Although special circumstances were charged and found, the prosecutor did not seek the death penalty and no penalty hearing was held. (See
At the sentencing hearing, the court stated its opinion that life imprisonment without possibility of parole was appropriate for Eddie Palmer because he had armed himself and stabbed the victim. (See fn. 4, ante.) The court continued, “Insofar as this defendant is concerned, the evidence appears that she was one of the persons who planned the operation, she was the person who applied one ligature to the mouth of the victim and behind the neck. [¶] Now, by the testimony of the doctor it appears because of the age of the victim and the fragility of the neck bones that the application caused a fracture in one of the processes of the neck which, in turn, put pressure on the spinal cord. [¶] This doctor without dispute said that as to cause of death, without medical intervention either the stab wound and/or the application of ligature and fracture with the pressure on the spinal cord together or separately would ultimately have brought the death of the lady. [¶] But on a scaling, I feel that on culpability this defendant was much less culpable than the defendant Eddie Palmer.
“My desire legally would be to sentence this lady and eliminate by staying the execution of the special circumstances and eliminate the without possibility of parole. I do not believe that looking at the Penal Code and the intent of the Legislature and as interpreted by the Appellate Courts, I do not believe I have that power. So I will have to sentence as I did with Eddie Palmer.” The court thereupon sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
II.
Appellant contends that the trial court did have the authority to dismiss the special circumstances findings under
In a series of cases commencing with People v. Burke (1956) 47 Cal.2d 45, this court has considered the scope of the trial court‘s authority to dismiss pursuant to
Defense counsel requested that the court strike the prior conviction for the purpose of sentencing. The court did so and sentenced the defendant to a term in the county jail. On the defendant‘s appeal from the conviction, the state argued that the trial court had erred.
This court held that
Nonetheless, the state argued that dismissal was improper because the statute required that the defendant “shall be imprisoned in the state prison....” (Id., at p. 51; italics added.) It was contended that the language of the statute revealed that “the Legislature intended to take from the court the power to dismiss or strike a charge of prior conviction if the defendant admits the charge.” (Ibid.) The state claimed that other statutes (and the cases interpreting them), which purported to require certain punishment or action by the trial court, were analogous. (Id., at p. 52.)
This court rejected the claim and held that the language of these statutes was insufficient to preclude the exercise of the court‘s power to dismiss under
Thereafter, the Legislature specifically set down the requirement in former
The four-to-three decision of Sidener was overruled by a unanimous court in People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89. This court noted that “... [n]o decision, and no legislation, prior to the adoption of
“When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature. Just as the fact of prosecutorial discretion prior to charging a criminal offense does not imply prosecutorial discretion to convict without a judicial determination of guilt, discretion to forego prosecution does not imply discretion to sentence without a judicial determination of those factors which the Legislature has never denied are within the judicial power to determine and which relate to punishment. The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay for its exercise.” (Ibid.)
After Sidener but prior to Tenorio, this court considered the validity of a trial court‘s order dismissing an entire action following a conviction for two counts of robbery. In People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968) 69 Cal.2d 491, the trial court stated that its dismissal was based on insufficient evidence to support the convictions and a violation of the right to counsel under United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218. This court upheld the trial court and found that “the discretion of the judge [under
In Howard, this court noted the policies served by
“A determination whether to dismiss in the interests of justice after a verdict involves a balancing of many factors, including the weighing of the evidence indicative of guilt or innocence, the nature of the crime involved, the fact that the defendant has or has not been incarcerated in prison awaiting trial and the length of such incarceration, the possible harassment and burdens imposed upon the defendant by a retrial, and the likelihood, if any, that additional evidence will be presented upon a retrial. When the balance falls clearly in favor of the defendant, a trial court not only may but should exercise the powers granted to him by the Legislature and grant a dismissal in the interests of justice.” (Id., at p. 505.)
The Howard rule of statutory construction was applied in People v. Dorsey (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 15. There, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon. The jury found that he had used a firearm in the commission of the offenses. (Former
The court also discussed the policy served by
The rule of statutory construction developed in Burke and reiterated in Howard and Dorsey is clear,
In People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, this court found that the trial court did not have the authority to strike a use finding in order to place an otherwise ineligible defendant on probation, because the Legislature had precluded such an exercise of judicial discretion.
Although
The Tanner decision did not purport to overturn Burke, Howard, or Dorsey. Indeed, the opinion cited Burke for the proposition that “[s]ection 1385 has been construed to provide judicial power to dismiss or strike—within the court‘s discretion—allegations which, if proven, would enhance punishment for alleged criminal conduct.” (Id., at p. 518.) Furthermore, it is clear from the opinion that the mere use of mandatory language in the statute does not indicate that
Turning to the statute before this court,
These provisions constitute the relevant portions of the death penalty statute. There is nothing which differentiates these sections from the statutes examined in Burke and Dorsey, since they also provided for a particular sentence based on the finding of additional factors. Unlike former
The holding in Tanner does not compel a contrary result.
