delivered the opinion of the Court.
Aрpellant, Stanley Weisenberger, was convicted by a jury in the district court of Montrose Cоunty of possession of marijuana. We reverse the conviction.
During the afternoon of January 25, 1971, Sheriff Gilmore of Montrose County and four other officers went to the farm of appellant, armed with a warrant which authorized the search of the “Residence of Stаnley Weisenberger, Olathe, Colorado.” The warrant was served upon appellаnt and, while Sheriff Gilmore and two of the officers searched appellant’s house, Undersheriff Weiszbrod and another officer searched some outbuildings, including a chicken house. No contraband was found in the house or the immediate outbuildings; however, a search of the chicken house uncovered three two-pound packages of marijuana, a number of plastic baggies containing marijuana, a wooden box containing marijuаna seeds, tops and stems, and three pipes. Also found was a Samsonite case containing a set of postal scales.
Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suрpress the evidence seized from the chicken house, upon the grounds that the affidavit was insufficient to authorize the issuance of the search warrant. After an evidentiary hеaring, the trial court concluded that “[t]he search warrant was issued on the basis of an аffidavit of very doubtful validity since it failed to set out the corroborative evidence in the knowledge of the sheriff.” The court found, however, that the chicken house was not within the сurtilage of the farm residence and the warrant did not apply to it. The court then cоncluded that *355 the officers had probable cause to search the chicken hоuse and that the warrantless search of the chicken house was not an unreasonable search. The motion to suppress the evidence seized was then denied. At trial, the motion to suppress was renewed and again denied.
The court’s findings, in our view, do not recite sufficient facts and circumstances from which a reasonable inference might bе drawn that appellant was secreting drugs in the outbuilding. Furthermore, assuming there was probablе cause, there were no attendant exigent circumstances which might otherwise authоrize a warrantless search in this case; as in the first instance, the officers felt comрelled to obtain a warrant before undertaking their search of appellant’s рremises.
In our view the court’s reliance on the curtilage doctrine was misplacеd. Even though the area of the search might have been outside the curtilage, nevertheless, if it was a place where the owner had a reasonable expectation of privacy, then it was a constitutionally protected area where warrаntless intrusions are forbidden under the federal and state constitutions.
Katz v. United States,
“* * * But this effort to decide whеther or not a given ‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects attention from the problem ■ presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment prоtects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to thе public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protectiоn. * * * But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessiblе to the public, may be constitutionally protected. * * *”
In. Katz, supra, petitioner was entitled to еxpect privacy in the telephone booth because of the private nаture of his business conducted therein.
The record reflects that the chicken house was in proximity to the Weisenberger home and was being put to an active domestic use. It hоused ten to fifteen laying hens and contained necessary feed and water for their maintenance.
*356
There was no public exposure of illicit activity being conducted in or about the chicken house.
Cf. Zamora v. People,
In light of these circumstances, we think it clear that apрellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this outbuilding. The warrantless intrusion upon it and the search and seizure of the items contained therein violated his rights undеr the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution.
In view of our disposition here, it is unnecessary to consider appellant’s other assignemnts of error.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.