People v. WilliamsPeople v. Williams
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant Jacquez Williams filed a pretrial detention1 appeal under
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2 ¶ 3 Defendant was arrested on April 11, 2024. He was charged with criminal sexual assault by force under section 11-1.20 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code)
¶ 4 A pretrial detention hearing occurred on April 13, 2024. The State‘s proffer showed that on May 5, 2023, at around 8 p.m., defendant and two other men accompanying him approached a group of four women, one of whom was K.W. The two groups engaged in conversation, with defendant and K.W. speaking to one another. Defendant was informed by K.W.‘s friend that she was 17 and that she was intoxicated. At some point, he put his number in her phone. Defendant then offered K.W. a ride home, and they both proceeded to his vehicle. When K.W. tried to sit in the front passenger seat, defendant pushed her into the back seat and closed the door. He attempted to remove her shorts, and K.W. physically resisted. Defendant eventually removed K.W.‘s shorts and underwear and then inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent. During this encounter, defendant became agitated by the repeated ringing of K.W.‘s cell phone. Following the encounter, he instructed K.W. to get out of his car, after which they returned to the larger group.
¶ 5 Upon their return, K.W. immediately made an outcry to one of her friends. She then went to that friend‘s relative‘s house, after which she stayed with her boyfriend for the night. On May 7, 2023, K.W. went to the hospital, where she had a criminal sexual assault kit conducted. She filed a police report that same day. The criminal sexual assault kit ultimately revealed three DNA profiles: K.W.‘s DNA, a major male DNA, and a minor male DNA. The DNA has not been identified as belonging to defendant or any other specific individual.
¶ 6 On June 15, 2023, defendant was identified through a photo array as the offender, both by K.W. and the friend to whom she had outcried on the night of the assault. Their identifications were based on observations from the night of the incident, as well as FaceTime calls that defendant made or attempted to make to K.W., which her friend observed.
¶ 7 The State argued that no conditions could mitigate the risk defendant posed because “[t]his was a stranger attack.” Although admitting that defendant had no criminal history, the State argued that in this case, he “was on the prowl, looking for a victim, and he saw the victim as nothing more than an opportunity.” The State further noted that electronic monitoring does not have “real time” capability to control defendant‘s “whereabouts” and that he still has 16 hours of movement while on monitoring.
¶ 8 Defendant disputed the characterization of the encounter between him and K.W. Defendant argued that he was not present at 31st Street beach in May 2023. However, he acknowledged being at the beach in June, and he described the encounter occurring at the time as consensual. Defendant did not commit the assault in May 2023 because he did not meet K.W. until June, when she identified him. When defendant and K.W. returned to the group after the encounter, they stayed with the group at the beach for three hours. According to defendant, K.W. contacted the mother of his children and told her that she had sex with defendant.
¶ 9 Defense counsel emphasized defendant‘s lack of criminal history and violent background. Defendant was also a high school graduate and worked at McCormick Place for 10 years. He has five children.
¶ 10 The trial court found K.W.‘s statements credible where she made an immediate
¶ 11 Defense counsel requested that defendant be allowed to present witnesses at the next court hearing. The trial court stated that defendant “has the right to review every court date” and that it was defense counsel‘s “prerogative” to present witnesses if she wished to do so. The court informed defendant that he had a right to appeal the detention ruling within 14 days but noted that the “law changes on April 15th.”
¶ 12 On April 26, 2024, defendant filed a motion for relief under amended
¶ 13 The hearing for this motion took place on May 3, 2024. Defendant brought two witnesses to the hearing, Shaquille Bryant and Shaquan Martin, whom he intended to call. They also provided affidavits, which were included in defendant‘s motion for relief.2 The trial court questioned whether affidavits should be considered at the hearing, acknowledging that the rule “doesn‘t really give us a lot of direction on how these Motions for Relief are heard.” The court allowed defendant to call his witnesses. After the State repeated its proffer from the April 13, 2024, hearing, the witnesses testified.
¶ 14 Bryant testified that he was defendant‘s cousin and he was 31 years old. On May 5, 2023, around 7 p.m., he was with defendant and Martin at 31st Street beach. They talked to a group of four women at the beach. No one stated that they were under 18 years of age. Defendant left with one of the women toward defendant‘s vehicle. Bryant and Martin “paired off” with the other women. When defendant returned with the woman, they were “calm,” and they walked to a grassy area near the beach and “huddled up.” Bryant and defendant left the beach around 11 p.m.
