In re WILLIAM M., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. William M., Appellee)
No. 93760
Supreme Court of Illinois
Opinion filed June 19, 2003
206 Ill. 2d 595
Similarly, the appellate court in this case found that Ledesma gave a valid general consent permitting police to search the vehicle and its contents. Even though Ledesma later inquired as to the purpose of the search, and according to police testimony “hem-hawed around,” he never limited or withdrew his consent. We agree and hold that the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the search of Ledesma‘s vehicle. Because we find that Ledesma consented to the search of his vehicle, we need not reach defendants’ arguments regarding the propriety of the use of the narcotics detection canine.
CONCLUSION
We find that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence in this matter. We therefore affirm the appellate court‘s decision reversing the trial court and remanding this cause for further proceedings.
Affirmed.
McMORROW, C.J., joined by FREEMAN and RARICK, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
FREEMAN, J., joined by McMORROW, C.J., and RARICK, J., also concurring in part and dissenting in part.
James E. Ryan and Lisa Madigan, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Edward D. Smith, State‘s Attorney, of Kankakee (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Anne S. Bagby and Lisa Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten and John X. Breslin, of the Office of the State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, and Deidre A. Donnellan, of Plainfield, of counsel), for the People.
Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Thomas A. Karalis, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
At issue in this case is the issue left open in In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313 (2001): whether a postadmission
BACKGROUND
The State filed a four-count delinquency petition against respondent, William M., in the circuit court of Kankakee County charging him with burglary and criminal trespass to two automobiles. On October 2, 2000, respondent appeared in court with his appointed counsel. Respondent‘s counsel informed the court that pursuant to a plea agreement, respondent would admit to the burglary allegations in exchange for the dismissal of the criminal trespass charges, as well as the dismissal of an unrelated domestic battery charge. The trial court admonished respondent that an admission waived his right to remain silent, to require the State to prove the charges, to a hearing, to present evidence and witnesses, and to cross-examine the State‘s witnesses. The trial court also informed respondent that the burglary charges would have been Class 2 felonies if he had been charged as an adult. Respondent acknowledged that he had not been coerced and was acting voluntarily. The trial court entered a finding of delinquency and adjudicated respondent a ward of the court.
On November 15, 2000, a dispositional hearing was held. Respondent was committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, for an indeterminate period. The trial court advised respondent of his right to appeal and further advised respondent that if he planned to appeal, he had to file a motion to withdraw his plea or a motion to reconsider his sentence within 30 days. At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, respondent‘s counsel requested the filing of a notice of appeal and the appointment of the appellate defender. The trial court granted both requests. The clerk of the court filed the
On appeal, respondent argued that the adjudication of delinquency must be vacated because the record failed to show that he was aware of the consequences of his admissions or that he was informed of the potential dispositions he could receive if he was adjudicated a delinquent minor. 328 Ill. App. 3d 974, 976. Respondent acknowledged, however, that he had failed to file a post-admission or postdisposition motion pursuant to
Citing People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996), the appellate court held that a
ANALYSIS
This court recently held that
In the context of adult defendants, this court has stated that a
At issue in this case is the interpretation of the “condition precedent” language in Wilk. The State interprets the “condition precedent” language in Wilk as establishing that the failure to file a
In In re A.W., the appellate court relied on Wilk in holding that a juvenile‘s failure to file a motion to withdraw his admission of juvenile delinquency prior to filing his notice of appeal required dismissal of the appeal. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 474. The appellate court rejected the juvenile‘s attempt to distinguish Wilk on the ground that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to a hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, while a juvenile has no corresponding right. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475. The appellate court acknowledged that there was language in Wilk indicating that the holding in that case would not leave defendants without a remedy. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475. The court concluded, however, that the language was not central to the court‘s holding and dismissed the juvenile‘s appeal. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475.
In contrast, respondent argues in favor of the appellate court‘s interpretation of the “condition precedent” language in Wilk. As noted, the appellate court in this case relied upon People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996), in holding that a juvenile‘s failure to file a
Upon review, we find that the court in McKay was correct in its determination that Wilk and its progeny do not stand for the proposition that the filing of a
Moreover, as respondent argues, if the failure to comply with
Similarly, in People v. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d 378 (2002), this court again addressed the written motion requirement of
On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the appellate court had erred in denying his request to vacate his guilty plea. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 382. The
“[w]hile it is true this court does not approve of any failure to comply strictly with the explicitly stated requirements of Rule 604(d) (People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103 (1988)), the unusual and fact-specific circumstances found in this case lead us to believe that the ends of justice will be better served by permitting defendant leave to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court.” Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 382.
We therefore remanded the cause to the trial court to give the defendant an opportunity to file a motion to vacate his guilty plea. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 383-84.