There is no indication of contrary legislative intent. The present statute was passed by initiative in 1978. In the voters pamphlet for that election, the Legislative Analyst stated, “Generally speaking, the law requires a sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole when an individual is convicted of first degree murder under one or more of the following special circumstances [¶] The proposition would also expand and modify the list of special circumstances which
The legislative history of the 1977 statute is similarly silent on this issue. Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a punishment for murder is discussed in only one paragraph of a 14-page analysis of Senate Bill No. 155 prepared by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. It reads, “Until now the penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole has been rarely used in California. This bill would make it the alternate punishment for all crimes for which the death penalty is authorized. Should the death penalty provisions be held invalid, all those already sentenced to death would be sentenced instead to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Thus, the bill, if enacted, would result in an increasing number of prison inmates incarcerated with no hope of eventual release.” (Bill Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 155 (as amended Feb. 17, 1977) by Sen. Com. on Judiciary, at pp. 8-9.)8
This paragraph suggests that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was written into the law, in part, because the Legislature believed the death penalty provisions might well be held unconstitutional. There is nothing in this passage which suggests that the Legislature contemplated the trial court‘s power to dismiss under
The next issue raised by respondent is whether there is something unique to this death penalty statute which prevents the application of
In a series of five cases handed down in July 1976, the United States Supreme Court ruled two similar statutes unconstitutional because they did not provide for consideration of mitigating circumstances or for guided discretion on the part of the sentencing authority. (Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153; Proffitt v. Florida (1976) 428 U.S. 242; Jurek v. Texas (1976) 428 U.S. 262; Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280 [statute unconstitutional]; Roberts v. Louisiana (1976) 428 U.S. 325 [statute unconstitutional].)
This court discussed those cases in Rockwell. “[S]tatutes providing for imposition of the death penalty may neither make that penalty mandatory nor give the jury or judge charged with determining the penalty absolute discretion in the choice of life or death, but must provide standards so that the sentencing authority will ‘focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.’ (Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 153, 199.) A statute which enumerates aggravating circumstances, one or more of which must be found as a prerequisite to imposition of the death penalty but which does not provide for ‘meaningful opportunity for consideration of mitigating factors presented by circumstances of the particular crime or by the attributes of the individual offender’ (Roberts v. Louisiana, supra, 428 U.S. 325, 333-334) permits the imposition of capital punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment‘s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, as does a statute which makes death a mandatory punishment for specified categories of murder. (Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. 280, 305.) ‘[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances
The death penalty statute considered in Rockwell suffered from the same infirmities as those struck down in Woodson and Roberts, supra. Death was the prescribed punishment once a special circumstance allegation was found to be true. No provision was made for individualized sentencing.
The state argued in Rockwell that
This argument was rejected for a variety of reasons. “First, no provision is made under
“Even if we assume that such a procedure is sanctioned by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, however, neither
First, this court noted that
Since
The language of the 1973 statute clearly demonstrated an intent by the Legislature that imposition of the death penalty be mandatory. No provision was made for consideration of mitigating factors or for the striking of special circumstance allegations.
In addition, the history of the statute bore out the fact that this was the Legislature‘s intent. Provisions which would have permitted consideration of mitigating factors were deleted from Senate Bill No. 450 before it was codified into
There is no indication that the drafters of the current death penalty law believed the death penalty statute would be ruled unconstitutional
Were this court to find that the present statute retained the design and purpose of the 1973 legislation, the statute would have to be held unconstitutional for the reasons expressed in Rockwell. Thus, the history and intent which were central to the inquiry in Rockwell are not only irrelevant here, they are necessarily absent.
Furthermore, the application of
Once it is recognized that the history and intent behind the 1973 legislation are inapposite to the current law, only the bare words of the statute are left. As noted in People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d 45 and People v. Dorsey, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d 15, the use of the word “shall” in the statute is insufficient to evidence an intent that the trial court is precluded from exercising its discretionary powers under
Trial courts will exercise this power in a careful and thoughtful manner. The wise use of this power will promote the administration of justice by ensuring that persons are sentenced based on the particular facts of the offense and all the circumstances. It enables the punishment to fit the crime as well as the perpetrator.
As noted earlier, appellant was tried on a felony-murder theory. There was no requirement that the jury find that she intended to cause death or even that she personally committed the acts resulting in death. The evidence produced at the trial certainly does not indicate such intent. Furthermore, the underlying felonies, used to establish a murder and then to raise the murder to first degree, were used a third time to establish special circumstances. Although appellant has not challenged the use of the felony-murder concept in this manner, these factors further support the trial court‘s conclusion.
III.
Next, appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that her waiver of Miranda12 rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The record does not support this claim.
Officer Collette testified that appellant was brought to his desk at approximately 8:10 a.m. on January 12, 1979. He asked her what she wanted and she replied that she wanted to speak with him concerning her involvement in some “cases.” He asked her, “What cases?” Appellant stated, “A robbery and a murder.”