¶ 15 Martin testified that defendant was a “cousin of the family,” although Martin was not related to defendant. Martin was 28 years old. He, Bryant, and defendant went to 31st Street beach on May 5, 2023, where they talked to a group of women who were “partying [and] listening to music.” He did not know any of them were under 18 years old. Defendant and K.W. left at some point and then returned. They were “getting along well.” He and Bryant “paired off” with the other women.
¶ 16 Defense counsel argued that the encounter between defendant and K.W. in defendant‘s car was consensual, pointing to the witnesses’ testimony that, upon her return from defendant‘s vehicle, K.W. expressed no immediate outcry and the group continued “partying” for at least 5 to 15 more minutes. Additionally, there was no evidence that K.W. suffered physical
¶ 17 The State argued that Bryant‘s and Martin‘s testimony corroborated K.W.‘s account of the incident and did not contradict her claim that defendant forcefully assaulted her in his vehicle. Furthermore, K.W.‘s lack of physical injury did not indicate that an assault never occurred. As for defendant‘s dangerousness, the State argued that defendant seized an opportunity with a “vulnerable” 17 year old. His “actions on that day make him a danger.” No conditions could mitigate this danger because electronic monitoring allows for two days of unrestricted movement.
¶ 18 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant‘s motion for relief. It found that the State had shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant “used force in penetrating the victim.” The court further stated that “taking into consideration the use of violence and force, the isolation, the opportunistic nature, the[se] are very cunning and opportunistic decisions [by defendant].” The trial court thus found that the State proved that defendant posed “a real and present threat to the safety of members of the community, specifically, vulnerable females.”
¶ 19 As to whether the State presented sufficient evidence that no conditions exist that could mitigate defendant‘s danger to the community, the trial court acknowledged that “we have no background” and that it has been “approximately a year” between the occurrence and defendant‘s arrest. As for the mitigation of risk, the court stated to defendant, “I don‘t have the ability to confine you to your home 24/7, in a way that the Cook County Department of Corrections could.” The court continued:
“And if my intention is to keep you away from the community, to keep you away from the opportunities that you were afforded in this instance—because it is a pretty quick decision to stop and talk to these teenagers, so for me to protect members of the community, would mean that I couldn‘t allow you to be in the community, but there are no conditions that allow me to do that. So there are no conditions that I could order that would mitigate the danger that you pose.”
¶ 20 Defendant filed his notice of appeal that same day, indicating that he sought to appeal the May 3, 2024, order.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 ¶ 22 Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code provides that “[a]ll defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release.”
¶ 23 Two days later, on April 15, 2024, amended
“As a prerequisite to appeal, the party taking the appeal shall first present to the trial court a written motion requesting the same relief to be sought on appeal and the grounds for such relief. The trial court shall promptly hear and decide the motion for relief. Upon appeal, any issue not raised in the motion for relief, other than errors occurring for the first time at the hearing on the motion for relief, shall be deemed waived.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. April 15, 2024).
¶ 24 Accordingly, on April 26, 2024, defendant filed a motion for relief under
¶ 25 First, we consider the State‘s argument that the May 3, 2024, hearing was an improper full detention hearing rather than a hearing on the motion. It contends that a full detention hearing was unnecessary and that the hearing should have instead proceeded as a motion for reconsideration. Citing People v. Wynne, 2024 IL App (1st) 240516-U, the State argues that the initial hearing encompassed the findings necessary for a continued hearing and that a second full hearing under these circumstances is a nullity. The State therefore contends that evidence and arguments made at the May 3, 2024, hearing are not relevant to this appeal.