The fact that this court has recognized exceptions to the written motion requirements of
“[t]he defendant, through no fault of his, is deprived of a right to be heard in the appellate court. Such assistance of counsel, coupled with the denial of appellate review, raises effective assistance of counsel constitutional questions. Furthermore, many of the grounds for withdrawal of guilty pleas, consideration of which is denied because of counsel‘s failure, themselves may raise constitutional questions.” Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 106.
We observed, however, that a defendant is not left without a remedy because the defendant can raise his claims in a postconviction petition.
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, however, has never been held to apply in juvenile proceedings. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 321-22 (“this court has not reviewed holdings of the appellate court concluding that relief from such [juvenile court] proceedings is unavailable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act“). Consequently, dismissing a juvenile defendant‘s appeal for failing to comply with the written motion requirements of
The State contends that juveniles would not be left without a remedy in this situation because they could present their claims in a section 2—1401 motion (
Because a juvenile does not have an adequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant to
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
I write separately to address the dissents’ related contentions that certain statements in the majority opinion are irreconcilably inconsistent and that the majority‘s conclusion is improperly based on the implicit assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. I believe that the statements can be reconciled and that our conclusion is supported by sound reasoning.
As the majority opinion states, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act has never been held to apply to juvenile proceedings. 206 Ill. 2d at 604. In the absence of such an affirmative holding, juvenile defendants necessarily face the possibility that no avenue of review exists for their claims, even when those claims allege constitutional violations. 206 Ill. 2d at 604. In this case, however, the State argues that section 2—1401 offers such an avenue. We explicitly reject that argument, holding that a juvenile cannot use a section 2—1401 motion to present a claim that trial counsel failed to comply with the mandates of
This last statement forms the basis for the dissenters’ contentions that the opinion is internally inconsistent because it both claims that the application of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act in juvenile cases is an open question and implicitly assumes that it does not apply. I believe these contentions are premised on an unduly loose interpretation of our statements and, thus, write separately to explain that the majority‘s conclusion, read in its proper context, does not suffer from a fatal flaw.
In this opinion, we recognize the absence of any hold
As for the dissenters’ contention that the majority should address the issue of whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juveniles in this case, I believe that our decision to decline that opportunity is well justified. The parties offer minimal argument on the issue. Indeed, as appellant, the State does not even raise the issue in its opening brief. Even more telling, the respondent‘s brief explicitly requests that we simply affirm the appellate court‘s remand, arguing that doing so would have the same effect as a decision on the merits of the substantive issue, plus have the additional benefits of serving the court‘s interest in judicial economy, and avoiding the potential for overburdening relatively uneducated juveniles with the filing of pro se postconviction petitions capable of surviving first stage review. Based on only this limited adversarial context, resolving an issue as important as the applicability of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act in juvenile proceedings would be premature and unwise. A question of such magnitude should be fully briefed and argued by opposing parties
CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join fully in Justice Freeman‘s partial concurrence and partial dissent. I write separately only to underscore the internal inconsistency in the majority‘s resolution of the appeal in the case at bar.
The majority concludes that “dismissal is too harsh a sanction for a juvenile defendant‘s failure to comply with Rule 604(d)” because “a juvenile does not have an adequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d).” 206 Ill. 2d at 605. Necessarily implicit in this conclusion is the determination that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. Otherwise there would be adequate means for a juvenile to present his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant to
However, only a few paragraphs earlier, the majority states that it is leaving as an open question whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. Quoting In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 321-22 (2001), the majority notes that ” ‘this court has not reviewed holdings of the appellate court concluding that relief from such [juvenile court] proceedings is unavailable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act’ ” and concludes that
If the question whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is truly an open one, as the majority claims, the majority should not be deciding this appeal as it does, based on the assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. As Justice Freeman points out, this court could just as readily assume that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does apply to juvenile proceedings. In so doing, however, the appeal in the case before us would necessarily be decided differently.
It should be apparent that resolution of the appeal in the case at bar is dependent on deciding whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. For this reason, the court has no discretion to avoid addressing the issue. The issue needs to be confronted head-on.
Like Justice Freeman, I concur in the majority‘s holding that a defendant‘s failure to comply with
JUSTICES FREEMAN and RARICK join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.
I agree with the majority‘s initial determination that a defendant‘s failure to comply with
ANALYSIS
In Wilk, in the context of criminal proceedings, this court considered what should be the effect of the defendants’ failure to comply with
“[A]n attorney who stands with his client in a criminal proceeding, hears the admonishments of the court required by Rule 605(b), and fails to adhere to Rule 604(d) by moving to withdraw the plea prior to filing a notice of appeal has fallen short of providing competent representation. *** The defendant, through no fault of his, is deprived of a right to be heard in the appellate court. Such assistance of counsel, coupled with the denial of appellate review, raises effective assistance of counsel constitutional questions. Furthermore, many of the grounds for withdrawal of guilty pleas, consideration of which is denied because of counsel‘s failure, themselves may raise constitutional questions.” Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 105-06.