Officer Collette took appellant into an interview room and read to her from Los Angeles PD Form 254: “You have the right to remain silent. [¶] Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court
Reading from the form, Officer Collette asked, “Do you understand each of these rights I‘ve explained to you?” Appellant answered, “Yes.” The officer asked, “Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?” Appellant replied, “Yes, I want to talk.”
On the other hand, appellant claims she went to the police station to inquire about her daughter, who had been arrested some two weeks earlier. However, this claim is not supported by the record. Rather, the evidence shows that appellant returned to Los Angeles at the prompting of her mother, who told her to turn herself in. Appellant patiently waited three hours at the police station for Officer Collette to arrive and then told him she wanted to talk about “[a] robbery and a murder.”
Appellant concedes that Officer Collette properly advised her of her rights under Miranda. She contends, however, that the waiver was invalid because she was not aware of the possible penalties for murder, robbery, and burglary or of the intricacies of the felony-murder rule. No authority is cited for this proposition. Although a valid waiver is more likely to be found where the police have provided the fullest possible information, such information is not necessary in every case in order to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. There is nothing in the record to support the contention that appellant did not understand her rights as they were read to her by Officer Collette.
“‘In determining whether there has been a waiver of constitutional rights, the issue must be resolved on the whole record [citations], and its resolution must depend upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case under consideration, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. [Citation.]‘” (People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218, 238, quoting from People v. Brockman (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1008.) The prosecution has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that a suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. (People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 701, judgment vacated and cause re-
“‘[T]he particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case under consideration‘” (People v. Duren, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 238) support the trial court‘s finding that appellant did knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her rights under Miranda. The confession was properly admitted.
IV.
This case is remanded to the trial court for exercise of the court‘s discretion to determine whether or not there is a basis for dismissing the finding of two special circumstances. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Newman, J., and Broussard, J., concurred.
RICHARDSON, J.—I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it affirms defendant‘s conviction of first degree murder, burglary and robbery. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority‘s reversal as to penalty. In my view, the trial court very properly sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
The 1978 death penalty law explicitly and unambiguously provides that “[t]he penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole in any case in which one or more ... special circumstances has been charged and specially found ....” (
The majority‘s rationale is as follows: Trial courts are vested with a general power to dismiss an action in furtherance of justice (
Such reasoning is faulty. First of all, the majority‘s statement of the applicable rule of statutory construction is directly contrary to our own recent holdings in People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 518-520, and Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420, 442-443. In each of these cases, the applicable statutes imposed specific penalties for particular crimes without any express withholding of the power to dismiss or reduce those penalties under
Thus, in Tanner the Legislature, without mentioning
Rockwell is even closer on point, involving as it did interpretation of the penalty provisions of a death penalty law comparable in all perti-
The majority herein does not purport to overrule either Tanner or Rockwell, but rather attempts to distinguish those cases on their facts. Accordingly, despite the majority‘s incorrect recital of the applicable rule of statutory construction (requiring a “specific” or “explicit” reference to
As I have noted, in Rockwell we focused upon (1) the mandatory language of the penalty provision, (2) the omission of any reference therein to
1. Mandatory language. In Rockwell, we stressed that the 1973 act required that a person found guilty of first degree murder “shall suffer death” (former
Similarly, the 1978 act involved here also uses mandatory language substantially identical to the 1973 act. The 1978 act provided that “The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole in any case in which one or more ... special circumstances has been charged and specially found ... to be true.” (
2. Omission of reference to
3. Legislative history. In Rockwell, our conclusion regarding the nonapplicability of
It is significant, in my view, that the legislative analyst‘s commentary which was given to the voters before the election states that the 1978 measure would “expand and modify the list of special circumstances which require either the death penalty or life without the possibility of parole.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978) p. 32, italics added.) There is absolutely no mention made of any trial court power to dismiss or strike a special circumstances finding “in the furtherance of justice.” Equally significant is the argument in favor of the initiative measure which stresses to the voters that the measure will provide a “new, tough death penalty law,” and indeed “the nation‘s toughest, most effective death penalty law.” (Id., at p. 34.) It is exceedingly doubtful that those who approved the initiative measure (72 percent in favor and 28 percent opposed; see People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 124-125 (dis. opn.)) reasonably anticipated that the seemingly mandatory penalties for first degree murder with special circumstances could be so readily reduced or modified at the discretion of a trial judge by the simple process of striking the jury‘s special circumstances finding. To the contrary, following such a finding, the trial judge‘s sole discretion under the act affects the penalty only, and only to the extent of authorizing imposition of life without possibility of parole in the place of the death penalty.
For all of the foregoing reasons, in my opinion, the majority seriously errs in reading into the 1978 law an implied authority to dismiss or strike a special circumstances finding. This is not what the people of this state thought they were approving when they adopted the 1978 ini-
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Kaus, J., concurred.
The petitions of both parties for a rehearing were denied February 3, 1982. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.