¶ 26 In Wynne, the second full hearing was held on the defendant‘s petition for release, which he filed on February 20, 2024, after the January 2, 2024, order that denied him pretrial release. Thus, the second hearing was considered a continued detention hearing. These hearings only determine the propriety of the defendant‘s continued detention at subsequent hearings. See
¶ 27 Here,
¶ 28 When construing a supreme court rule, we ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters by giving the language used its plain and ordinary meaning. Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 2017 IL 121297, ¶ 22. Admittedly, the scope of a hearing under
¶ 29 Following the plain language of the rule, we find that a proper
¶ 30 Before deciding the merits of defendant‘s appeal, we must also consider the appropriate standard of review. Here, a proper
¶ 31 We agree with the reasoning in Reed and Saucedo as set forth in those cases. Therefore, for elements reviewed under the manifest weight standard, a finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). For the third element, the trial court abuses its discretion if its finding is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or if no reasonable person would agree with the
¶ 32 Defendant first contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident, or the presumption is great, that the defendant used force to sexually assault K.W.
¶ 33 The evidence presented before the trial court established that K.W. and defendant had intercourse in his car, and that two days later K.W. had a sexual assault kit performed. The State asserted that the encounter was not consensual, as evidenced by K.W.‘s outcry upon her return to the group and her submission to testing under the sexual assault kit. Although defendant claimed the encounter was consensual, the trial court‘s assessment of K.W. as a credible witness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 34 Defendant further argues that the State failed to present any evidence that proved he used force or threat of force during his encounter with K.W. and that any evidence presented of K.W.‘s outcry, as well as her decision to have a sexual assault kit performed, was circumstantial and insufficient. He also argues that the DNA recovered from the sexual assault kit was not explicitly tied to him and was inconclusive in nature.
¶ 35 We are mindful that the State‘s burden here is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 13. Also, defendant‘s argument that the State‘s proffer was insufficient to show that he committed the assault, because the evidence was circumstantial, is not well taken. By way of analogy, circumstantial evidence is admissible in criminal cases if it is relevant, more probative than prejudicial, and does not violate other evidentiary rules. See People v. Levy, 204 Ill. App. 3d 201, 205 (1990). As such, a circumstantial proffer of what the evidence will be can certainly support the trial court‘s determination here that the proof is evident, or the presumption is great, that defendant committed the offense. The trial court‘s determination that the State met its burden on this element was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 36 Defendant next contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. As support, he cites his lack of criminal background and close ties to his family. He also argues that he engaged in no criminal conduct between the time of the incident on May 5, 2023, and his arrest on April 11, 2024.
¶ 37 To assess this element, the legislature provided a list of factors that, while not comprehensive, guide courts in determining whether a defendant poses a real and present threat.
¶ 38 The evidence presented before the trial court showed that defendant had no criminal history, was actively employed, and maintained a relationship with his children. As for the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the State‘s proffer detailed defendant‘s actions in approaching K.W., isolating her, and then forcing himself on her while they were separated from the rest of the group. The trial court relied on these facts, along with K.W.‘s young age at the time of the offense, to find that defendant posed a real and present threat
¶ 39 Defendant‘s final contention is that the trial court erred in denying him pretrial release where the State failed to establish that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the risk he posed. We review this element using an abuse of discretion standard. A trial court abuses its discretion if the court‘s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or if no reasonable person would agree with the court. Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232020, ¶ 36.
¶ 40 There are multiple factors that trial courts consider when determining whether mitigating conditions of pretrial release are appropriate. These include but are not limited to
“(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant, except that the court may consider the admissibility of any evidence sought to be excluded;
(3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including:
(A) the defendant‘s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, history [sic] criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state;
(4) the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, that would be posed by the defendant‘s release, if applicable, as required under paragraph (7.5) of Section 4 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act;
(5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed by the defendant‘s release, if applicable[.]”
725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022).
¶ 41 At the hearing, defendant emphasized his lack of criminal history, as reflected in his public safety assessment (PSA). Defendant‘s PSA stated he was a 1 out of 6 on both the “New Criminal Activity Scale” and the “Failure to Appear Scale.” He additionally emphasized that he had made no attempt to contact K.W. in the extended time between the encounter and his arrest. The State focused on the “nature and randomness” of his offense as the reason no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat defendant posed. It additionally argued that electronic monitoring could be “walked away from, cut off, or removed” and that it allowed for two days of unrestricted movement.
¶ 42 In considering whether any discretionary conditions could be imposed, the trial court emphasized K.W.‘s age and characterized defendant‘s actions as an attempt to “prey” on that young person on a beach. In its written order, the trial court reasoned that, given the nature of the offense, as well as the fact that it involved contact with a teenager in a public place, neither electronic monitoring nor curfew or GPS could mitigate defendant‘s threat.