This court also emphasized, however, the importance of
“[The] purpose [of Rule 604(d)] is to ensure that before a criminal appeal can be taken from a guilty plea, the trial judge who accepted the plea and imposed sentence be given the opportunity to hear the allegations of improprieties that took place outside the official proceedings and dehors the record, but nevertheless were unwittingly given sanction in the courtroom. Rule 604(d) provides for fact finding to take place at a time when witnesses are still available and memories are fresh. [Citation.] A hearing under Rule 604(d) allows a trial court to immediately correct any improper conduct or any errors of the trial court that may have produced a guilty plea.” Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 104.
The court then noted that exceptions to
“If the appellate court elects to retain jurisdiction of the appeal and considers the merits of the defendant‘s contentions, the rule has been ignored. If the appellate court remands the case for a motion to withdraw, to be filed and to be considered by the trial court, the case has taken a needless trip to the appellate court, wasted that court‘s time, extended the time within which the motion to withdraw must be filed under Rule 604(d), and attaches no consequences to the ignoring of the requirements of the rule of this court.” Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 106-07.
In the case at bar, as in Wilk, respondent‘s attorney failed to comply with
The appellate court recognized that whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is a crucial issue in this case. The court observed:
“Since the issue is one of waiver rather than jurisdiction, the question is not whether we can consider respondent‘s appeal but whether we should. Of course, if this were a criminal case Wilk would dictate dismissal, leaving the respondent to his remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ***.” (Emphases in original.) 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977.
The court then held that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Being aware, however, that by its holding the juvenile‘s claim of constitutional violations would escape scrutiny, the court advanced an alternate resolution of the case:
“Because a juvenile, unlike an adult offender, has no alternative means of presenting his claims, we believe it is appropriate to invoke Supreme Court Rule 615(a): ‘Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977-78.
The appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit court for strict compliance with
The majority opinion tracks the reasoning of the appellate court in determining that compliance with
“The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, however, has never been held to apply in juvenile proceedings. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 321-22 (2001) (‘this court has not reviewed holdings of the appellate court concluding that relief from such [juvenile court] proceedings is unavailable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act‘). Consequently, dismissing a juvenile defendant‘s appeal for failing to comply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d) may leave a juvenile without a remedy for his claims, including those claims alleging constitutional violations.” 206 Ill. 2d at 604.
Further, in rejecting the State‘s contention that a juvenile would not be left without a remedy but could resort to a section 2—1401 motion (
“Section 2—1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, does not provide a juvenile defendant with a remedy equivalent to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Although the remedial powers of section 2—1401 have been held to extend to criminal cases, such a motion is intended ‘to correct all errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to the petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered, which, if then known, would have prevented its rendition.’ [Citation.] A juvenile‘s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d) does not fall within those parameters.” 206 Ill. 2d at 604-05.
The majority concludes that:
“Because a juvenile does not have an adequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), we find that dismissal is too harsh a sanction for a juvenile defendant‘s failure to comply with Rule 604(d). We emphasize, however, that this court requires strict compliance with Rule 604(d) in both the juvenile and the adult context. We therefore hold that when a juvenile defendant fails to comply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d) prior to filing an appeal, the appellate court has no discretion and must remand the cause to the circuit court for strict compliance with Rule 604(d).” 206 Ill. 2d at 605.
With due respect, my colleagues of the majority err in that they make an assumption which affects the very outcome of this case. Consider the alternate assumption, that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. In that case, respondent, like the defendants in Wilk, has an adequate remedy for counsel‘s failure to comply with
I note that this court is entrusted with the responsibility for a just result and the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent. People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 379 (1993), quoting American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (1991), citing Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967). Where, as here, an issue of import is relevant to the final determination of the cause and is not yet decided by this court, the court is duty bound to consider the issue and arrive at a reasoned decision concerning the issue. The court should not assume, without analysis or authority, that the issue has been decided in a particular manner. Nor should the court divorce itself from its responsibility by observing that no other court has ever decided the issue in a particular manner. In the case at bar, this court is duty bound to consider whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. The court may not merely assume that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings.
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a remedy for a defendant who has suffered a substantial violation of his or her constitutional rights in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction. See
CONCLUSION
I cannot join fully in the majority opinion because the majority refuses to decide an important issue in the case at bar, and because the majority makes an assumption about that issue which controls the very outcome of the case. While I concur in the majority‘s holding that a defendant‘s failure to comply with
CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICE RARICK join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.