¶ 43 Defendant argues that the “bare allegations that [he] has committed a violent
¶ 44 Unlike Stock, the State in this case provided argument, beyond the bare fact that a sexual assault occurred, to support that no conditions could mitigate defendant‘s danger to the community or K.W. if he was released. In finding that no conditions could mitigate defendant‘s threat, the trial court weighed “several factors” in favor of defendant and against, and it explained in detail why no conditions of release could safeguard the victim or the community. Accordingly, we find that the trial court‘s determination on this element was not an abuse of discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 ¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 47 Affirmed.
¶ 48 JUSTICE LAMPKIN, specially concurring:
¶ 49 I concur in the judgment affirming the trial court‘s decision to deny defendant pretrial release. However, I write separately to respectfully disagree with the standard of review being applied in this case.
¶ 50 This appeal presents us, not only with the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to justify defendant‘s pretrial detention, but how we should review the trial court‘s denial of defendant‘s
¶ 51 JUSTICE VAN TINE, specially concurring:
¶ 52 I agree with affirming the trial court‘s orders imposing pretrial detention and denying defendant‘s
¶ 53 ¶ 54 My chief concern is that defendant improperly used a
¶ 55 Defendant used the
¶ 56 In this case, defendant should have asked the trial court to commence and continue, or simply continue, the initial pretrial detention hearing so he could present witnesses instead of filing a
¶ 57 Therefore, I would hold that a defendant may not use a
II. Standard of Review
¶ 58 ¶ 59 I also disagree with the lead opinion as to the applicable standard of review. Defendant appeals both the initial pretrial detention ruling and the denial of his
III. Pretrial Detention Ruling
¶ 60 ¶ 61 Finally, I write to clarify why pretrial detention is appropriate in this case. The alleged facts of this incident suggest that defendant took the opportunity to prey on an intoxicated teenage girl and used the offer of a ride home to sexually assault her. The fact that defendant is a 31-year-old man means that he may appear to be a trustworthy authority figure to young people and that he could exploit a similar opportunity again in the future. The scenario that the State claims occurred here would be relatively easy for defendant to repeat if he were not detained, even if he were on electronic monitoring. That is why Judge Beach ordered pretrial detention. I agree with that decision.
¶ 62 Defendant‘s primary argument is that, pursuant to Stock, the trial court could not base its finding that he poses a threat to the safety of individuals or the community order solely on the allegations in this case. Stock held that the State failed to establish that no conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat defendant posed to the community because it proffered no evidence to support that conclusion and relied solely on the allegation that the defendant committed aggravated battery in that case. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 17. I agree with the holding of Stock in general, but that does not equate to error in this case. In the case at bar, the State did not merely recite the elements of criminal sexual assault and ask that defendant be detained on that basis alone. Rather, the State argued that defendant‘s alleged behavior created a risk that he
¶ 63 People v. Carpenter, 2024 IL App (1st) 240037, guides my analysis. In that case, the 29-year-old defendant was charged with two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child based on allegedly engaging in oral sex with a 5-year-old. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. The State proffered that the complaining witness‘s sister corroborated some aspects of her story, there was a “strong probability” that defendant‘s DNA was found in the complaining witness‘s underwear, and the defendant admitted that the complaining witness performed oral sex on him. Id. ¶ 4. The trial court ordered pretrial detention. Id. ¶ 6. We affirmed the trial court‘s finding of dangerousness, rejecting his contention that “a defendant can only be detained based on facts other than the crime charged.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 14. On the contrary, “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged is the prime consideration in determining the conditions of release, if any (
¶ 64 Accordingly, I agree with affirming the trial court‘s rulings granting the State‘s petition for pretrial detention and denying defendant‘s
People v. Williams, 2024 IL App (1st) 241013
| Decision Under Review: | Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 24-CR-04602-01; the Hon. Mary Cay Marubio and the Hon. Charles Beach II, Judges, presiding. |
| Attorneys for Appellant: | Ari Williams, of Ari Williams Law, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant. |
| Attorneys for Appellee: | Kimberly M. Foxx, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee Farbman, Assistant State‘s Attorney, of counsel), for the People. |